Approximation of Value Efficient Solutions

We introduce an approximation set to the value efficient set in multiobjective problems under partial information on the decision maker's preferences modelled by a vector value function. We show monotonicity and convergence properties based on increasingly precise vector value functions with two components, which improve the approximation and might be a support to possible solution methods. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Personal Value,Biographical Identity,and Retrospective Attitudes

We all could have had better lives, yet often do not wish that our lives had gone differently, especially when we contemplate alternatives that vastly diverge from our actual life course. What, if anything, accounts for such conservative retrospective attitudes? I argue that the right answer involves the significance of our personal attachments and our biographical identity. I also examine other options, such as the absence of self-to-self connections across possible worlds and a general conservatism about value.     

The influence of number line estimation precision and numeracy on risky financial decision making

This study examined whether different aspects of mathematical proficiency influence one's ability to make adaptive financial decisions. “Numeracy” refers to the ability to process numerical and probabilistic information and is commonly reported as an important factor which contributes to financial decision‐making ability. The precision of mental number representation (MNR), measured with the number line estimation (NLE) task has been reported to be another critical factor. This study aimed to examine the contribution of these mathematical proficiencies while controlling for the influence of fluid intelligence, math anxiety and personality factors. In our decision‐making task, participants chose between two options offering probabilistic monetary gain or loss. Sensitivity to expected value was measured as an index for the ability to discriminate between optimal versus suboptimal options. Partial correlation and hierarchical regression analyses revealed that NLE precision better explained EV sensitivity compared to numeracy, after controlling for all covariates. These results suggest that individuals with more precise MNR are capable of making more rational financial decisions. We also propose that the measurement of “numeracy,” which is commonly used interchangeably with general mathematical proficiency, should include more diverse aspects of mathematical cognition including basic understanding of number magnitude.     

相对熟悉度和同音线索在谐音型歇后语理解中的作用

谐音型歇后语是汉语特殊的语汇表达形式, 对其加工常常需要通达后一语节的同音线索来完成语音、语义隐喻映射。本研究通过2个实验探讨相对熟悉度和同音线索类型对谐音型歇后语加工的作用。实验1结果表明, 在高熟悉度条件下, 被试对语汇的加工策略取决于歇后语的同音线索类型。当后一语节为同音字时, 加工较为快速; 当后一语节为谐音字时, 通达歇后语隐喻意义的路径受阻。对熟悉度较高的谐音型歇后语进行加工, 语义通达表现出预存性; 在缺乏同音线索的条件下, 语料加工时间较长, 反应准确率较低, 支持概念隐喻模型和概念合成假说。而对熟悉度较低的歇后语进行加工, 被试更倾向于采用即时(on-line)策略, 支持概念合成理论和基于心理模型的语用推理假说。实验2结果表明, 呈现“错误同音”线索对歇后语的加工形成干扰, 不支持概念合成理论和基于心理模型的语用推理理论。总的结果表明, 相对熟悉度和同音线索类型影响谐音型歇后语的通达, 谐音歇后语加工需要同时激活语音和语义两条通道。     

Forward inference in risky choice: Mapping gaze and decision processes

The study of cognitive processes is built on a close mapping between three components: overt gaze behavior, overt choice, and covert processes. To validate this overt–covert mapping in the domain of decision‐making, we collected eye‐movement data during decisions between risky gamble problems. Applying a forward inference paradigm, participants were instructed to use specific decision strategies to solve those gamble problems (maximizing expected values or applying different choice heuristics) during which gaze behavior was recorded. We revealed differences between overt behavior, as indicated by eye movements, and covert decision processes, instructed by the experimenter. However, our results show that the overt–covert mapping is for some eye‐movement measures not as close as expected by current decision theory, and hence question reverse inference as being prone to fallacies due to a violation of its prerequisite, that is, a close overt–covert mapping. We propose a framework to rehabilitate reverse inference.     

Is the victim Max (Planck) or Moritz? How victim type and social value orientation affect dishonest behavior

Does the potential victim of dishonest behavior—a family or a bank, a pensioner or an insurance firm—affect the propensity to engage in such behavior? We investigate the effect of victim type—an individual person or an impersonal institution—on dishonest behavior and test whether it interacts with potential perpetrators' social value orientation (prosocial or proself). In a between‐subjects design, we allowed experimental participants (N = 368) to misreport private information in order to increase (decrease) their profit (loss) at the expense of either another participant or the experimenter's budget. Both prosocials and proselfs engaged in dishonesty, but proselfs did so much more. Furthermore, prosocials reduced their dishonesty when the victim was another person, rather than an institution, but proselfs did not. A direct implication is that the dishonesty of prosocials may be curbed by increasing the salience of the adverse effect their dishonesty has on other individual people but that such interventions will not be effective for proselfs. In contrast with recent results, we did not find a general effect of increased dishonesty under a loss (vs. gain) frame.     

The relationship between attitudes toward suicide and willingness to pay for suicide prevention: a cross-sectional study in Japan

There are gaps in our knowledge of the role attitudes toward suicide play in determining people’s willingness to participate (WTP) for suicide prevention. We conducted a large nationwide cross-sectional study with the aim of clarifying the relationship between WTP for reducing suicide risk and attitudes toward suicide. Ordinal logistic regression analyses (n = 1771) showed that there were significant associations of WTP for suicide prevention with ‘Suicide as a right’ (β = ?.15, 95% CI: ?.25 to ?.04, p = .006), ‘Preventability/readiness to help’ (β = .81, 95% CI: .69–.94, p < .001) and ‘Common occurrence’ (β = .32, 95% CI: .19–.46, p < .001). ‘Incomprehensibility/unpredictability’ did not show an association with WTP. Taxpayer acceptance for suicide prevention is more likely to be achieved through provision of information that increases endorsement of ‘preventability/readiness to help’ and ‘common occurrence’ factors, and decreases ‘suicide as a right’ scores.     

The Relatively Infinite Value of the Environment

Some environmental ethicists and economists argue that attributing infinite value to the environment is a good way to represent an absolute obligation to protect it. Others argue against modelling the value of the environment in this way: the assignment of infinite value leads to immense technical and philosophical difficulties that undermine the environmentalist project. First, there is a problem of discrimination: saving a large region of habitat is better than saving a small region; yet if both outcomes have infinite value, then decision theory prescribes indifference. Second, there is a problem of swamping probabilities: an act with a small but positive probability of saving an endangered species appears to be on par with an act that has a high probability of achieving this outcome, since both have infinite expected value. Our paper shows that a relative (rather than absolute) concept of infinite value can be meaningfully defined, and provides a good model for securing the priority of the natural environment while avoiding the failures noted by sceptics about infinite value. Our claim is not that the relative infinity utility model gets every detail correct, but rather that it provides a rigorous philosophical framework for thinking about decisions affecting the environment.     

Philosophy Makes No Progress,So What Is the Point of It?

Philosophy makes no progress. It fails to do so in the way science and mathematics make progress. By “no progress” is meant that there is no successive advance of a well‐established body of knowledge—no views are definitively established or definitively refuted. Yet philosophers often talk and act as if the subject makes progress, and that its point and value lies in its doing so, while in fact they also approach the subject in ways that clearly contradict any claim to progress. This article presents evidence for, and a theoretical explanation of, the view that philosophy makes no progress, concluding with an account of what philosophy is and what the point and value of it is. Philosophy should not be shy about being what it is, nor should it pretend to be what it is not. What it is should be reflected in philosophizing and the way it is taught.