An Unfinished Debate: What Are the Aims of Religion and Science?

I discuss the kinds of fundamental questions that must be addressed by people who develop theories about how religion and science are (or should be) related. After categorizing these questions as axiological, epistemological, ontological, or semantic, I focus on those that concern the goals of religion and science (the axiological issues). By distinguishing between epistemic and practical goals, individual and collective goals, and manifest and latent goals, I identify seven axiological questions. The various answers that religion/science theorists give or presuppose to these axiological questions help to explain why such deep, ongoing differences continue among them.     

SCIENTISM, INTERPRETATION, AND CRITICISM

Abstract. What is the relationship between natural science, social science, and religion? The dominant paradigm in contemporary social science is scientism, the attempt to apply the methods of natural science to the study of society. However, scientism is problematic: it rests on a conception of natural science that cannot be sustained. Natural scientific understanding emerges from an instrumental and objectifying relation to the world; it is oriented toward control and manipulation of the physical world. Social-scientific understanding, by contrast, must begin with a practical and meaningful relation to the world: it is oriented toward the mediation of values and objective possibilities in the social world. Social science is therefore a form of practical reason based on objective claims. But while social-scientific understanding starts with interpretation, its possibilities by no means end there. In particular, by developing abstract and objectified models of society as a system, social science opens existing social organization to critical reflection. Religion, by contrast, is a form of speculative reason about ultimate values, based on subjective claims of religious experience. Social science nevertheless shares with religion an orientation toward values and concern with the “good life.”     

Rhétorique et dialectique chez Aristote

Rhetoric and dialectic are two distinct circles, but in intersection. Rhetoric is an application (among others) of the dialectic to public debates. The dialectic is then the intellectual tool of rhetoric, distinct from its emotive means of persuading. But each of them can be antistrophos to the other one because both of them belong to the same sublunar world, our world. Such is Aristotle's answer, both to the sophists and to Plato.

     

Sentimentalist Practical Reason and Self-Sacrifice

ABSTRACT

For obvious reasons sentimentalists have been hesitant to offer accounts of moral reasons for action: the whole idea at least initially smacks of rationalist notions of morality. But the sentimentalist can seek to reduce practical to sentimentalist considerations and that is what the present paper attempts to do. Prudential reasons can be identified with the normal emotional/motivational responses people feel in situations that threaten them or offer them opportunities to attain what they need. And in the most basic cases altruistic/moral reasons involve the empathic transfer of one person’s prudential reasons and emotions to another person or persons who can help them. Practical/moral reasons for self-sacrifice also depend on empathic transfer and can vary in strength with the strength of the transfer.     

Hume’s better argument for motivational skepticism

On a standard interpretation, Hume argued that reason is not practical, because its operations are limited to “demonstration” and “probability.” But recent critics claim that by limiting reason’s operations to only these two, his argument begs the question. Despite this, a better argument for motivational skepticism can be found in Hume’s text, one that emphasizes reason’s inability to generate motive force against contrary desires or passions. Nothing can oppose an impulse but a contrary impulse, Hume believed, and reason cannot generate an impulse. This better argument is here developed and defended. Two lines of objection to it can be anticipated: (1) that reason actually can generate impulsive force, based on contents of its normative judgments and (2) that reason neither can nor needs to generate an impulse, since the actions of rational agents are not determined by forceful impulses of desire, as Hume supposed. These objections are answered by pointing out their unsatisfying consequences.     

Clarifying Amateurism: A Logical Approach to Resolving the Exploitation of College Athletes Dilemma

In this paper we investigate the logical consequences of the common understanding of amateurism in the context of big-time US college athletics, and in so doing, illustrate a method based on linguistic analysis and logic. The initial thrust of the paper centres on the term ‘amateur’ as presupposed by the late Professor Brand in his attempt to justify the ‘business’ of NCAA-sponsored Division I sports by decoupling the ‘participants from the enterprise’. Next, we examine a more rigorous definition of the term ‘amateur’ in order to show more clearly the difficulties posed by the current situation in college athletics. Additionally, our use of linguistic analysis exposes a flaw in the NCAA's recent move to amend by-law 12.02 in an attempt to avoid the charge of exploitation. Lastly, we put forth a new proposal for better dealing with the central issues swirling around the NCAA as it strives to formulate sound policy at this ‘tectonic’ juncture of players, fans, college programmes and academic integrity.     

On Ultrafilter Logic and Special Functions

Logics for generally were introduced for handling assertions with vague notions,such as generally, most, several, etc., by generalized quantifiers, ultrafilter logic being an interesting case. Here, we show that ultrafilter logic can be faithfully embedded into a first-order theory of certain functions, called coherent. We also use generic functions (akin to Skolem functions) to enable elimination of the generalized quantifier. These devices permit using methods for classical first-order logic to reason about consequence in ultrafilter logic.Presented by André Fuhrmann     

History and Method of Charles V. Gerkin’s Pastoral Theology: Toward an Identity-Embodied and Community-Embedded Pastoral Theology,Part II. Method

The purpose of this article is to explore the legacy of Charles V. Gerkin’s pastoral theology and to construct a method of pastoral theology. In Part I, I will trace within a larger context of pastoral theology the history of Gerkin’s pastoral theology since his early clinical praxis. In Part II, I will explore his method of developing pastoral theology and construct a renewed critical and constructive method of pastoral theology, reflecting on the implications of exploring the history and method of his pastoral theology.     

数学证明:数学真理的来源?

对于一个数学实在论者来说,一个特别急迫的任务是回答数学证明是如何建立起关于数学对象的真理性问题。本文批判性考察由Resnik所提出的认知解答,指出了其中不成立的前提。并且在此基础上提出我们自己的解答,它是基于由Oliver．G所提倡的方面(aspects)概念而来的社会——论辩方案。