预见性的本体论指归

囿于认识论或价值论范围,把有关预见性的一切解释置于本体论解释的视野之外,预见性的本体论根据之追究就会被无端地“搁置”起来,从而处在被“荒漠化”的境地,本体论意义之显现也就会被严实地“遮蔽”起来,即使偶有论及也只处在被“边缘化”的地带。本文由自我认识的诠解引发关于自我认识的预见性研究的本体论和方法论意义,进而集中解说自我认识何以具有预见性,自我认识的预见性有什么特点和表现形式,其存在变化是否具有客观基础暨本体论指归。     

"一阴一阳之谓道"析议

一阴一阳之谓道,包含着三个问题:一是一阴一阳的关系;二是一阴一阳与道的关系;三是道究 竟是二元的或是一元的。本文结合中西哲学史对此展开分析,并得出结论认为,“一阴一阳之谓道”,已将 易之三义(即易简、变易、不易)全部涵括在其中了。     

Instrumental Rationality and Carroll's Tortoise

Some philosophers have tried to establish a connection between the normativity of instrumental rationality and the paradox presented by Lewis Carroll in his 1895 paper “What the Tortoise Said to Achilles.” I here examine and argue against accounts of this connection presented by Peter Railton and James Dreier before presenting my own account and discussing its implications for instrumentalism (the view that all there is to practical rationality is instrumental rationality). In my view, the potential for a Carroll-style regress just shows us that since instrumental rationality involves a higher-order commitment to combine our willing an end with our taking the necessary means, it therefore cannot, on pain of regress, itself be added as a conjunct to one of the elements to be combined. This view does not support instrumentalism.     

Focusing on Educational Outcomes

National education goals, content standards, and national tests are the hot topics of the day in educational reform. Special services personnel eventually will be faced with these issues, and can either be part of the discussion from the beginning, or wait and have to deal with someone else's decisions. In this article, we highlight some recent national and state educational reform activities and their probable implications for students with disabilities. We explain in brief the impetus behind the thrust toward an outcomesbased approach to education, and summarize the response of the National Center on Educational Outcomes for Students with Disabilities to this push. Possible ways in which special service providers can act to influence the focus on outcomes are described.     

Spiritual Maturity and Meaning-Filled Relationships: A Sociological Perspective

SUMMARY

The process of self-development, spiritual maturity and the construction of new meaning-filled relationships in late life are analyzed through the actions and interactions observed in the biographical case history of Sarah-Patton Boyle. Atchley's four stages in the process of retirement applied to the case of Sarah-Patton Boyle identifies the changes in her social roles and relationships and the struggle to maintain a positive self-view in the midst of socio-environmental changes. The struggle to continue “spiritual self” identity and ties with the church are discussed.     

Development ethics – Why? What? How? A formulation of the field

The paper assesses the rationale, contributions, structure, and challenges of the field of development ethics. Processes of social and economic transformation involve great risks and costs and great opportunities for gain, but the benefits, costs, and risks are typically hugely unevenly and inequitably distributed, as is participation in specifying what they are and their relative importance. The ethics of development examines the benefits, costs, risks, formulations, participation, and options. The paper outlines a series of ways of characterizing such work, arguments for and against its importance, and some of its major sources and contributions, especially from the interdisciplinary stream of work represented over several decades by Denis Goulet. Definitions are diverse since the work covers many different intersections of practice and theorizing, at multiple levels. The paper considers and replies to arguments against discussing development ethics: the claim that it involves only endless proliferation of different opinions, is an expensive luxury that undermines long-run development, is superfluous if one already works with the capability approach or the human rights tradition, or never has influence. Finally, it presents suggestions for how development ethics thinking can have increased impact, with reference to incorporation in policy analysis and planning methods, professional codes and training, and to its intellectual location and communication strategies. The field should articulate the methodological pragmatism which much of it has adopted, consistent with its required role as a practice-oriented interdisciplinary meeting ground.     

Fetuses,corpses and the psychological approach to personal identity

Olson (1997a) tries to refute the Psychological Approach to personal identity with his Fetus Argument, and Mackie (1999) aims to do the same with the Death Argument. With the help of a suggestion made by Baker (1999), the following discussion shows that these arguments fail. In the process of defending the Psychological Approach, it is made clear exactly what one is and is not committed to as a proponent of the theory.     

The trouble with prudence

Standard discussions of prudence treat it as requiring time-slice management. That this is the standard view of prudence can be seen by its presence in two seemingly opposed positions on prudence, those of Thomas Nagel and Derek Parfit. I argue that this kind of view fails to properly appreciate the difficulty with being prudent, treating imprudence as a kind of theoretical mistake. I then offer a characterization of prudence as integrity, the holding together of disparate but temporally extended parts of the self in a manner that makes the act of reasoning possible.     

Incorrect understanding and concept possession

Tyler Burge has argued that an incorrect understanding of a word can be sufficient for possessing the concept the word literally expresses. His well-known ‘arthritis’ case involves a patient who understands ‘arthritis’ incorrectly, but who nevertheless, according to Burge, possesses the concept arthritis. Critics of Burge have objected that there is an alternative concept that best matches the patient's understanding and that this, therefore, is the patient's concept. The paper first argues that Burge's response to this objection is unconvincing. A better response is then developed. It is argued that there is no alternative concept that matches the incorrect understanding, since the patient thinks he has a partial understanding. This, together with points about ordinary psychological explanation and modes of presentations of concepts, establish that it is impossible to undermine Burge's social externalism by appealing to the idea that an alternative concept matches the incorrect understanding.