WHY PRACTICE PHILOSOPHY AS A WAY OF LIFE?

This essay explains why there are good reasons to practice philosophy as a way of life. The argument begins with the assumption that we should live well but that our understanding of how to live well can be mistaken. Philosophical reason and reflection can help correct these mistakes. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that philosophical reasoning often fails to change our dispositions and behavior. Drawing on the work of Pierre Hadot, the essay claims that spiritual exercises and communal engagement mitigate the factors that prevent us from living in accordance with our conceptions of the good life. So, many of us have reasons to engage in philosophical reasoning along with behavioral, cognitive, and social strategies to alter our behavior and attitudes so that they’re in line with our philosophical commitments. In these respects, many of us should practice philosophy as a way of life.     

论心理健康素质

心理健康素质是在素质教育和心理健康教育研究基础上提出的一个新概念。本文主要探讨了心理健康素质问题研究的实践意义和理论基础;构建了心理健康素质的框架结构,解释了心理健康素质的内容,要素及其涵义;并对心理健康素质的影响因素作了简单阐释。     

Reductionism in Fallacy Theory

(1) The aim of the paper is to develop a reduction of fallacy theory, i.e. to 'deduce' fallacy theory from a positive theory of argumentation which provides exact criteria for valid and adequate argumentation. Such reductionism has several advantages compared to an unsystematic action, which is quite usual in current fallacy but which at least in part is due to the poor state of positive argumentation theory itself. (2) After defining 'fallacy' (3) some principle ideas and (4) the exact criteria for (argumentatively) valid and adequate arguments of the 'practical theory of argumentation' of the author are expounded. These criteria will be used as the positive basis for the following reduction. (5) In the main part of the paper a systematization, definition and explanation of the main types and many subforms of fallacies of argumentative validity and (6) adequacy is developed, following the list of positive conditions of validity and adequacy. In addition to many new types of fallacies, this systematization contains the most important of the traditionally known and named fallacies; these are explained and the criteria for some of them are corrected or put more precisely.     

A Universally Particular Psychology? A Feminist Practical Theological Exploration of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Indigenous and Cultural Psychology</Emphasis>

The newly published volume, “Indigenous and Cultural Psychology: Understanding People in Context” (2006) seeks to further understandings of human behavior with an indigenous psychology that places culture and context in the foreground of its methods, practices, and analysis. As such it represents a significant development in its field, and is important to practical theologians with their attention to context, culture, and the lived religious practices of persons and communities. This article offers a critical review of the book from the standpoint of feminist practical theology, in an effort to further and support the agenda of indigenous psychology. After describing the importance of indigenous psychology for the work of practical theologians, I consider the volume’s chapter on indigenous Filipino psychology (chapter five by Rogelia Pe-Pua) as paradigmatic of the strengths of an indigenous approach put forward in the larger volume. Last, I critically consider two key paradoxical tensions present in the volume’s articulation of indigenous psychology: the tension between universality and particularity, and the tension between indigeneity and critical gender analysis.     

Reasons and Value – in Defence of the Buck-Passing Account

In this article, I will defend the so-called buck-passing theory of value. According to this theory, claims about the value of an object refer to the reason-providing properties of the object. The concept of value can thus be analyzed in terms of reasons and the properties of objects that provide them for us. Reasons in this context are considerations that count in favour of certain attitudes. There are four other possibilities of how the connection between reasons and value might be formulated. For example, we can claim that value is a property that provides us with reasons to choose an option that has this property. I argue that none of these four other options can ultimately be defended, and therefore the buck-passing account is the one we ought to accept as the correct one. The case for the buck-passing account becomes even stronger, when we examine the weak points of the most pressing criticism against this account thus far.     

从矛盾辩证法到和谐辩证法 --辩证法的历史变迁

本文构建社会主义和谐社会的最新提法为契机,系统地考察了自黑格尔以来辩证法在马克思主义视域中的历史变迁,提出了与和谐社会相适应的和谐辩证法的新概念。和谐辩证法是对矛盾辩证法的继承和发展,是时代精神和建设中国特色社会主义实践的深厚的思想积淀,承认对立面的肯定因素、实现对立面的结合和双赢等是和谐辩证法的基本内涵。