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261.
Robert Francescotti 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(1):69-81
Olson (1997a) tries to refute the Psychological Approach to personal identity with his Fetus Argument, and Mackie (1999) aims to do the same with the Death Argument. With the help of a suggestion made by Baker (1999), the following discussion shows that these arguments fail. In the process of defending the Psychological Approach, it is made clear exactly what one is and is not committed to as a proponent of the theory. 相似文献
262.
Anthony Simon Laden 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(1):19-40
Standard discussions of prudence treat it as requiring time-slice management. That this is the standard view of prudence can be seen by its presence in two seemingly opposed positions on prudence, those of Thomas Nagel and Derek Parfit. I argue that this kind of view fails to properly appreciate the difficulty with being prudent, treating imprudence as a kind of theoretical mistake. I then offer a characterization of prudence as integrity, the holding together of disparate but temporally extended parts of the self in a manner that makes the act of reasoning possible. 相似文献
263.
Halvor Nordby 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(1):55-70
Tyler Burge has argued that an incorrect understanding of a word can be sufficient for possessing the concept the word literally expresses. His well-known ‘arthritis’ case involves a patient who understands ‘arthritis’ incorrectly, but who nevertheless, according to Burge, possesses the concept arthritis. Critics of Burge have objected that there is an alternative concept that best matches the patient's understanding and that this, therefore, is the patient's concept. The paper first argues that Burge's response to this objection is unconvincing. A better response is then developed. It is argued that there is no alternative concept that matches the incorrect understanding, since the patient thinks he has a partial understanding. This, together with points about ordinary psychological explanation and modes of presentations of concepts, establish that it is impossible to undermine Burge's social externalism by appealing to the idea that an alternative concept matches the incorrect understanding. 相似文献
264.
Edmund Henden 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(3):295-308
Suppose an agent has made a judgement of the form, ‘all things considered, it would be better for me to do a rather than b (or any range of alternatives to doing a)’ where a and b stand for particular actions. If she does not act upon her judgement in these circumstances would that be a failure of rationality on her part? In this paper I consider two different interpretations of all things considered judgements which give different answers to this question, one suggested by Donald Davidson, the other by Paul Grice and Judith Baker. I argue that neither interpretation is adequate. However, a third interpretation that combines features of the Grice/Baker view with the Davidsonian view is possible. In the final section of the paper I defend this interpretation against two objections. 相似文献
265.
Ran Lanzet 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(3):589-604
A finite chain of valid arguments can never lead from truth to falsehood. Call this the concatenation principle, or CP. Some propose to reject CP in response to the sorites paradox. I offer a justification of a restricted version of CP based on intuitively-appealing principles, all of which are already assumed in mathematics. The restricted version excludes soritical cases, but covers intuitively correct applications of CP in mathematics and elsewhere. The upshot is that the cost of rejecting the unrestricted CP is much lower than is often assumed. 相似文献
266.
Christopher Cowie 《Metaphilosophy》2015,46(4-5):605-619
Metaethicists typically develop and assess their theories—in part—on the basis of the consistency of those theories with “ordinary” first‐order normative judgment. They are, in this sense, “methodologically conservative.” This article shows that this methodologically conservative approach obstructs a proper assessment of the debate between internalists and externalists. Specifically, it obstructs one of the most promising readings of internalism. This is a reading—owed to Bernard Williams—in which internalism is part of a practically and politically motivated revision of the assessment of action. The article uses this case study to highlight the role of methodological conservatism in contemporary metaethics more generally. 相似文献
267.
Jeff Behrends 《Canadian journal of philosophy》2015,45(2):159-178
Source Hybridism about practical reasons is the position that facts that constitute reasons sometimes derive their normative force from external metaphysical grounds, and sometimes from internal. Although historically less popular than either Source Internalism or Source Externalism, hybridism has lately begun to garner more attention. Here, I further the hybridist's cause by defending Source Hybridism from three objections. I argue that we are not warranted in rejecting hybridism for any of the following reasons: that hybridists cannot provide an account of normative weight, that hybridists are committed to implausible results concerning practical deliberation, or that Source Hybridism is objectionably unparsimonious. 相似文献
268.
Carla A. Grosch-Miller 《Theology & Sexuality》2014,20(3):188-202
AbstractEach of us has lived sexual experience that gives us embodied knowledge. This embodied knowledge is a primary source for the creation of practical sexual wisdom. We learn by doing, bumping up against others and mining the consequences to create a personal ethic. Grace accompanies us along the way. In this article a model of sexual-spiritual integration is proposed in which embodied knowledge is in critical-liminal conversation with other sources of knowledge to create practical sexual wisdom in a poetic and phronetic process. Such integration is an example of the moral creativity of the human being and derives from the function of sexuality in the person, the story-telling tendency of the brain to create identity, and the narrative intelligibility of human life. Implications for theological education (providing safe space, information, and invitations to critical and liminal reflection) are briefly discussed before particular graces (desire, vulnerability, honesty and wrestling) are explored and illustrated by stories and poems. 相似文献
269.
270.