Metadialogues for Resolving Burden of Proof Disputes

In this paper, a solution to the problem of analyzing burden of proof in argumentation is developed by building on the pioneering work of Erik C. W. Krabbe on metadialogues. Three classic cases of burden of proof disputes are analyzed, showing how metadialogue theory can solve the problems they pose. The solution is based on five dialectical requirements: (1) global burden of proof needs to be set at the confrontation stage of a dialogue, (2) there need to be special mechanisms for resolving disputes about burden of proof at all four stages of the dialogue, (3) they are especially significant during the argumentation stage, where burden of proof often shifts back and forth at each move, (4) such local shifts need to be partly regulated by the global burden of proof already set, and (5) the connection between burden of proof and the speech act of making a presumption in a dialogue needs to be clarified.     

A Universally Particular Psychology? A Feminist Practical Theological Exploration of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Indigenous and Cultural Psychology</Emphasis>

The newly published volume, “Indigenous and Cultural Psychology: Understanding People in Context” (2006) seeks to further understandings of human behavior with an indigenous psychology that places culture and context in the foreground of its methods, practices, and analysis. As such it represents a significant development in its field, and is important to practical theologians with their attention to context, culture, and the lived religious practices of persons and communities. This article offers a critical review of the book from the standpoint of feminist practical theology, in an effort to further and support the agenda of indigenous psychology. After describing the importance of indigenous psychology for the work of practical theologians, I consider the volume’s chapter on indigenous Filipino psychology (chapter five by Rogelia Pe-Pua) as paradigmatic of the strengths of an indigenous approach put forward in the larger volume. Last, I critically consider two key paradoxical tensions present in the volume’s articulation of indigenous psychology: the tension between universality and particularity, and the tension between indigeneity and critical gender analysis.     

论心理健康素质

心理健康素质是在素质教育和心理健康教育研究基础上提出的一个新概念。本文主要探讨了心理健康素质问题研究的实践意义和理论基础;构建了心理健康素质的框架结构,解释了心理健康素质的内容,要素及其涵义;并对心理健康素质的影响因素作了简单阐释。     

Strengthening scientific verbal behavior: an experimental comparison of progressively prompted and unprompted programmed instruction and prose tutorials

Web-based software was used to deliver and record the effects of programmed instruction that progressively added formal prompts until attempts were successful, programmed instruction with one attempt, and prose tutorials. Error-contingent progressive prompting took significantly longer than programmed instruction and prose. Both forms of programmed instruction substantially increased the appropriate use of behavioral vocabulary during subsequent interpretive essays. These behavioral gains extended to a different setting, suggesting that more was being learned than simply how to answer programmed tutorial frames correctly.     

Tragic Dilemmas and the Priority of the Moral

My purpose in this paper is to argue that we are not vulnerableto inescapable wrongdoing occasioned by tragic dilemmas. I directmy argument to those who are most inclined to accept tragicdilemmas: those of broadly Nietzschean inclination who reject``modern moral philosophy' in favor of the ethical ideas of theclassical Greeks. Two important features of their project are todeny the usefulness of the ``moral/nonmoral distinction,' and todeny that what are usually classified as moral reasons always oreven characteristically ``trump' nonmoral reasons in anadmirable agent's deliberations.I show critics of modern moral philosophy such as BernardWilliams that their acceptance of tragic dilemmas underminestheir project of denying the moral/nonmoral distinction and thepriority of moral reasons. The possibility of tragic dilemmasrequires an account of practical deliberation in which moralreasons appear as already in-force obligations, with blame andguilt ready to be invoked, while nonmoral reasons appear as merereasons. This makes moral reasons importantly different fromnonmoral reasons in how they achieve their deliberative weight,and also makes them characteristically weightier. Thus,accommodating tragic dilemmas reinforces the moral/nonmoraldistinction and the priority of moral reasons, the very thingsthese critics want to deny. By accepting the possibility oftragic dilemmas, these critics are undermining their own project.The standard normative theories are dead set against tragicdilemmas, and the critics of modern moral philosophy shouldreject tragic dilemmas for the good of their project. Thus we allshould reject tragic dilemmas.     

The Idea of a Proof-Theoretic Semantics and the Meaning of the Logical Operations

This is a purely conceptual paper. It aims at presenting and putting into perspective the idea of a proof-theoretic semantics of the logical operations. The first section briefly surveys various semantic paradigms, and Section 2 focuses on one particular paradigm, namely the proof-theoretic semantics of the logical operations. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Reductionism in Fallacy Theory

(1) The aim of the paper is to develop a reduction of fallacy theory, i.e. to 'deduce' fallacy theory from a positive theory of argumentation which provides exact criteria for valid and adequate argumentation. Such reductionism has several advantages compared to an unsystematic action, which is quite usual in current fallacy but which at least in part is due to the poor state of positive argumentation theory itself. (2) After defining 'fallacy' (3) some principle ideas and (4) the exact criteria for (argumentatively) valid and adequate arguments of the 'practical theory of argumentation' of the author are expounded. These criteria will be used as the positive basis for the following reduction. (5) In the main part of the paper a systematization, definition and explanation of the main types and many subforms of fallacies of argumentative validity and (6) adequacy is developed, following the list of positive conditions of validity and adequacy. In addition to many new types of fallacies, this systematization contains the most important of the traditionally known and named fallacies; these are explained and the criteria for some of them are corrected or put more precisely.     

Knowledge,reasoning, and deliberation

Epistemologists have become increasingly interested in the practical role of knowledge. One prominent principle, which I call PREMISE, states that if you know that p, then you are justified in using p as a premise in your reasoning. In response, a number of critics have proposed a variety of counter-examples. In order to evaluate these problem cases, we need to consider the broader context in which this principle is situated by specifying in greater detail the types of activity that the principle governs. I argue that if PREMISE is interpreted as governing deductive reasoning, then the examples lose their force. In addition, I consider the cases, discussed by Keith DeRose, where the subject is in more than one practical context at the same time. In order to account for these latter cases, we need to further specify the scope of PREMISE. I distinguish two ways of understanding PREMISE, as a knowledge-action principle and as a knowledge-deliberation principle. I conclude by arguing for the knowledge-deliberation version of the principle and by exploring what this principle says about the practical role of knowledge.     

WHY PRACTICE PHILOSOPHY AS A WAY OF LIFE?

This essay explains why there are good reasons to practice philosophy as a way of life. The argument begins with the assumption that we should live well but that our understanding of how to live well can be mistaken. Philosophical reason and reflection can help correct these mistakes. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that philosophical reasoning often fails to change our dispositions and behavior. Drawing on the work of Pierre Hadot, the essay claims that spiritual exercises and communal engagement mitigate the factors that prevent us from living in accordance with our conceptions of the good life. So, many of us have reasons to engage in philosophical reasoning along with behavioral, cognitive, and social strategies to alter our behavior and attitudes so that they’re in line with our philosophical commitments. In these respects, many of us should practice philosophy as a way of life.