Desires, Whims and Values

Neo-Humean instrumentalists hold that anagent's reasons for acting are grounded in theagent's desires. Numerous objections have beenleveled against this view, but the mostcompelling concerns the problem of ``aliendesires' – desires with which the agent doesnot identify. The standard version ofneo-Humeanism holds that these desires, likeany others, generate reasons for acting. Avariant of neo-Humeanism that grounds anagent's reasons on her values, rather than allof her desires, avoids this implication, but atthe cost of denying that we have reasons to acton innocent whims. A version of neo-Humeanismthat holds that an agent has reason to satisfyall of her desires that are not in conflictwith her values appears to allow us to grantthe reason-giving force of innocent whims whiledenying the reason-giving force of alien desires.     

Might Intentions be the Only Source of Practical Imperatives?

I focus on the broadly instrumentalist view that all genuine practical imperatives are hypothetical imperatives and all genuine practical deliberation is deliberation from existing motivations. After indicating why I see instrumentalism as highly plausible, I argue that the most popular version of instrumentalism, according to which genuine practical imperatives can take desires as their starting point, is problematic. I then provide a limited defense of what I see as a more radical but also more compelling version of instrumentalism. According to the position I defend, genuine practical deliberation and genuine practical imperatives take as their starting point the agent's intentions and only the agent's intentions.Given my loose usage, the Humean position Bernard Williams defends in his seminal article “Internal and External Reasons” (1981) counts as a version of instrumentalism about practical reason, since it incorporates the idea that every genuine practical imperative takes as its starting point some existing motivation(s) of the agent. It deviates from strict instrumentalism in that it leaves room for specificationist reasoning (reasoning aimed at moving from general ends to specific ends) in addition to means-end reasoning. For example, it leaves room for practical reasoning that is focused on “finding constitutive solutions, such as deciding what would make for an entertaining evening, granted that one wants entertainment” or on “thinking how the satisfaction of elements in [one's subjective motivational set] can be combined, e.g. by time-ordering” (Williams, 1981, p. 104).     

举证责任倒置对医疗纠纷诉讼的影响

举证责任倒置是一般举证责任原则的例外,在医疗纠纷诉讼中施行举证责任倒置的法理依据。主要是医患双方的诉讼地位不平等和医患双方的信息不对称,导致患方举证困难,实施新的举证规则后,必将会对医疗纠纷诉讼产生一系列的影响,医方对此要有深刻的认识并积极研究其对策。     

Practical Reason and the Stability Standard

Practical reasoning, reasoning about what to do, is a very familiar activity. When we think about whether to cook or to go out for dinner, to buy a house or rent, or to study law or business, we are engaged in practical reasoning. If the kind of reasoning we engage in is truly a rational process, there must be some norms or standards that govern it; the process cannot be arbitrary or random. In this paper I argue that one of the standards that governs practical reasoning is the stability standard. The stability standard, I argue, is a norm that is constitutive of practical reasoning: insofar as we do not take violations of this norm to be relevant considerations, we do not count as engaged in reasoning at all. Furthermore, I argue that it is a standard we can explicitly employ in order to deliberate about our ends or desires themselves. Importantly, this standard will not require that some ends are prescribed or determined by reason alone. The stability standard, therefore, allows us to retain some of the attractive features of instrumentalism without accepting the implication that there is no rational way to evaluate ends.     

Knowledge-How,Abilities, and Questions

The debate about the nature of knowledge-how is standardly thought to be divided between intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of propositional knowledge, and anti-intellectualist views, which take knowledge-how to be a kind of ability. In this paper, I explore a compromise position—the interrogative capacity view—which claims that knowing how to do something is a certain kind of ability to generate answers to the question of how to do it. This view combines the intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how is a relation to a set of propositions with the anti-intellectualist thesis that knowledge-how is a kind of ability. I argue that this view combines the positive features of both intellectualism and anti-intellectualism.     

Caribbean Women's Empowerment

This article focuses on the necessity for theological education and theological participation for women in the Caribbean to be formally trained to participate in the restructuring and developing of any institutional programmes and training regarding theological education.     

Temporal Creation and Cosmological Arguments in Early-Modern Calvinism

This study examines the varieties of cosmological arguments deployed in the natural theologies of early-modern Calvinism. Some of the first Reformed forays into theistic proofs make use of Thomist arguments which allow for the logical possibility of creation from eternity. In the seventeenth century, many Reformed theologians prefer to use arguments against the possibility of an eternal world – arguments which had been defended by medieval theologians such as Bonaventure. But these arguments in turn faced criticism in the seventeenth century, and many of the Reformed supplemented them or replaced them with others. The argument from the mutability of the world to its temporal beginning became increasingly popular among Reformed thinkers. Historical arguments from the recent rise of arts and sciences or biological species supplemented the philosophical arguments for the world's beginning. Their theological commitment to the impossibility of eternal creation may explain why the Reformed did not typically use the Clarke and Leibniz argument from contingency.     

从矛盾辩证法到和谐辩证法 --辩证法的历史变迁

本文构建社会主义和谐社会的最新提法为契机,系统地考察了自黑格尔以来辩证法在马克思主义视域中的历史变迁,提出了与和谐社会相适应的和谐辩证法的新概念。和谐辩证法是对矛盾辩证法的继承和发展,是时代精神和建设中国特色社会主义实践的深厚的思想积淀,承认对立面的肯定因素、实现对立面的结合和双赢等是和谐辩证法的基本内涵。     

Reasons and Value – in Defence of the Buck-Passing Account

In this article, I will defend the so-called buck-passing theory of value. According to this theory, claims about the value of an object refer to the reason-providing properties of the object. The concept of value can thus be analyzed in terms of reasons and the properties of objects that provide them for us. Reasons in this context are considerations that count in favour of certain attitudes. There are four other possibilities of how the connection between reasons and value might be formulated. For example, we can claim that value is a property that provides us with reasons to choose an option that has this property. I argue that none of these four other options can ultimately be defended, and therefore the buck-passing account is the one we ought to accept as the correct one. The case for the buck-passing account becomes even stronger, when we examine the weak points of the most pressing criticism against this account thus far.