排序方式: 共有14条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
11.
Liao SM 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2006,27(2):141-147
In the debate regarding the moral status of human embryos, the Embryo Rescue Case has been used to suggest that embryos are
not rightholders. This case is premised on the idea that in a situation where one has a choice between saving some number
of embryos or a child, it seems wrong to save the embryos and not the child. If so, it seems that embryos cannot be rightholders.
In this paper, I argue that the Embryo Rescue Case does not independently show that embryos are not rightholders. 相似文献
12.
13.
Samuel Kimpton-Nye 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2021,102(2):342-358
Hardcore actualism (HA) grounds all modal truths in the concrete constituents of the actual world (see, e.g., Borghini and Williams (2008), Jacobs (2010), Vetter (2015)). I bolster HA, and elucidate the very nature of possibility (and necessity) according to HA, by considering if it can validate S5 modal logic. Interestingly, different considerations pull in different directions on this issue. To resolve the tension, we are forced to think hard about the nature of the hardcore actualist’s modal reality and how radically this departs from possible worlds orthodoxy. Once we achieve this departure, the prospects of a hardcore actualist validation of S5 look considerably brighter. This paper thus strengthens hardcore actualism by arguing that it can indeed validate S5–arguably the most popular logic of metaphysical modality–and, in the process, it elucidates the very nature of modality according to this revisionary, but very attractive, modal metaphysics. 相似文献
14.
S. F. Kislev 《Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology》2020,51(3):259-274
ABSTRACT Highlighting the relations between De Anima II.5 and De Anima III.4, this paper argues that Aristotle held a surprisingly dynamic view of the intellect. According to this view, the intellect is in a constant development brought about by its own activity. This dynamic view distinguishes the intellect from both physical objects and from sense-perception. For Aristotle the intellect is a “nothing” that gradually becomes something by thinking. The paper traces the logic of this idea and its meaning. It defends the simple thesis that in the intellect alone first and second transitions are bound together: that every concrete thought is also a determination of the possibility of the intellect. This, I will suggest, was known to ancient commentators who distinguished between not two but three “intellects” in De Anima; not only the possible and actual intellects, but also the acquired intellect. It is the unique conceptual structure of the acquired intellect that this paper sketches. 相似文献