For God or Country? Comparing the Sources of Anti-American and Anti-Muslim Attitudes

Negative attitudes about Americans pervade the Muslim world. And many Americans hold negative views of Muslims. Although prior literatures provide many explanations for the sources of antagonism in each population, scholars have yet to provide a direct comparison between the two. Thus, instead of explaining the attitudes themselves, this research compares them. When the same questions are asked of Americans and Muslims, are the same variables significant predictors of antagonism? We use 2008 and 2011 survey data from the Pew Global Attitudes Project and ordered probit models to answer this question at two distinct points in time. The results illustrate the importance of domestic politics for both populations, providing insight into the potential utility of foreign policies designed to improve attitudes. Additionally, we find that the story of religion's influence on anti-American attitudes is a complex one, which changes depending on how religiosity is operationalized. This research represents a first step in bringing the literatures on anti-Muslim and anti-American attitudes together, while also revealing important similarities and differences in the sources of antagonism.     

Faking revisited: Exerting strategic control over performance on the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure

Across four studies, we demonstrate that effects obtained from the Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure, like those obtained from other indirect procedures, are not impervious to strategic manipulation. In experiment 1, we found that merely informing participants to “fake” their performance without providing a concrete strategy to do so did not eliminate, reverse, or in any way alter the obtained outcomes. However, when those same instructions orientated attention toward the core parameters of the task, participants spontaneously derived a strategy that allowed them to eliminate their effects (experiment 2). When the participants were provided with a viable response strategy, they successfully reversed the direction of their overall Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure effect (experiment 3). By refining the nature of those instructions, we managed to target and alter individual trial‐type effects in isolation with some success (experiment 4).     

Associations between parental gendered attitudes and behaviours and children’s gender development across middle childhood

The present study used a longitudinal, multi-informant approach to examine which specific elements of parents’ gendered attitudes and behaviours were predictive of multiple dimensions of children’s gender development. One hundred and six families with two children (older sibling M = 7.45 years and younger sibling M = 5.19 years at Time 1) were assessed at two time points four to five years apart. At Time 1, parents reported on division of household labour, their own gender-role attitudes (GRAs), and children’s gendered preferences. At Time 2, children reported on their gendered preferences, GRAs and gendered personality traits. Results from multilevel modelling showed that fathers’ egalitarian GRA and egalitarian division of household tasks were predictive of egalitarian child GRA and outcomes, but child sex did not moderate these relationships. As some gender measures were more strongly correlated than others, these findings highlight the importance of examining multiple dimensions of both children’s and parents’ gendered attitudes and behaviours.     

'I'm Just Saying . . .': Discourse Markers of Standpoint Continuity

Examining discourse markers (Schiffrin, 1987) in two transcribed discussions of controversial issues in an undergraduate 'critical thinking' class, we note frequent uses of 'I'm just saying' and related metadiscursive expressions (I'm/we're saying, I'm/we're not saying, etc.). Our central claim is that these 'saying' expressions are pragmatic devices by which speakers claim 'all along' to have held a consistent argumentative standpoint, one that continues through the discussion unless changed for good reasons. Through close analysis of a series of discourse examples, we show how these discourse markers are used to display continuity, deflect counterarguments, and acknowledge the force of counterarguments while preserving continuity. In a concluding section we reflect critically on the use of these continuity markers with regard to four pragmatic functions that they potentially serve: to specify and clarify argumentative standpoints, to acknowledge a presumption of standpoint continuity, to acknowledge a normative expectation that discussion participants should have standpoints, and to avoid overt disagreement while saving face.     

All on the Same Side: Reflections on the Dialogue Between Science and Religion

The 'war' between religion and science is winding down, creating new opportunities for fruitful dialogue. The foundations of indirect religion-science dialogue, where the perspectives of the two disciplines illuminate some third subject, are not well established. A detailed comparison of the Roman Catholic bishops' dialogues and a similar program within the American Association for the Advancement of Science illustrates the variety in formalscience-religion interactions and reveals much about the promise, achievements, and limitations of different approaches. Success depends in large part on controlling the diversity of the dialogue group, choosing topics carefully, and adopting positive and cooperative attitudes.     

Effects of contact and personality on intergroup attitudes of different professionals†

The aim of this study was to examine the effects of intergroup contact, personality, and demographic characteristics on the intergroup attitudes of police officers, medical doctors and nurses (N=421; 274 females, 147 males). Following the contact hypothesis, intergroup contact in and of itself was not expected to be sufficient for reducing intergroup prejudice, especially in unequal contacts between professionals and their clients. It was argued that the quality of contact required for the improvement of intergroup attitudes is not equal status or emotional closeness of the participants, but rather that of individuation and familiarity of the outgroup member. The results showed that both level of authoritarianism and individuation of an outgroup member affected intergroup attitudes across all types of contact. For authoritarianism, this result did not hold separately for males, but the individuation effect was very stable; those who knew an outgroup member only superficially held more negative intergroup attitudes than those who knew him or her well, even in unequal and non‐voluntary contacts, and even when controlling for authoritarianism, gender, education and professional field. The effect was non‐significant in voluntary contacts. No differences in intergroup attitudes were found between males and females or between the professional groups among males after controlling for authoritarianism. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Are members of low status groups perceived as bad, or badly off? Egalitarian negative associations and automatic prejudice

Three studies explored the hypothesis that implicit measures of prejudice can tap negative, yet egalitarian associations. In Study 1, automatically associating African Americans with oppression predicted greater automatic prejudice. In Studies 2 and 3, classically conditioning associations between the novel group Noffians and words like oppressed, maltreated, and victimized led to greater automatic prejudice against Noffians. Results suggest that White Americans’ negative automatic associations with African Americans may partly result from associating members of low status groups with unfair circumstances. Because automatic associations predict prejudiced behaviors, the burden of proof is on those wishing to argue that egalitarian negative associations complicate the assessment of automatic attitudes rather than contribute to prejudiced responses. Discussion focuses on the implications of egalitarian negative associations for the theory and measurement of automatic prejudice.     

Dehumanization and Guilt as Distinct but Related Predictors of Support for Reparation Policies

In two studies, we predicted that support for reparation policies would be influenced positively by feelings of group-based guilt and negatively by dehumanization of the outgroup. We also hypothesized that a valence manipulation of the ingroup's behavior would cause differences in such support which would be mediated by guilt. In the first study, we manipulated the valence of past ingroup behavior and assessed guilt, dehumanization, and reparation support. As expected, guilt predicted positively and dehumanization negatively participants' support. In addition, guilt partially mediated the manipulation effects on policy support. Consistent with previous research, guilt and dehumanization were unrelated. In Study 2, we assessed individual differences in dehumanization before the manipulation and examined their associations with guilt and reparation support. Initial analyses replicated Study 1. In addition, guilt partially mediated the influence of dehumanization on reparation support. Results suggest that the presence of guilt motivates support for reparation policies, while the absence of guilt explains in part why individual differences in dehumanization inhibit such support.     

Practical Reasons, Practical Rationality, Practical Wisdom

There are a number of proposals as to exactly how reasons, ends and rationality are related. It is often thought that practical reasons can be analyzed in terms of practical rationality, which, in turn, has something to do with the pursuit of ends. I want to argue against the conceptual priority of rationality and the pursuit of ends, and in favor of the conceptual priority of reasons. This case comes in two parts. I first argue for a new conception of ends by which all ends are had under the guise of reasons. I then articulate a sense of rationality, procedural rationality, that is connected with the pursuit of ends so conceived, where one is rational to the extent that one is motivated to act in accordance with reasons as they appear to be. Unfortunately, these conceptions of ends and procedural rationality are inadequate for building an account of practical reasons, though I try to explain why it is that the rational pursuit of ends generates intuitive but misleading accounts of genuine normative reasons. The crux of the problem is an insensitivity to an is-seems distinction, where procedural rationality concerns reasons as they appear, and what we are after is a substantive sense of rationality that concerns reasons as they are. Based on these distinct senses of rationality, and some disambiguation of what it is to have a reason, I offer a critique of internalist analyses of one’s reasons in terms of the motivational states of one’s ideal, procedurally rational self, and I offer an alternative analysis of one’s practical reasons in terms of practical wisdom that overcomes objections to related reasons externalist views. The resulting theory is roughly Humean about procedural rationality and roughly Aristotelian about reasons, capturing the core truths of both camps.