More than 50% or Less than 70% Chance: Pragmatic Implications of Single‐Bound Probability Estimates

Probability estimates can be given as ranges or uncertainty intervals, where often only one of the interval bounds (lower or upper) is specified. For instance, a climate forecast can describe La Niña as having “more than 70% chance” or “less than 90% chance” of occurring. In three experiments, we studied how research participants perceived climate‐related forecasts expressed with lower‐bound (“over X% chance”) or upper‐bound (“under Y% chance”) probability statements. Results indicate that such single‐bound statements give pragmatic information in addition to the numeric probabilities they convey. First, the studies show that these statements are directional, leading the listeners' attention in opposite directions. “Over” statements guide attention towards the possible occurrence of the event and are explained by reasons for why it might happen, while “under” statements direct attention to its possible non‐occurrence and are more often explained by reasons for why the target event might not appear, corresponding to positive (it is possible) versus negative (it is uncertain) verbal probabilities. Second, boundaries were found to reveal the forecaster's beliefs and could be perceived as indicative of an increasing or a decreasing trend. Single‐bound probability estimates are therefore not neutral communications of probability level but might “leak” information about the speaker's expectations and about past and future developments of the forecast. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Evaluating the multiple proposition strategy

Contextualism about many expressions faces a common objection: in some discourses it appears that there is no single interpretation which can explain how a speaker is justified in making her assertion and how a hearer with different information or standards is justified in negatively evaluating what the speaker said. According to the Multiple Proposition Strategy, contextualists may attempt to explain these competing features pragmatically in terms of different propositions in play. In this paper I argue against the Multiple Proposition Strategy, first focusing on epistemic modals and then generalising the results to other expressions. I show how when purportedly contextualist terms are embedded in belief reports, we get similar problems but that the Multiple Proposition Strategy does not provide a satisfactory explanation of such cases. I suggest, therefore, that we reject the Multiple Proposition Strategy in favour of a theory that explains the unembedded and embedded cases in similar ways.     

学习不良儿童社会技能研究的语用视角

80年代以来,语用研究范式逐步为教育和发展心理学所采纳,并为进一步探索学习不良儿童社会技能的规律提供了崭新视角。在对语用的概念进行简要介绍后,对西方近20年有关学习不良儿童语用研究的主要成果从言语行为、语用灵活性、意图推理、指称交际和干预五个方面进行了概括和分析。最后,就语用对学习不良儿童社会技能研究的意义和存在的问题进行了讨论。     

Nonfallacious Rhetorical Strategies: Lyndon Johnson’s Daisy Ad

The traditional concepts of rhetorical strategy and argumentative fallacy cannot be readily reconciled. Doing so requires escaping the following argument: All argumentation involves rhetorical strategies. All rhetorical strategies are violations of logical or dialectical ideals. All violations of logical or dialectical ideals are fallacies. Normative pragmatics provides a perspective in which rhetorical strategies can be seen to have the potential for constructive contributions to argumentation and in which fallacies are not simply violations of ideals. One kind of constructive contribution, framing moves, is illustrated with the case of Lyndon Johnson’s 1964 TV campaign commercial known as the Daisy ad.     

Oneiric activity and the analytical process A semiotic perspective on Willy Baranger's theory of dreams1

This author reconsiders, from a semiotic perspective, the theoretical and technical ideas developed by Willy and Madeleine Baranger, especially W. Baranger's views on the function of dreams, the status of oneiric symbols and the further clinical‐technical use of dreams in the context of the intersubjective dynamic fi eld, together with the basic unconscious fantasy that emerges in the analytic situation. She attempts to relate the Barangers' ideas to others arising from Peirce's analytic semiotics that would support a triadic conceptualization of dreams. The need to incorporate a pragmatic view of communication and of the processes of production of sense as contributions to dream metapsychology and interpretation in the case of non‐neurotic patients is particularly emphasized. On the basis of the hypothesis of a described series of triads underlying the production and retelling of dreams, the acknowledgment of these produced/told dreams as intentional signs allows the presence of a continuous process of semiosis to be proposed. The author introduces clinical material to illustrate the communicative value of dreams through the textual analysis of the report and accompanying associations of three dreams. Such analysis takes a linguistic pragmatics approach that examines those aspects of meaning not accounted for by a restricted semantic theory.     

Infelicitous Cancellation: The Explicit Cancellability Test for Conversational Implicature Revisited

This paper questions the adequacy of the explicit cancellability test for conversational implicature as it is commonly understood. The standard way of understanding this test relies on two assumptions: first, that that one can test whether a certain content is (merely) conversationally implicated, by checking whether that content is cancellable, and second, that a cancellation is successful only if it results in a felicitous utterance. While I accept the first of these assumptions, I reject the second one. I argue that a cancellation can succeed even if it results in an infelicitous utterance, and that unless we take this possibility into account we run the risk of misdiagnosing philosophically significant cases.     

Different answers to different audiences: effects of social context on the accuracy-informativeness trade-off

Research on conversational exchanges shows that people attempt to optimise their responses’ relevance when they definitely know the correct answer (e.g., “What time is it?”). However, such certainty is often unavailable while speakers may still be under social pressure to provide an answer. We investigated how social context influences the informativeness level when answering questions under uncertainty. In three experiments, participants answered difficult general-knowledge questions placed in different social contexts (formal vs. informal). Participants generated their answers, then they were presented with a given context, and decided on the number of alternative responses they wanted to provide (single, with one alternative vs. plural, with several alternatives) and whether the answer should be reported or withheld (report option). Participants reported more answers in the informal context. In the formal context, single answers were preferred, and they were more frequently reported. We conclude that social context influences the level of informativeness in a conversation, affecting achievable accuracy. Our results also show the joint influence of the confidence and the social context on willingness to share information.     

Teaching by Convincing: Strategies of Argumentation in Lectures

The aim of this article is to show the argumentative component in the discourse of teachers. This is done on the basis of an analysis of the argumentative strategies used by teachers during the first class of a university course in order to increase their discourse efficiency. The analysis of the corpus studied shows that in such a session teachers use argumentative strategies in order to control the social distance which separates them from students. In doing so, they make a double movement, one of distancing and one of approximation, with the aim of achieving a balance which permits them to consolidate their authority in the eyes of the students and, at the same time, present an accessible and well-disposed image to them.     

Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontology

The democratic egalitarian ideal requires that everyone should enjoy equal power over the world through voting. If it is improper to vote twice in the same election, why should it be permissible for dual citizens to vote in two different places? Several possible excuses are considered and rejected.     

Think Before You Speak: Utterances and the Logic of Indexicals

This essay discusses some aspects of the logical behaviour of sentences in languages containing indexical and demonstrative expressions. After some preliminary remarks in section one, sections two and three focus on instances of logically true sentences that may be uttered falsely, and on cases of logically equivalent sentences whose utterances may have distinct truth-values. The logical and semantic problems taken into consideration include the validity of a Principle of Translation, the so-called puzzle of addressing, and examples related to measurement and approximation. Section four discusses the complementary phenomenon of sentences that may presumably always be uttered truly, but that do not qualify as logically true. In particular, I argue against the widespread tendency to consider I am here now or I exist as truths of the logic of indexicals.