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221.
Markos Valaris 《Ratio》2020,33(2):97-105
Almost everything that we do, we do by doing other things. Even actions we perform without deliberation or conscious planning are composed of ‘smaller’, subsidiary actions. But how should we think of such subsidiary actions? Are they fully-fledged intentional actions (in the sense of things that we do for reasons) in their own right? In this paper I defend an affirmative answer to this question, against a recently influential form of scepticism. Drawing on a distinctive kind of ‘action-demonstrative’ representation, I show that the sceptic's arguments do not go through. 相似文献
222.
Timothy J. Golden 《The Journal of religious ethics》2012,40(4):603-628
The aim of this essay is to provide a philosophical discussion of Frederick Douglass's thought in relation to Christianity. I expand upon the work of Bill E. Lawson and Frank M. Kirkland—who both argue that there are Kantian features present in Douglass as it relates to his conception of the individual—by arguing that there are similarities between Douglass and Kant not only concerning the relationship between morality and Christianity, but also concerning the nature of the soul. Specifically, I try to show that the moral weakness of slaveholding Christianity that Douglass attacked is found in the ecclesial formation of the slaveholding Christian church; it is a formation that begins with epistemology, but ignores ethics. I conclude, in part, that both Douglass and Kant reject a Cartesian psychological dualism in favor of a conception of the soul that is more attentive to one's moral development. 相似文献
223.
In this paper we unpack and examine attitudes and potential barriers of end-users towards the self-driving car. We explore whether drivers have (mental) barriers and/or show resistance towards the self-driving car and, given such barriers and resistance are identified, investigate the main underlying reasons. Further, we suggest potential strategic implications for automotive companies and avenues to overcome, or at least mitigate, drivers’ barriers. The paper contributes to a better understanding of end-users’ opinions on radical innovations such as the self-driving car and strives to add value by linking scientific insights from both psychology as well as innovation literature. Only a limited number of studies so far have dealt with the potential barriers of users towards the self-driving car; therefore, it is our intent to provide first empirical evidence to trigger further research and foster a broader discussion on this relevant topic. 相似文献
224.
ABSTRACTThis paper provides an overview of the issues and themes that were discussed on an interdisciplinary panel which occurred at the American Philosophical Association’s pacific division meeting in April of 2017. The panel focused on the connections between the VIA classification of virtues and character strengths in psychology and virtues and the Aristotelian approach to virtue in philosophy. Three key themes emerged from the papers presented at this panel: 1) the nature of the relationship between virtues and character strengths on the VIA model; 2) the extent to which the conceptions of virtues and character strengths are best understood as universal or culturally-embedded; and 3) the reliability of using self-report measurements to measure character strengths. This paper serves to frame papers that resulted from that panel and were incorporated into this special issue of the Journal of Positive Psychology. 相似文献
225.
Anthony O'Hear 《Ratio》2020,33(2):106-116
This paper examines the relationship between morality and reasoning in a general sense. Following a broadly Aristotelian framework, it is shown that reasoning well about morality requires good character and a grounding in virtue and experience. Topic neutral ‘critical thinking’ on its own is not enough and may even be detrimental to morality. This has important consequences both for philosophy and for education. While morality is objective and universal, it should not be seen purely in terms of the intellectual grasp of true propositions. As Simone Weil shows, it emerges from very basic aspects of our nature. As well as reasoning in an abstract sense we need what Pascal calls esprit de finesse based in our humanity as a whole, in sens, raison et coeur. The paper concludes with some reflections on our propensity to fail morally and on the relationship between virtue and happiness. 相似文献
226.
Christian B. Miller 《The journal of positive psychology》2019,14(1):6-19
ABSTRACTWritten from the perspective of a philosopher, this paper raises a number of potential concerns with how the VIA classifies and the VIA-IS measures character traits. With respect to the 24 character strengths, concerns are raised about missing strengths, the lack of vices, conflicting character strengths, the unclear connection between character strengths and virtues, and the misclassification of some character strengths under certain virtues. With respect to the 6 virtues, concerns are raised about conflicting virtues, the absence of practical wisdom, and factor analyses that do not find a 6 factor structure. With respect to the VIA-IS, concerns are raised about its neglect of motivation and about the underlying assumptions it makes about character traits. The paper ends by sketching a significantly improved classification which omits the 6 virtues and introduces additional strengths, vices, and a conflict resolution trait. 相似文献
227.
Kyle B. T. Lambelet 《The Journal of religious ethics》2019,47(3):583-600
In this paper I take up the ambivalence we rightly feel toward leaders by examining the relationship between charismatic authority and moral exemplarity. Drawing on the social theory of Max Weber, and in dialogue with a case study of an anti‐militarism movement called the SOA (School of Americas) Watch, I demonstrate that through a “politics of sacrifice” leaders synchronize their own stories with those of communally recognized exemplars and act in ways that evidence a solidarity in the suffering of those exemplars thereby generating their charismatic authority. While performing crucial strategic, motivational, and pedagogical roles, this charisma also introduces problematic temptations to authoritarianism that short‐circuit the practical reasoning that exemplars supposedly help to form. In the end this leaves our sense of ambivalence intact. What is needed, I argue, are practices of critique that reopen the distance between leader and follower and thus allow the possibility of practical reason. 相似文献
228.
Alison Springle 《Philosophical Psychology》2019,32(5):634-660
ABSTRACTThe acquisition of a skill, or knowledge-how, on the one hand, and the acquisition of a piece of propositional knowledge on the other, appear to be different sorts of epistemic achievements. Does this difference lie in the nature of the knowledge involved, marking a joint between knowledge-how and propositional knowledge? Intellectualists say no: All knowledge is propositional knowledge. Anti-intellectualists say yes: Knowledge-how and propositional knowledge are different in kind. What resources or methods may we legitimately and fruitfully employ to adjudicate this debate? What is (or are) the right way(s) to show the nature of the knowledge knowers know? Here too there is disagreement. I defend the legitimacy of the anti-intellectualist appeal to cognitive neuroscientific findings against a recent claim that anti-intellectualists conflate the scientific categories of procedural and declarative knowledge with the mental kinds of skill (knowledge-how) and propositional knowledge, respectively. I identify two kinds of arguments for this claim and argue that neither succeeds. 相似文献
229.
Carlotta Pavese 《Philosophical Psychology》2019,32(5):784-821
ABSTRACTWe represent the world in a variety of ways: through percepts, concepts, propositional attitudes, words, numerals, recordings, musical scores, photographs, diagrams, mimetic paintings, etc. Some of these representations are mental. It is customary for philosophers to distinguish two main kinds of mental representations: perceptual representation (e.g., vision, auditory, tactile) and conceptual representation. This essay presupposes a version of this dichotomy and explores the way in which a further kind of representation – procedural representation – represents. It is argued that, in some important respects, procedural representations represent differently from both purely conceptual representations and purely perceptual representations. Although procedural representations, just like conceptual and perceptual representations, involve modes of presentation, their modes of presentation are distinctively practical, in a sense which I will clarify. It is argued that an understanding of this sort of practical representation has important consequences for the debate on the nature of know-how. 相似文献
230.
Karl Schafer 《Philosophical explorations》2019,22(2):177-193
Over the last two decades, Kant’s name has become closely associated with the “constitutivist” program within metaethics.1 But is Kant best read as pursuing a constitutivist approach to meta-normative questions? And if so, in what sense?2 In this essay, I argue that we can best answer these questions by considering them in the context of how Kant understands the proper methodology for philosophy in general. The result of this investigation will be that, while Kant can indeed be read as a sort of constitutivist, his constitutivism is ultimately one instance of a more general approach to philosophy, which treats as fundamental our basic, self-conscious rational capacities. Thus, to truly understand why and how Kant is a constitutivist, we need to consider this question within the context of his more fundamental commitment to “capacities-first philosophy”. 相似文献