Moral Reasoning Effects on Political Participation

In this study, respondents who agreed to participate in a computer-administered interview were presented with information and questions about public interest groups, followed by the Defining Issues Test of moral reasoning (DIT). Respondents with high DIT scores stressed morally central over morally peripheral considerations in deciding whether to participate in public interest groups. Less sophisticated reasoners showed the opposite pattern. Morally central considerations also had a much greater impact on the probability that sophisticated respondents would attempt to participate in public interest groups after completing the interview. The analysis included controls for potential confounding variables such as cognitive ability, education, prior political participation, and gender. The findings imply motivational differences between advantaged and disadvantaged population groups. Such differences may help to account for the differing strategies and successes of political organizations mobilizing these groups.     

Intention and Responsibility in Double Effect Cases

I argue that the moral distinction in double effect cases rests on a difference not in intention as traditionally stated in the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE), but in desire. The traditional DDE has difficulty ensuring that an agent intends the bad effect just in those cases where what he does is morally objectionable. I show firstly that the mental state of a rational agent who is certain that a side-effect will occur satisfies Bratman's criteria for intending that effect. I then clarify the nature of the moral distinction in double effect cases and how it can be used to evaluate the moral blameworthiness of agents rather than the moral status of acts. The agent's blameworthiness is reduced not by his lack of intention but by his desire not to bring about the side-effect, and the 'counterfactual test' can be used to determine whether he desires the effect in acting. In my version, the DDE has its rationale in virtue ethics; it is not liable to abuse as the traditional version is; and it makes more plausible distinctions when applied to standard examples.     

Prenatal Diagnosis for Inherited Deafness—What is the Potential Demand?

Genetic testing for inherited deafness is now available within some genetics centres. This study used a structured questionnaire to assess the potential uptake of prenatal diagnosis (PND) for inherited deafness, and document the opinions of deaf and hearing individuals toward PND and termination of pregnancy (TOP) for hearing status. Participants were self-selected from the whole of the UK, of whom 644 were deaf, 143 were hard of hearing or deafened, and 527 were hearing individuals who had either a deaf parent or child. The results showed that 21% of deaf, 39% of hard of hearing and deafened, and 49% of hearing participants said they would consider PND for deafness. Six percent of deaf, 11% of hard of hearing and deafened, and 16% of hearing participants said they would consider a TOP if the fetus was found to be deaf. Two percent of deaf participants said they would prefer to have deaf children and would consider a TOP if the fetus was found to be hearing.     

Compassionate Politics: Support for Old-Age Programs Among the Non Elderly

This study examines the existence of compassionate support for old-age programs such as Social Security and Medicare among the non-elderly. Past research has focused on merit and equality as a basis for support of social welfare programs by examining views of recipients' deservingness; in contrast, this study considers the extent of program support based on recipients' perceived need. Analysis of data from the 1984 National Election Study and from a local survey (Suffolk County, New York, 1989) shows that non-elderly individuals who view older people as financially impoverished are more likely to support government benefits for the aged. Moreover, compassionate support for old-age programs is distinct from liberal ideology; indeed, political conservatives, not liberals, are most likely to support such programs out of compassion for older people, a finding at odds with Sniderman's (Sniderman & Carmines, 1997) notion of principled conservatism. The analysis also revealed that response to elderly need does not convey the effects of long-term and family-based interests; this result substantiates that support of old-age programs can be considered as other-regarding (i.e., reflecting a concern for individuals that is unrelated to one's personal circumstances). Short-term and long-term interests tend to eclipse rather than promote compassionate support of old-age programs, consistent with the findings of traditional research on self-interest.     

New Employee Development Tactics: Perceived Availability, Helpfulness, and Relationship with Job Attitudes

This study examined the availability and helpfulness of twenty new employee development tactics and their relationship with seven job attitudes. Bachelor's graduates surveyed twelve months after graduation (n = 378) reported low availability of many tactics but high perceived helpfulness. Multiple regression analyses revealed strong correlations (R = .50–.58) with satisfaction, commitment, intent to quit, psychological success, and post-decision dissonance. The most important tactic was allowing new employees to fully utilize their skills and abilities. Implications for new approaches to new employee development in organizations and for human resource professionals are discussed.     

Preconditions for Normative Argumentation in a Pluralist World

A problem arises, both for philosophy and for argumentation theory, in a pluralist world where people hold widely different beliefs about what to do. Some responses to this problem, including relativism, might settle but do not provide any criteria for resolving such differences. Alternative responses seek a means of resolution in universalist, culture-neutral criteria which must be invoked in assessing all human action. A philosophically adequate account of universalism would contribute to an ideal of critical rationality, as well as to the ideas of field-invariance and of convincing, as opposed to persuasive, argumentation. The account's adequacy would require universality both in form and in content. Universality in form is secured by seeking universal preconditions for practical reasoning in general, rather than specifically for morality. Universality in content is harder, and candidates such as freedom, autonomy and health are problematic. An alternative content is provided by the proposition that the satisfaction of material preconditions is necessary for the performance of any action whatever. Neglect of these preconditions may constitute a fallacy in the extended sense found in argumentation theory, and assumptions about them should form part of the point of departure for any practical deliberation.     

The Death of a Child and the Birth of Practical Wisdom

This paper explores the notion of practical wisdom asan alternative to current formulations of criticalthinking. The practical realm is that ofill-structured problems that emerge from life aslived; it is a realm of legitimate uncertainty andambiguity that requires an ethical responsiveness orpractical wisdom. The death of a child is a case inpoint. The author identifies and examines threeaspects of practical wisdom – the ethical claims ofpartiality, a yielding responsiveness and the play ofthought – and juxtaposes them with aspects of criticalthinking. The work of Martha Nussbaum and RichardPaul are interwoven throughout the discussion. Theauthor concludes that the discourse of criticalthinking is in danger of lapsing into a form of moralescapism wherein all we are rationally responsible foris thinking correctly. Practical wisdom, on theother hand, recognizes that thinking is not simply anintellectual cognitive act of an individual but adance between the life of a child and the love of anelder, a conversation between what is and what couldbe, an openness to passionate sorrow and surprise, aplay between understanding and perception. As such,practical wisdom provides a more likely account ofliving in good faith with oneself and others.     

Philosophy of Education in Spain at the Threshold of the 21st Century – Origins,Political Contexts,and Prospects

This article analyzes the evolution of Philosophy of Educationin Spain and its situation at the dawn of the 21st century. Spain'speculiar socio-historical circumstances have largely conditioned thedirection this discipline has taken over the last several decades. So,although during a period there was some approximation towards themethods of analytic philosophy, Philosophy of Education has never fullyrelinquished its normative vocation. To do so would have meant spurningthe hopes and fears that had filled Spanish society by the mid 1970supon the reinstatement of civil liberties and democracy. Indeed,attention to the circumstances and that normative orientation have foundtheir best fit in a practical Aristotelian-based philosophy meant toendow Philosophy of Education with a normative character that do notshun the educator's need for reflection, practical decision-making, andresponsibility. Since the 1990s, new directions have been marked by thechallenge of postmodernism, inasmuch as it affects not only thetechnological positivist model but also the reflective educator's modelof a practical Philosophy of Education. The new directions spread out invarious ways, yet they all fall into a common denominator of narrativetrends. The problem posed by these new languages lies in the extent towhich they are consistent with pedagogic intent. In turn, the answerstake on different profiles depending on whether the stance leans moretowards the philosophical or the pedagogical point of view withinPhilosophy of Education. The complementary nature of both perspectivescharacterizes the current state of the field in Spain.     

Just Plain "Ought'

Is there any sense to the idea of an ``ought''that is not relative to any particularnormative framework? This ``ought'' would not bea moral, prudential, legal, aesthetic, orreligious ``ought,'' but rather an unqualified or just plain ``ought.'' Thispaper (i) argues for the existence andusefulness of just plain ``ought''; (ii) locatesthe concept of just plain ``ought'' within amajor strand in the history of ethics (namely,the perennial attempt to demonstrate thatmorality and prudence are in harmony); and(iii) challenges David Copp's recent attempt toshow that in fact there is no such thing asjust plain ``ought.'' A theory of just plain``ought'' emerges along the way.