Using the process dissociation procedure to estimate recollection and familiarity in working memory: An experimental and individual differences investigation

Numerous studies have found that working memory capacity and perceptual speed predict variation in fluid intelligence. Within the cognitive ageing literature, perceptual speed accounts for substantial ageing variance in working memory capacity and fluid intelligence. However, within young adults, the interrelationships among these three abilities are less clear. The current work investigated these relationships via confirmatory factor analyses and structural equation modelling using tasks with verbal, spatial, and numerical content. The results indicate that working memory capacity and perceptual speed were not related in a large, cognitively diverse sample of young adults. However, both working memory capacity and perceptual speed accounted for unique variance in fluid intelligence. The results are discussed in relation to previous research with young and older adults.     

Lilliputian Computer Ethics

This essay considers some ethical issues of nanotechnology and quantum computing, particularly the issue of privacy, and questions related to artificial intelligence, implants, and virtual reality. It then examines the claim that research in this field should be halted.     

Creating in Our Own Image: Artificial Intelligence and the Image of God

There is remarkable convergence between twentieth-century interpretations of the image of God ( imago Dei ), what it means for human beings to be created in God's image, and approaches toward creating in our own image in the field of artificial intelligence (AI). Both fields have viewed the intersection between God and humanity or humanity and computers in terms of either (1) a property or set of properties such as intelligence, (2) the functions we engage in or are capable of, or (3) the relationships we establish and maintain. Each of these three approaches reflects a different understanding of what stands at the core of our humanity. Functional and relational approaches were common in the late twentieth century, with a functional understanding the one most accepted by society at large. A relational view, however, gives new insights into human dignity in a computer age as well as new approaches to AI research.     

Probability, logic and the cognitive foundations of rational belief

Since Pascal introduced the idea of mathematical probability in the 17th century discussions of uncertainty and “rational” belief have been dogged by philosophical and technical disputes. Furthermore, the last quarter century has seen an explosion of new questions and ideas, stimulated by developments in the computer and cognitive sciences. Competing ideas about probability are often driven by different intuitions about the nature of belief that arise from the needs of different domains (e.g., economics, management theory, engineering, medicine, the life sciences etc). Taking medicine as our focus we develop three lines of argument (historical, practical and cognitive) that suggest that traditional views of probability cannot accommodate all the competing demands and diverse constraints that arise in complex real-world domains. A model of uncertain reasoning based on a form of logical argumentation appears to unify many diverse ideas. The model has precursors in informal discussions of argumentation due to Toulmin, and the notion of logical probability advocated by Keynes, but recent developments in artificial intelligence and cognitive science suggest ways of resolving epistemological and technical issues that they could not address.     

论伦理学与诠释学的内在关系

人的行为活动趋于善的特性,是人类活动的价值特性。人通过教化、通过自己的价值活动,能够对自己的本性作出决定,能够化性起伪,决定自己是什么人或成为什么样的人,从而建构一个道德价值意义的世界,使自己获得作为诠释的诠释视域。同时,在一个多元性价值观念的世界,对于事物产生误解或理解分歧的可能性直接要求诠释学的在场。诠释学的理解要求一种回到前理解的共享性前见中去,在这个意义上,人具有作为伦理诠释和诠释理解的双重身份。伦理学与诠释学的内在贯通,从根本上看,在于它们都分有着实践理性的特性。这种实践理性体现在,普遍的东西的具体化。换言之,是普遍性知识与具体实践情境的结合。     

The distinctiveness and utility of a measure of trait emotional awareness

There has been a proliferation of new measures of individual differences in emotional processing, but too little research that evaluates the distinctiveness and utility of such measures. We critically evaluated the Level of Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS), which is a measure of people's awareness of emotions in both the self and others. Across two studies, university students (N=124 and 107 for study 1 and 2, respectively) completed the LEAS, as well as a battery of personality measures and ability tests, and a mood-induction task. The LEAS was statistically distinct from a wide variety of personality measures, emotional intelligence tests, and self-report ability measures. In addition, both studies demonstrated that people high in emotional awareness were less likely than others to show mood congruent biases in their judgments (e.g. when bad moods lead to negative judgments and good moods to good judgments). The LEAS appears to be both distinctive and useful in understanding mood-relevant processes.     

An investigation of the interaction between cognitive style and context reinstatement on the memory performance of eyewitnesses

The power of context reinstatement to improve recall is well established, but the degree of effect obtained varies widely between studies. Exploring possible causes for this variation, this paper examines the relationship between cognitive style and the efficacy of context reinstatement in improving free and cued recall in an eyewitness paradigm. Experiment 1, using a live staged event and a 1 week delay, indicated a significant improvement in free recall with the reinstatement of context and, as expected, no such improvement in cued recall. However, analysis of the data according to field dependency, as measured by Witkin, Oltman, Raskin, and Karp's [A manual for the Embedded Figures Test (1971) Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press] Group Embedded Figures Test (GEFT) revealed that, in free recall, field dependent witnesses' scores improved significantly with context reinstatement, whilst the scores of field independent witnesses did not. In cued recall, however, the field independent witnesses scored significantly higher overall than field dependent witnesses. Experiment 2 sought replication of these findings again utilised the GEFT and the Riding [Cognitive Styles analysis (1991) Birmingham: Learning and Training Technology] Cognitive Styles Analysis (CSA). Analysis of the data according to the Wholist-Analytic (W-A) dimension of the CSA, indicated no interaction with either context reinstatement or memorial performance. However the GEFT analysis produced similar results to that obtained in Experiment 1. The meaning of the interaction between the GEFT and both free and cued recall, and the failure of the CSA to similarly interact are discussed, together with the implication of these findings for establishing the value of reinstating context for individual eyewitnesses.     

Monotonicity in Practical Reasoning

Classic deductive logic entails that once a conclusion is sustained by a valid argument, the argument can never be invalidated, no matter how many new premises are added. This derived property of deductive reasoning is known as monotonicity. Monotonicity is thought to conflict with the defeasibility of reasoning in natural language, where the discovery of new information often leads us to reject conclusions that we once accepted. This perceived failure of monotonic reasoning to observe the defeasibility of natural-language arguments has led some philosophers to abandon deduction itself (!), often in favor of new, non-monotonic systems of inference known as `default logics'. But these radical logics (e.g., Ray Reiter's default logic) introduce their desired defeasibility at the expense of other, equally important intuitions about natural-language reasoning. And, as a matter of fact, if we recognize that monotonicity is a property of the form of a deductive argument and not its content (i.e., the claims in the premise(s) and conclusion), we can see how the common-sense notion of defeasibility can actually be captured by a purely deductive system.     

NON‐RELATIVE REASONS AND HUMEAN THOUGHT: IF WHAT IS A REASON FOR YOU IS A REASON FOR ME,WHERE DOES THAT LEAVE THE HUMEAN?

Abstract: A variety of strategies have been used to oppose the influential Humean thesis that all of an agent's reasons for action are provided by the agent's current wants. Among these strategies is the attempt to show that it is a conceptual truth that reasons for action are non‐relative. I introduce the notion of a basic reason‐giving consideration and show that the non‐relativity thesis can be understood as a corollary of the more fundamental thesis that basic reason‐giving considerations are generalizable. I then consider the relationship between the generalizability thesis and the Humean thesis that all of an agent's reasons for action are provided by the agent's current wants. I argue that, contrary to a common assumption, there is a subtle and clearly motivated version of the Humean thesis that does not deny, and so is not threatened by, the generalizability thesis.