Stories as indicators of practical knowledge: Analysing project workers' talk from a study of participation in a youth inclusion programme

The paper deals with the issue of practical knowledge for enabling participation. Participation as a strategy for change is widespread in community, health and human service contexts. Research to date has focused on the mechanisms of beneficiaries' participation (e.g. identity, empowerment, activity, gender, space). However, participation as an engagement strategy is action oriented and requires high levels of interaction between those creating the conditions for participation and those participating. These conditions need to be continuously adjusted and outcomes are often unpredictable. This process of ‘working with’ is often dealt with as a technical issue and captured in metaphorical language. Less emphasis has been given to the type of knowledge modalities that might be necessary in order to enable participation. Drawing on an ethnographic case study of participation in a youth inclusion programme the paper explores the role of stories as potential indicators of practical knowledge. The paper argues that enabling young people's participation requires intuition and imagination, patience and perseverance, and judgement for acting under uncertainty. It concludes that stories only partially fulfil their potential as indicators of such knowledge modalities. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Ethos and Habituation in Aristotle

This paper is concerned with Aristotle’s theory of habituation, focusing on the following three issues: (1) the relation between habit and reason, (2) human nature and habituation, and (3) the roles of family and politics in habituation. Aristotle’s theory of habituation has been a topic of interest recently. Yet so far, most debates about this topic are about the first issue. This paper will bring in the second and the third issues, in order to provide a complete picture of the theory. To be more specific, the paper seeks to better understand the following three claims of Aristotle, corresponding to the three issues mentioned above: (1) “We become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts” (NE 1103a34–b1) . (2) “We are adapted by nature to receive virtues, and are made perfect by habit” (teleuioumenois de dia tou ethous) (1103a25–26). (3) “One’s own good cannot exist without household management, nor without a form of government” (1142a9–11).     

康德实践理性的事实概念及其对自由的证明

康德实践理性的事实概念指的是道德律或道德律的意识,而道德律本身实际上是道德律的意识。道德律是某种自身肯定的东西,它作为事实肯定了纯粹实践理性的客观实在性,并通过理性的这一积极的概念,证明了它自身在实践上的客观实在性。正是通过道德律这一事实,在思辨哲学那里只具有消极性的自由的原因性的概念,在实践哲学中获得了积极的规定,也成为了一个“事实”。     

康德哲学与企业文化

本文分析了中国当前企业文化的三种类型即官商、儒商和佛商,指出佛商流行于华南一带,是目前最有生机活力的一种企业文化,但这种生机活力是由于解构一切规范带来的,具有投机性,不具有积极建设性,对市场经济规律没有自觉意识,尤其对于赚钱的目的性不明确,背后受本能欲望的支配;康德哲学和西方基督教文化在这方面的启示是能够提供一种终极关怀,实践理性的道德自律为人的生存指明了一种理想目标。因此,当代企业文化的发展前景依赖于个人自由意志的确立和建立理性的规范,赚钱的目的应归结到完成自由人格。     

关于高校的实验与实践教学：基于教育心理学理论的思考

对于高校教育,运算学习方法多指实验、实践和学生科研活动,学生通过从事的实验、实践和科研活动来实现陈述性知识向程序性知识的转化,学习评价应着重考核学生对知识的理解和运用所学知识去解决问题的能力。本文阐述了突出实验／实践训练的高校教学设计的设想,并强调了应将各种教学实验类型有机地组合,给予学生先进、实用的实验技术的训练,以及在实验／实践教学中运用交互式的教学方法。     

Practical Reasons, Practical Rationality, Practical Wisdom

There are a number of proposals as to exactly how reasons, ends and rationality are related. It is often thought that practical reasons can be analyzed in terms of practical rationality, which, in turn, has something to do with the pursuit of ends. I want to argue against the conceptual priority of rationality and the pursuit of ends, and in favor of the conceptual priority of reasons. This case comes in two parts. I first argue for a new conception of ends by which all ends are had under the guise of reasons. I then articulate a sense of rationality, procedural rationality, that is connected with the pursuit of ends so conceived, where one is rational to the extent that one is motivated to act in accordance with reasons as they appear to be. Unfortunately, these conceptions of ends and procedural rationality are inadequate for building an account of practical reasons, though I try to explain why it is that the rational pursuit of ends generates intuitive but misleading accounts of genuine normative reasons. The crux of the problem is an insensitivity to an is-seems distinction, where procedural rationality concerns reasons as they appear, and what we are after is a substantive sense of rationality that concerns reasons as they are. Based on these distinct senses of rationality, and some disambiguation of what it is to have a reason, I offer a critique of internalist analyses of one’s reasons in terms of the motivational states of one’s ideal, procedurally rational self, and I offer an alternative analysis of one’s practical reasons in terms of practical wisdom that overcomes objections to related reasons externalist views. The resulting theory is roughly Humean about procedural rationality and roughly Aristotelian about reasons, capturing the core truths of both camps.

Gert on Subjective Practical Rationality

The purpose of this paper is to consider Joshua Gert’s novel view of subjective practical rationality in his book Brute Rationality. After briefly outlining the account, I present two objections to his view and then consider his own objections to a rival approach to understanding subjective rationality which I take to be much more plausible.

Not So Enticing Reasons

A common view of the relation between oughts and reasons is that you ought to do something if and only if that is what you have most reason to do. One challenge to this comes from what Jonathan Dancy calls ‘enticing reasons.’ Dancy argues that enticing reasons never contribute to oughts and that it is false that if the only reasons in play are enticing reasons then you ought to do what you have most reason to do. After explaining how enticing reasons supposedly work and why accepting them may appear attractive, I firstly show why we are not committed to accepting them into our conceptual framework and then argue that no reasons work in the way enticing reasons are claimed to. Thus we should reject the category of enticing reasons entirely.

大学生的自立人格与现实问题解决

为了探讨大学生的自立人格能否影响其现实问题解决的质量,对个人/人际高低分组的共30名大学生进行了现实问题解决访谈,结果发现:个人/人际自立高分组被试在访谈中解决个人/人际问题的质量显著高于低分组。为了探索自立人格与现实问题解决能力的关系,使用《青少年学生自立人格量表》和《大学生日常问题解决能力调查问卷》对101名有效被试进行了调查,结果发现:自立人格的多个维度都与日常问题解决能力的维度有显著相关,自立人格的多个相关维度是日常问题解决相关能力的有效预测变量。两个研究的结果支持了研究假设:自立人格利于个体对现实生活问题的解决;自立人格包含或涉及个体解决现实问题的能力因素。此外,自立人格影响现实生活问题解决的具体特点和机制还值得进一步研究。     

Temptation and Deliberation

There is a great deal of plausibility to the standard view that if one is rational and it is clear at the time of action that a certain move, say M₁, would serve one’s concerns better than any other available move, then one will, as a rational agent, opt for move M₁. Still, this view concerning rationality has been challenged at least in part because it seems to conflict with our considered judgments about what it is rational to do in cases of temptation that share the structure of Warren Quinn’s self-torturer case. I argue that there is a way to accomodate our considered judgments about the relevant cases of temptation without giving up the standard view or dismissing, as in some way rationally defective, the concerns of the agents in the relevant cases. My reasoning relies on the idea that, at least in some cases, whether an action serves one’s concerns well depends on what action(s) or course(s) of action it is part of. In the final section of the paper, I explain how this idea sheds light on an important source of frustration in collective decision-making.