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31.
Hrishikesh Joshi 《Philosophical explorations》2017,20(1):70-87
This paper explores some key commitments of the idea that it can be rational to do what you believe you ought not to do. I suggest that there is a prima facie tension between this idea and certain plausible coherence constraints on rational agency. I propose a way to resolve this tension. While akratic agents are always irrational, they are not always practically irrational, as many authors assume. Rather, “inverse” akratics like Huck Finn fail in a distinctively theoretical way. What explains why akratic agents are always either theoretically or practically irrational? I suggest that this is true because an agent’s total evidence determines both the beliefs and the intentions it is rational for her to have. Moreover, an agent’s evidence does so in a way such that it is never rational for the agent to at once believe that she ought to Φ and lack the intention to Φ. 相似文献
32.
This research focused on personal practical theories of Finnish student teachers, on how they argued for them and what they contained, and the data were analysed using Korthagen’s ‘onion’ model of reflection (e.g. 2004). The framework of this research consists of reflection and personal practical theories (PPTs). Personal practical theories are viewed as important for a teacher’s identity: they guide the teacher’s work, action, and reactions before, during, and after a teaching event. Reflecting on teaching, then again, has been one of the most significant issues and focus of numerous studies for several decades. This is a case study of six elementary school student teachers, who had constructed their PPTs before the practicum. We examined their reflections using the onion model of reflection, according to which a person reflects on different levels. The data were collected by interviewing the student teachers after their final practicum. The results show that most of their reflection focused on Environment and Behaviour, so it was located mostly in the outer layers of the onion model. The categorization of the reflection also showed that Competence was the smallest category. 相似文献
33.
Caroline T. Arruda 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2017,95(3):488-504
The question ‘Why care about being an agent?’ asks for reasons to be something that appears to be non-optional. But perhaps it is closer to the question ‘Why be moral?’; or so I shall argue. Here the constitutivist answer—that we cannot help but have this aim—seems to be the best answer available. I suggest that, regardless of whether constitutivism is true, it is an incomplete answer. I argue that we should instead answer the question by looking at our evaluative commitments to the exercise of our other capacities for which being a full-blown agent is a necessary condition. Thus, the only kind of reason available is hypothetical rather than categorical. The status of this reason may seem to undermine the importance of this answer. I show, however, that it both achieves much of what we want when we cite categorical reasons and highlights why agency is valuable. 相似文献
34.
Niklas Forsberg 《Metaphilosophy》2017,48(1-2):30-46
What is it we do when we philosophize about a word? How are we to act as we ask the philosophical question par excellence, “What is … ?” These questions are addressed here with particular focus on Troy Jollimore's Love's Vision and contemporary theories of love. Jollimore's rationalist account of love, based on a specific understanding of “reasons for love,” illustrates a particular philosophical mistake: When we think about a word, we are prone to believe that even though “the sense of the word” that we investigate may be up for grabs, the other words we use when we do these investigations are not. Jollimore's exploration of love is guided by specific conceptions of “reasons” and “rationality” that remain unquestioned. The article argues that we may have to rethink a great number of words as we embark on the task of uncovering the sense of one word. 相似文献
35.
Voin Milevski 《Philosophical Psychology》2017,30(1-2):44-57
The unconditional version of motivational internalism says that if an agent sincerely judges that to φ in circumstances C is the best option available to her, then, as a matter of conceptual necessity, she will be motivated to φ in C. This position faces a powerful counterargument according to which it is possible for various cases of practical irrationality to completely defeat an agent’s moral motivation while, at the same time, leaving her appreciation of her moral reasons intact. In this paper, I will argue that weakness of will, as the paradigmatic case of practical irrationality, and all other cases of practical irrationality that feature in standard formulations of this argument do not represent genuine counterexamples to this version of motivational internalism. In this sense, the main aim of this paper is to show that proponents of this internalist position are well justified in their denial of the claim that there are people who are completely unmotivated by their judgments about what is the best option available to them. 相似文献
36.
医疗暴力的危害、原因及对策 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
医疗暴力事件严重干扰医院正常诊疗秩序,给医疗服务带来许多负面影响,是急待解决的一个重要问题。介绍了部分国内外有关医疗暴力的报道,分析其危害及产生的原因,并提出相关对策。 相似文献
37.
Jonathan E. Adler 《Argumentation》2004,18(3):279-293
Is there a duty to respond to objections in order to present a good argument? Ralph Johnson argues that there is such a duty, which he refers to as the “dialectical tier“ of an argument. I deny the (alleged) duty primarily on grounds that it would exert too great a demand on arguers, harming argumentation practices. The valuable aim of responding to objections, which Johnson 's dialectical tier is meant to satisfy, can be achieved in better ways, as argumentation is a social-epistemic activity. 相似文献
38.
应用Markov模型进行临床决策分析的思考 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
应用模型进行临床决策分析的研究日益增多,Markov模型就是近年来用于临床决策分析的一种.它优于传统的决策树分析方法,能应用于疾病预后影响因素的研究、筛查试验的评价、疾病治疗结局预测、纵向生命质量资料分析等多个方面.Markov模型用于临床决策分析,是创新思维的体现,是实事求是的典范,体现了认识的辩证过程. 相似文献
39.
以中国古代外伤止血技术为例,从医学发展进程的角度,比较东、西方止血技术发展的差异,分析外伤止血方法发展缓慢的原因,据此提出加快发展中医药现代化进程的若干建议. 相似文献
40.
Pekka Väyrynen 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2004,7(1):53-79
This paper addresses a recent suggestion that moral particularists can extend their view to countenance default reasons (at
a first stab, reasons that are pro tanto unless undermined) by relying on certain background expectations of normality. I
first argue that normality must be understood non-extensionally. Thus if default reasons rest on normality claims, those claims
won't bestow upon default reasons any definite degree of extensional generality. Their generality depends rather on the contingent
distributional aspects of the world, which no theory of reasons should purport to settle. Appeals to default reasons cannot
therefore uniquely support particularism. But this argument also implies that if moral generalism entailed that moral reasons
by necessity have invariant valence (in the natural extensional sense), it would be a non-starter. Since generalism is not
a non-starter, my argument forces us to rethink the parameters of the generalism-particularism debate. Here I propose to clarify
the debate by focusing on its modal rather than extensional aspects. In closing, I outline the sort of generalism that I think is motivated by my discussion,
and then articulate some worries this view raises about the theoretical usefulness of the label ‘default reason’. 相似文献