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71.
Philip S. Gorski 《Zygon》1990,25(3):279-307
Abstract. What is the relationship between natural science, social science, and religion? The dominant paradigm in contemporary social science is scientism, the attempt to apply the methods of natural science to the study of society. However, scientism is problematic: it rests on a conception of natural science that cannot be sustained. Natural scientific understanding emerges from an instrumental and objectifying relation to the world; it is oriented toward control and manipulation of the physical world. Social-scientific understanding, by contrast, must begin with a practical and meaningful relation to the world: it is oriented toward the mediation of values and objective possibilities in the social world. Social science is therefore a form of practical reason based on objective claims. But while social-scientific understanding starts with interpretation, its possibilities by no means end there. In particular, by developing abstract and objectified models of society as a system, social science opens existing social organization to critical reflection. Religion, by contrast, is a form of speculative reason about ultimate values, based on subjective claims of religious experience. Social science nevertheless shares with religion an orientation toward values and concern with the “good life.” 相似文献
72.
Michael Slote 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2018,26(3):419-436
ABSTRACTFor obvious reasons sentimentalists have been hesitant to offer accounts of moral reasons for action: the whole idea at least initially smacks of rationalist notions of morality. But the sentimentalist can seek to reduce practical to sentimentalist considerations and that is what the present paper attempts to do. Prudential reasons can be identified with the normal emotional/motivational responses people feel in situations that threaten them or offer them opportunities to attain what they need. And in the most basic cases altruistic/moral reasons involve the empathic transfer of one person’s prudential reasons and emotions to another person or persons who can help them. Practical/moral reasons for self-sacrifice also depend on empathic transfer and can vary in strength with the strength of the transfer. 相似文献
73.
On a standard interpretation, Hume argued that reason is not practical, because its operations are limited to “demonstration” and “probability.” But recent critics claim that by limiting reason’s operations to only these two, his argument begs the question. Despite this, a better argument for motivational skepticism can be found in Hume’s text, one that emphasizes reason’s inability to generate motive force against contrary desires or passions. Nothing can oppose an impulse but a contrary impulse, Hume believed, and reason cannot generate an impulse. This better argument is here developed and defended. Two lines of objection to it can be anticipated: (1) that reason actually can generate impulsive force, based on contents of its normative judgments and (2) that reason neither can nor needs to generate an impulse, since the actions of rational agents are not determined by forceful impulses of desire, as Hume supposed. These objections are answered by pointing out their unsatisfying consequences. 相似文献
74.
《Journal of Cognitive Psychology》2013,25(1):38-50
An experiment was run to complete our understanding of the involvement of working memory (WM) components in the construction of a spatial model from visual input, considering some of the visuospatial abilities known to modulate performance. In addition, to allow for consideration of the flexibility of the spatial representation, routes in a virtual environment were presented with a route perspective, and tests were presented with route and survey perspectives. The results indicate that the verbal and spatial WM are only involved in the memorisation of certain types of information, and that their involvement depends on the change of perspective necessitated by the task. Thus, even when the learning material and the tests used to assess performance are only visual, a verbal recoding of some information is necessary. Moreover, individual differences modulate the involvement of WM; an individual with higher visuospatial capacities uses more spatial WM than an individual with lower spatial capacities. 相似文献
75.
Non-human animals vary in their ability to make and use tools. The goal of the present study was to further explore what, if anything, differs between tool-users and non-tool-users, and whether these differences lie in the conceptual or motor domain. We tested two species that typically do not use tools-cotton top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) and vervet monkeys (Cercopithecus aethiops)-on problems that mirrored those designed for prolific tool users such as chimpanzees. We trained subjects on a task in which they could choose one of two canes to obtain an out-of-reach food reward. After training, subjects received several variations on the original task, each designed to examine a specific conceptual aspect of the pulling problem previously studied in other tool-using species. Both species recognized that effective pulling tools must be made of rigid materials. Subsequent conditions revealed significant species differences, with vervets outperforming tamarins across many conditions. Vervets, but not tamarins, had some recognition of the relationship between a tool's orientation and the position of the food reward, the relationship between a tool's trajectory and the substance that it moves on, and that tools must be connected in order to work properly. These results provide further evidence that tool-use may derive from domain-general, rather than domain-specific cognitive capacities that evolved for tool use per se. 相似文献
76.
The purpose of this article is to explore the legacy of Charles V. Gerkin’s pastoral theology and to construct a method of pastoral theology. In Part I, I will trace within a larger context of pastoral theology the history of Gerkin’s pastoral theology since his early clinical praxis. In Part II, I will explore his method of developing pastoral theology and construct a renewed critical and constructive method of pastoral theology, reflecting on the implications of exploring the history and method of his pastoral theology. 相似文献
77.
78.
H. Lillehammer 《The Journal of Ethics》2000,4(3):173-190
This paper examines the metaphysically modest view that attributionsof normative reasons can be made true in the absence of a responseindependent normative reality. The paper despairs in finding asatisfactory account of normative reasons in metaphysically modestterms. 相似文献
79.
Michael Schilling Jrn R. Sparfeldt Nicolas Becker Marie Engel Julie Levacher Tilman F. P. Sebastian Juliane Schfer Sarah Schwabe Cornelius J. Knig 《International Journal of Selection & Assessment》2020,28(3):264-282
Recent research has highlighted competitive worldviews as a key predictor of faking—the intentional distortion of answers by candidates in the selection context. According to theoretical assumptions, applicants’ abilities, and especially their cognitive abilities, should influence whether faking motivation, triggered by competitive worldviews, can be turned into successful faking behavior. Therefore, we examined the influence of competitive worldviews on faking in personality tests and investigated a possible moderation of this relationship by cognitive abilities in three independent high school and university student samples (N1 = 133, N2 = 137, N3 = 268). Our data showed neither an influence of the two variables nor of their interaction on faking behavior. We discuss possible reasons for these findings and give suggestions for further research. 相似文献
80.
John Lemos 《Philosophia》2006,34(1):85-93
In this article it is assumed that human goodness is to be judged with respect to how well one does at practical reasoning. It is acknowledged that (1) there is a difference between moral practical reasoning (MPR) and prudential practical reasoning (PPR) and (2) what these would recommend sometimes conflict. A distinction is then made between absolute PPR and relative PPR and it is argued that doing well at absolute PPR is always consistent with MPR. It is also argued that since it is more reasonable to assess prudential practical rationality in terms of the absolute standard than the relative standard, there is no conflict between the demands of MPR (morality) and PPR (self-interest).
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John LemosEmail: |