文化心理学的启示意义及其发展趋势

心理学的研究对象乃是一种文化现象,是与人类文化互相创生发展的过程。心理学研究对象的独特性质决定着,心理学研究不可能脱离具体的文化背景。文化心理学的兴起适时地满足了当代心理学发展的要求。作为心理学研究的一种重要视角,文化心理学蕴涵着对心理学的研究对象、研究方法、研究目标及学科性质的独特理解。由于文化心理学兴起的时间较短,它必然还要不断吸取各种养分,实现内部取向的不断整合,提出更加明确的研究纲领。     

A dual systems theory of incontinent action

In philosophy of action, we typically aim to explain action by appealing to conative attitudes whose contents are either logically consistent propositions or can be rendered as such. Call this “the logical criterion.” This is especially difficult to do with clear-minded, intentional incontinence since we have to explain how two judgments can have non-contradicting contents yet still aim at contradictory outcomes. Davidson devises an innovative way of doing this but compromises his ability to explain how our better judgments can cause our continent behaviors. In this essay, I preserve Davidson’s approach to the logical criterion but deviate from his broader theory of action by developing a default-interventionist dual systems theory of action. To do this, I focus on the dynamical relationship between System 1 and System 2: (1) the logical construction of value judgments in System 2 from System 1 and (2) the imaginative construction of non-propositional conative attitudes in System 1 from System 2. I draw on Street’s Humean constructivism and Peacocke’s theory of imagination for logical and imaginative construction, respectively. Within this framework, I provide a new definition of continence and incontinence that satisfies the logical criterion and explains how our better judgments can cause our continent behaviors.     

Belief Revision,Rational Choice and the Unity of Reason

Hans Rott has argued, most recently in his book Change, Choice and Inference, that certain formal correspondences between belief revision and rational choice have important philosophical implications, claiming that the former strongly indicate the unity of practical and theoretical reason as well as the primacy of practical reason. In this paper, I confront Rott's argument with three serious challenges. My conclusion is that, while Rott's work is indisputable as a formal achievement, the philosophical consequences he wants to draw are not forthcoming. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

两个世界与历史理念--一种历史观念的考察

两个世界与理性自由的理念构成了古希腊时代以来西方哲学-文化的基本传统和基本精神。这一传统直到马克思哲学产生后才受到了实践批判的深刻挑战。本文对这一历史过程作了概括性考察,认为在两个世界的张力结构与理性自由的基本理念之间存在着深刻的内在关联。本文不同意把持续了数千年之久的这样一种精神传统仅仅批判为唯心主义的简单化做法,认为有必要深入考察这种传统在西方哲学-文化史上的基本意义。在本文看来,两个世界与理性自由的理念在历史的前进发展中不断发生着内容的更新与转换,但只有在马克思唯物史观的实践批判中才得到了彻底的革命性变革。     

Theories of Practical Reason

Leading theories of practical reason can be grouped into one of four families: psychologism, realism, compatibilism, and Aristotelianism. Although there are many differences among the theories within each family, I ignore these in order to ask which family is most likely to deliver a satisfactory philosophical account of reasons for action. I articulate three requirements we should expect any adequate theory of practical reason to meet: it should account for (1) how reasons explain action, (2) how reasons justify action, and (3) how an agent can act for the reason that justifies her action. Only the Aristotelian theory, however, can meet all three requirements. It avoids the problems that plague the other theories by grounding reasons neither in psychological states nor in facts totally independent of the agent in question, but in the nature of the kind of creature the agent is. Our explanations of action need descend to the biographical only when explaining why a human being does not act in ways characteristic of her kind. The Aristotelian view of practical reason, then, appears to be the most promising program for future work.     

Heidegger,Dreyfus, and the Intelligibility of Practical Comportment

Most scholars agree that meaning and intelligibility are central to Heidegger’s account of Dasein and Being-in-the-world, but there is some confusion about the nature of this intelligibility. In his debate with McDowell, Dreyfus draws on phenomenologists like Heidegger to argue that there are two kinds of intelligibility: a basic, nonconceptual, practical intelligibility found in practical comportment and a conceptual, discursive intelligibility. I explore two possible ways that Dreyfus might ground this twofold account of intelligibility in Heidegger: first in the distinction between the hermeneutic and apophantic “as”, and second in the presence and absence of the as-structure. I argue that neither approach succeeds because practical intelligibility is always already discursive and discursive articulation is a condition of practical comportment.     

A metaphysics for practical knowledge

Is Anscombean practical knowledge independent of what the agent actually does on an occasion? Failure to understand Anscombe’s answer to this question is a major obstacle to appreciating the subtlety and plausibility of her view. I argue that Anscombe’s answer is negative, and turns on the nature of mistakes in performance, and reveals a distinctive implicit metaphysics of mind and knowledge, structured by related capacities and exercises of capacities. If my interpretation is correct, then practical knowledge shares features with knowledge-how and knowledge-that, but deserves its own epistemic category.     

Juvenile prostitution and community rehabilitation: an exploratory analysis of beliefs and values

A community, juvenile prostitution rehabilitation programme in Bogotá, Colombia, South America is described; and beliefs and values of the residents were explored. Multiple sorting procedures and multi‐dimensional scaling analysis elicited qualitative, structured, self‐report data, and investigated cognitive constructs. Participants discriminated between belief‐statements along two global dimensions: street‐life and prostitution; and rehabilitation. These were comprised of qualitatively different elements. Clinical implications for interventions with this group and the rehabilitation programme are discussed. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

预见性的本体论指归

囿于认识论或价值论范围,把有关预见性的一切解释置于本体论解释的视野之外,预见性的本体论根据之追究就会被无端地“搁置”起来,从而处在被“荒漠化”的境地,本体论意义之显现也就会被严实地“遮蔽”起来,即使偶有论及也只处在被“边缘化”的地带。本文由自我认识的诠解引发关于自我认识的预见性研究的本体论和方法论意义,进而集中解说自我认识何以具有预见性,自我认识的预见性有什么特点和表现形式,其存在变化是否具有客观基础暨本体论指归。