论道德相对性及其道德实践意义——兼析道德相对主义

道德相对性表现为道德准则规范具有具体性、差异性和不确定性.道德相对性中渗透了道德绝对性即存在普遍的、共同的、不变的道德价值.道德相对主义的错误在于夸大相对性而否定了绝对性.但道德相对主义基于道德相对性的某些主张有一定的合理性.正确理解道德相对性在道德实践中有重要意义.个体道德自主性的提高,既要把握绝对的道德价值观念,同时需要把握道德的相对性以提高具体情境中道德判断和选择能力.     

道德建设:价值向度的迷失与回归

本文认为道德结构是规范向度和价值向度的内在统一,然而人们往往偏爱前者,忽视后者,造成了规范向度的膨胀和价值向度的迷失,因此本文着重从理论上对道德的价值向度及其功能作了阐释和论证,并对在道德建设中凸显价值向度的途径作了陈述和分析。     

论公共决策的优先性价值

公共决策关涉价值,且负荷优先性价值。在思想史的维度上,众多学者认同公平是公共决策的优先性价值。在学理层面上,公共决策的公共性和政府的服务性决定公平是公共决策的优先性价值。处于市场经济条件下的政府必须以公共决策的优先性价值为基础正确把握公平与效率的辩证关系。     

Must Differences in Cognitive Value be Transparent?

Frege’s ‘differential dubitability’ test is a test for differences in cognitive value: if one can rationally believe that p while simultaneously doubting that q, then the contents p and q amount to different ‘cognitive values’. If subject S is rational, does her simultaneous adoption of different attitudes towards p and q require that the difference between p and q (as cognitive values) be transparent to her? It is natural to think so. But I argue that, if attitude anti-individualism is true, then rational differential dubitability does not presuppose that differences in cognitive value are transparent. The significance of this argument lies in what it tells us, both about the notion of cognitive value and its relation to the differential dubitability test, but also about the prospects for a Burge-type position which aims to combine attitude anti-individualism with a (qualified) reliance on the differential dubitability test.

中国城区青少年对广告价值的评价:前因和后果

通过对北京市7所中学366名学生的调查,探讨了青少年对广告价值的评价以及何种因素影响青少年对广告价值的评价,广告价值的评价是否会进一步影响其决策等问题。运用AMOS 4.0建立结构方程模型对研究假设进行检验,结果表明：（1）青少年对广告价值的评价直接影响到他们的决策意图;（2）在探讨广告价值的影响因素时发现,对广告的知觉因素（信息性和娱乐性）和青少年对广告以及广告商的社会认知（观看广告的社会动机和对广告劝服技巧的认识）对广告价值的影响作用也十分显著,信息性、娱乐性与社会动机都对广告价值产生积极影响,而对广告劝服技巧的认识则对广告价值产生显著的负面影响     

计算机人格适应性测验的初始值估计研究

一般来说,对于计算机人格适应性测验（CAPT）,由于对被试每种人格特质的施测项目数比较少,初始值估计方法的好坏直接影响着被试人格特质水平估计的准确性。该研究提出利用被试特质水平与其人格特质自我评定信息的回归模型来获取被试人格特质水平的初始值。模拟数据的研究结果表明：新方法获得的初始值确实能够更准确的估计被试的特质水平。     

Can the West Save the East? Intrinsic Value and the Foundation of Chinese Environmental Ethics

Intrinsic value in nature is a key concept in professional environmental ethics literature in the West. Western scholars such as Holmes Rolston III and Paul Taylor argue that the philosophical foundation of environmental ethics should be based on the concept of intrinsic value in nature. Influenced by this concept, some influential Chinese environmental ethics scholars such as Yu Mouchang and Lu Feng argue that the foundation of environmental ethics in China should be based on the concept of intrinsic value in nature. This paper holds that the metaphysical, epistemological and ethical meaning of intrinsic value in nature is the legacy of Western philosophical traditions, which is in conflict with the Chinese philosophical traditions. Meanwile, the paper argues that the Daoist conception of living in harmony with nature can become the foundation for Chinese environmental ethics. The Daoist conception of living in harmony with nature is based on aesthetic appreciation of nature and people’s participation in the beauty of nature.     

Response rate correlates with indifference points in a delay‐discounting procedure

To study how effort affects reward value, we replicated Fortes, Vasconcelos and Machado's (2015) study using an adjusting‐delay task. Nine pigeons chose between a standard alternative that gave access to 4 s of food, after a 10 s delay, and an adjusting‐delay alternative that gave access to 12 s of food after a delay that changed dynamically with the pigeons' choices, decreasing when they preferred the standard alternative, and increasing when they preferred the adjusting alternative. The delay value at which preference stabilized defined the indifference point, a measure of reward value. To manipulate effort across phases, we varied the response rate required during the delay of the standard alternative. Results showed that a) the indifference point increased in the higher‐response‐rate phases, suggesting that reward value decreased with effort, and b) in the higher‐response‐rate phases, response rate in the standard alternative was linearly related to the indifference point. We advance several conceptions of how effort may change perceived delay or amount and thereby affect reward value.     

Explaining Evidence Denial as Motivated Pragmatically Rational Epistemic Irrationality

This paper introduces a model for evidence denial that explains this behavior as a manifestation of rationality, and it is based on the contention that social values (measurable as utilities) often underwrite these sorts of responses. Moreover, it contends that the value associated with group membership in particular can override epistemic reason when the expected utility of a belief or belief system is great. It is also true, however, that it appears to be the case that it is still possible for such unreasonable believers to reverse this sort of dogmatism and to change their beliefs in a way that is epistemically rational. The conjecture made here is that we should expect this to happen only when the expected utility of the beliefs in question dips below a threshold where the utility value of continued dogmatism and the associated group membership is no longer sufficient to motivate defusing the counterevidence that tells against such epistemically irrational beliefs.