解析实践智力理论

实践智力理论是斯腾伯格等人针对智商研究解释力不足提出的,它是对传统智力理论的有益补充。本文介绍了实践智力理论的核心概念、基本观点以及当前心理学界对之提出的主要质疑,并对该理论的优长与缺憾进行了分析和讨论。     

犯罪心理学研究中运用量化方法引起的理论思考

量化与统计分析,是一项重要的研究方法。这一方法在犯罪心理学研究中得到了广泛运用,同时也存在着使用的局限性。犯罪人有很强的心理掩饰性,对包括犯罪人在内的人的心理的测量实际上是一种间接测量,测得的数据是心理学家标定的数据,兼有客观性与主观性。量化研究如果不与科学思维相结合,有可能得出浅薄平庸甚至错误的结论。心理学研究应当以"人性"为基点,多种方法综合运用,实现量化方法与非量化方法的有机结合。     

Practical reasoning and practical knowledge

The judgement that provides the content of intention and coincides with the conclusion of practical reasoning is a normative judgement about what to do, and not, as Anscombe and McDowell argue, a factual judgement about what one is doing. Treating the conclusion of practical reasoning as expressing a recommendation rather than a verdict undermines McDowell’s argument; the special nature of practical reasoning does not preclude its conclusions being normative. Anscombe’s and McDowell’s claim that practical self-knowledge is productive of action may be accommodated by identifying the content of practical knowledge not with the conclusion but with a premise of practical reasoning – a kind of practical reasoning that occurs within rather than before action.     

Trinitarian Mission and Practical Theology

The contextual dimension of mission remains both critical and relevant in understanding the nature and scope of the church with regard to its place and purpose. This is formed against the backdrop of the continual importance of the missio Dei in framing its engagement. Newbigin's conception of trinitarian mission is one approach that can give specific focus to this understanding. A trinitarian missional ecclesiology can find common ground with practical theology in service of mission. Practical theology should be understood contextually and can be conceived missiologically. By bringing Newbigin's trinitarian mission into conversation with practical theology, an important conversation is generated regarding the contextual nature of both the discipline of practical theology and the missio Dei.     

A Discourse on Educational Leadership: Global Themes,Postmodern Perspectives

Epistemology mirrors reality but notperfectly, and in the process molds reality butnot exactly as intended or anticipated. Horizontal interconnections also exist betweenand among epistemology, ideology, theory andpraxiology. However, these relations areneither deductive nor deterministic in naturebut are merely resonant, and then unclear,ambiguous and confounded. In this paper, thepoint is made that we need a grand reflectionon both our paradigms of reality and ourpredicaments of life as lived, to deal with thediscontent of humanity at this moment of thehistory of our civilization, and to engage inpraxis ``to act on our world and to reconstructit' to make it moral, just and more humane. Toundertake such a grand reflection, we need apractical philosophy of knowledge – that is, apractical epistemology – to bridge across themultiple epistemological approaches nowcrowding our discussions. An epistemictriangle formed by systems thinking,constructivist thinking, and dialecticalthinking is offered to serve as the startingpoint of crystallization for building a commonground for epistemologies. It is shown how suchan epistemological diagram could be first usedto develop a minimum ideological consensus andthen to bring orderliness to the chaos ofcontemporary themes of our civilization andissues of education and culture within andacross nations. Finally, an agenda foreducational leadership for educational practiceis offered to fit the needs of the globalcommunity of nations as we enter thetwenty-first century.     

A Pragma-Dialectical Approach of the Analysis and Evaluation of Pragmatic Argumentation in a Legal Context

This paper answers the question how pragmatic argumentation which occurs in a legal context, can be analyzed and evaluated adequately. First, the author surveys various ideas taken from argumentation theory and legal theory on the analysis and evaluation of pragmatic argumentation. Then, on the basis of these ideas, she develops a pragma-dialectical instrument for analyzing and evaluating pragmatic argumentation in a legal context. Finally she demonstrates how this instrument can be used by giving an exemplary analysis and evaluation of pragmatic argumentation in a decision of the Dutch Supreme Court.     

Reasons-Responsiveness and Ownership-of-Agency: Fischer and Ravizza's Historicist Theory of Responsibility

No one has done more than John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza toadvance our understanding of the important dispute in the theoryof responsibility between structuralists and historicists.This makes it all the more important to take the measure of Responsibility and Control, their mostrecent contribution to the historicist side of the discussion. In this paper I examine some novelfeatures of their most recent version of responsiblity-historicism,especially their new notions of ``moderate reasons-responsiveness' and ``ownership-of-agency.' Fischer and Ravizza intend these newelements to solve two problems untouched by earlier versions of theirtheory: the ``problem of strange preference patterns' and the ``reasons-responsivenessproblem of induction.' I argue that they cannot solve these problemswithin the theoretical strictures they place upon themselves, namely aminimalist meta-ethics of value and practical reason, and attentiononly to certain formal features of preference-acquisition. I concludethat historicist compatibilists cannot hope to meet the challenge ofstructuralist compatibilism, from the one side, and of incompatibilism,from the other, unless they take on the full task of accounting for thedifference between the child's acquisition (via education) of autonomoussubstantive preferences and values and her acquisition (viaindoctrination) of heteronomous ones.     

Sidgwick's Problem

Henry Sidgwick regarded his failure to reconcile the claims of rational egoism with those of utilitarianism to reveal a fundamental contradiction within practical reason. However, the conflict that concerns him arises only in relation to a particular kind of agent. While Sidgwick construes his version of the problem to be a systematic formulation of a conflict that arises within the practical reasoning of ordinary people, it is actually an example of a worst-case scenario that reflects the common philosophical tendency to deal with issues in their most challenging form. But such a transformation of ordinary conflicts between self-interest and morality into an insoluble philosophical problem obscures the nature of the more typical practical conflict.     

The Sunk Costs Fallacy or Argument from Waste

This project tackles the problem of analyzing a specific form of reasoning called sunk costs in economics and argument from waste in argumentation theory. The project is to build a normative structure representing the form of the argument, and then to apply this normative structure to actual cases in which the sunk costs argument has been used. The method is partly structural and partly empirical. The empirical part is carried out through the analysis of case studies of the sunk costs argument found in business decision-making, as well as other areas like medical decision-making and everyday conversational argumentation. The structural part is carried out by using existing methods and techniques from argumentation theory, like argumentation schemes. The project has three especially significant findings. First, the sunk costs argument is not always fallacious, and in many cases it can be seen to be a rational precommitment strategy. Second, a formal model of argumentation, called practical reasoning, can be constructed that helps a rational critic to judge which sunk costs arguments are fallacious and which are not. Third, this formal model represents an alternative model of rationality to the cost-benefit model based on Bayesian calculation of probabilities. This alternative model is called the argumentation model, and it is based on interpersonal reasoning in dialogue as the model of rational thinking. This model in turn is based on the underlying notion of commitment in dialogue.     

Five Observations Concerning the Intended Meaning of the Intuitionistic Logical Constants

This paper contains five observations concerning the intended meaning of the intuitionistic logical constants: (1) if the explanations of this meaning are to be based on a non-decidable concept, that concept should not be that of `proof"; (2) Kreisel"s explanations using extra clauses can be significantly simplified; (3) the impredicativity of the definition of can be easily and safely ameliorated; (4) the definition of in terms of `proofs from premises" results in a loss of the inductive character of the definitions of and and (5) the same occurs with the definition of in terms of `proofs with free variables".