Inferential Intensionality

The paper is a study of properties of quasi-consequence operation which is a key notion of the so-called inferential approach in the theory of sentential calculi established in [5]. The principal motivation behind the quasi-consequence, q-consequence for short, stems from the mathematical practice which treats some auxiliary assumptions as mere hypotheses rather than axioms and their further occurrence in place of conclusions may be justified or not. The main semantic feature of the q-consequence reflecting the idea is that its rules lead from the non-rejected assumptions to the accepted conclusions.First, we focus on the syntactic features of the framework and present the q-consequence as related to the notion of proof. Such a presentation uncovers the reasons for which the adjective inferential is used to characterize the approach and, possibly, the term inference operation replaces q-consequence. It also shows that the inferential approach is a generalisation of the Tarski setting and, therefore, it may potentially absorb several concepts from the theory of sentential calculi, cf. [10]. However, as some concrete applications show, see e.g.[4], the new approach opens perspectives for further exploration.The main part of the paper is devoted to some notions absent, in Tarski approach. We show that for a given q-consequence operation W instead of one W-equivalence established by the properties of W we may consider two congruence relations. For one of them the current name is kept preserved and for the other the term W-equality is adopted. While the two relations coincide for any W which is a consequence operation, for an arbitrary W the inferential equality and the inferential equivalence may differ. Further to this we introduce the concepts of inferential extensionality and intensionality for q-consequence operations and connectives. Some general results obtained in Section 2 sufficiently confirm the importance of these notions. To complete a view, in Section 4 we apply the new intensionality-extensionality distinction to inferential extensions of a version of the ukasiewicz four valued modal logic.     

Encountering—An uncomfortable vocation of love. Theology and practice in Scandinavian parish work

This is an analysis of practical theology in a parish, responding to organized racism in the local area. The involvement in civil action, as well as the theological aspects of such work are considered and discussed in relation to Scandinavian creation theology. The need for radical practice is discussed in relation to vocation and the love of the neighbor, even when such practice becomes uncomfortable and even threatening.     

老子的水性人格理论及其现实意义

老子认为,人性是源于道的朴,具有主动性、柔弱性、复归倾向和自我意识。水性兼具人性和道性。圣人的人格是水性人格,其结构包括“食母”需要、质朴的自我意识和柔弱处世三个组成部分。在环境无条件的积极关注之下,个体通过致虚守静和以“重静”规约“轻躁”的努力,就可以形成水性人格。老子的水性人格理论,对于人格理论的构建和健全人格的培养都具有一定的启示价值。     

Two notions of intentional action? Solving a puzzle in Anscombe’s Intention

The account of intentional action Anscombe provides in her (1957) Intention has had a huge influence on the development of contemporary action theory. But what is intentional action, according to Anscombe? She seems to give two different answers, saying first that they are actions to which a special sense of the question ‘Why?’ is applicable, and second that they form a sub-class of the things a person knows without observation. Anscombe gives no explicit account of how these two characterizations converge on a single phenomenon, leaving us with a puzzle. I solve the puzzle by elucidating Anscombe's two characterizations in concert with several other key concepts in ‘Intention’, including, ‘practical reasons’, the sui generis kind of explanation these provide, the distinction between ‘practical’ and ‘speculative’ knowledge, the formal features which mark this distinction, and Anscombe's characterization of practical knowledge as knowledge ‘in intention’.     

Why cognitivism?

Intention Cognitivism – the doctrine that intending to V entails, or even consists in, believing that one will V – is an important position with potentially wide-ranging implications, such as a revisionary understanding of practical reason, and a vindicating explanation of ‘Practical Knowledge.’ In this paper, I critically examine the standard arguments adduced in support of IC, including arguments from the parity of expression of intention and belief; from the ability to plan around one’s intention; and from the explanation provided by the thesis for our knowledge of our intentional acts. I conclude that none of these arguments are compelling, and therefore that no good reason has been given to accept IC.     

Practical Skills and Practical Wisdom in Virtue

This paper challenges a frequent objection to conceptualizing virtues as skills, which is that skills are merely capacities to act well, while virtues additionally require being properly motivated to act well. I discuss several cases that purport to show the supposed motivational difference by drawing our attention to the differing intuitions we have about virtues and skills. However, this putative difference between virtue and skill disappears when we switch our focus in the skill examples from the performance to the performer. The ends of a practice can be used to judge not only the skilfulness of a performance, but also the motivational commitment of the performer. Being virtuous requires both acting well and being properly motivated to do so, which can be captured by viewing virtues as the moral subset of skills. In claiming this, though, I resist the idea that there is no element in virtue that is not found in other skills. Virtue requires being practically wise about how practices fit into a conception of the good life, but other skills do not. I further argue that this difference doesn't undermine the ‘virtue as skill’ thesis, as it's the connection between virtues and morality that requires practical wisdom.     

Instrumentalism about practical reason: not by default

Instrumentalism is the view that all requirements of practical reason can be derived from the instrumental principle, that is, from the claim that one ought to take the suitable means to one's ends. Rationalists, by contrast, hold that there are requirements of practical reason that concern the normative acceptability of ends. To the extent that rationalists put forward these requirements in addition to the instrumental principle, rationalism might seem to go beyond instrumentalism in its normative commitments. This is why it is sometimes thought that rationalism is stronger than instrumentalism in a way that entails that instrumentalism is the default view, while rationalists carry the burden of proof. In this paper, I explore and discuss different ways of spelling out this idea. I argue that rationalism is not stronger than instrumentalism in a way that has implications for matters of justification and differences in prima facie defensibility of the two sorts of views.     

Developing pre-service teachers’ confidence: real-time coaching in teacher education

Teacher quality continues to be of major concern in the Western world, and identifying the most effective approach to teacher training remains a contested area. It has been argued that teachers resist change because they lack motivation, have inadequate knowledge and expertise to modify their practices, and are reluctant to take risks for fear of having their confidence damaged. While remaining skeptical of such a deficit view, our interest is in pedagogic approaches which seek to better prepare teachers for teaching in contemporary society and, thus, to enhance their ‘effectiveness.’ This article discusses the use of a Real-Time Coaching (RTC) model designed to enhance pre-service teachers’ practical skills for contemporary classroom teaching. The model focuses upon pre-service teachers micro-teaching while simultaneously gaining feedback via a headset in real time; this is then combined with multiple collaborative feedback cycles within a learning community in order to foster reflective practice. To collect information about participants’ experiences with the RTC process, two rounds of semi-structured interviews were conducted with participants. Our findings indicate the RTC model has the capacity to foster a sense of confidence and ownership of learning by developing practical skills alongside affective attributes such as resilience, efficacy, and a disposition toward continual improvement.     

A Social Psychological Approach to Enduring Rivalries

The recent scholarly work on the concept of enduring rivalries offers a promising way to examine strategic interaction among dyads of states over extended periods of time. A focus on rivalry, and on the mechanisms that provide for such interaction, may offer a way to bridge existing theories of international relations that rely exclusively on structure or process. Unfortunately, the potential for theory-building has not been fully realized because research into rivalry has tended to be inductive. This paper seeks to rectify that problem by situating the rivalry concept within a social psychological approach to international relations. The rivalry concept is appropriately located in a theoretical approach that views the international system as a social system where actors are conditioned by mechanisms of competition and socialization.