The excess choice effect: The role of outcome valence and counterfactual thinking

Contrary to economic theory, psychological research has demonstrated increased choice can undermine satisfaction. When and why this ‘excess choice effect’ (ECE) occurs remains unclear. Building on theories of counterfactual thinking we argue the ECE is more likely to occur when people experience counterfactual thought or emotion and that a key trigger is a negative versus positive task outcome. Participants either selected a drink (Experiment 1) or chocolate (Experiment 2) from a limited (6) versus extensive (24) selection (Experiment 1) or were given no choice versus extensive (24) choice (Experiment 2). In both experiments, however, the choice was illusory: Half the participants tasted a ‘good’ flavour, half a ‘bad’ flavour. As predicted, extensive choice was only detrimental to satisfaction when participants tasted the ‘bad’ drink or chocolate, and this was mediated by the experience of counterfactual thought (Experiment 1) or emotion (Experiment 2). When outcomes were positive, participants were similarly satisfied with limited versus extensive and no choice versus extensive choice. Implications for our theoretical understanding of the ECE and for the construction of choice architectures aimed at promoting individual satisfaction and well‐being are discussed.     

The primal scene and symbol formation

This article discusses the meaning of the primal scene for symbol formation by exploring its way of processing in a child's play. The author questions the notion that a sadomasochistic way of processing is the only possible one. A model of an alternative mode of processing is being presented. It is suggested that both ways of processing intertwine in the “fabric of life” (D. Laub). Two clinical vignettes, one from an analytic child psychotherapy and the other from the analysis of a 30 year‐old female patient, illustrate how the primal scene is being played out in the form of a terzet. The author explores whether the sadomasochistic way of processing actually precedes the “primal scene as a terzet”. She discusses if it could even be regarded as a precondition for the formation of the latter or, alternatively, if the “combined parent‐figure” gives rise to ways of processing. The question is being left open. Finally, it is shown how both modes of experiencing the primal scene underlie the discoursive and presentative symbol formation, respectively.     

The role of repetitive thought in determining posttraumatic growth and distress following interpersonal trauma

Background and Objectives: Repetitive thought (RT) strategies have been linked to a range of negative outcomes following traumatic interpersonal events but are proposed to serve an adaptive function under particular circumstances. This study examined outcomes following RT within a transdiagnostic framework, and explored the potentially adaptive nature of trait-like and event-related RT. Design: The centrality of a traumatic event to one's identity was explored as a context under which the adaptive nature of RT might change. Young adults with interpersonal violence experiences (N = 163) reported use of trait-like and event-related RT, centrality of the event, depressive, anxious, and posttraumatic stress symptoms (PTSS), posttraumatic depreciation and posttraumatic growth. Methods: Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were used to examine main and moderating effects of four types of RT and event centrality on outcome variables. Results: Centrality positively predicted depressive symptoms and PTSS, depreciation, and growth. Brooding RT positively predicted all negative outcomes. Reflecting RT positively predicted anxious symptoms and PTSS and depreciation. Only deliberate RT positively predicted growth. Centrality did not moderate any examined relationships. Conclusions: Findings highlight the importance of addressing specific types of RT in interventions with survivors and of considering centrality as a robust contributor to outcomes following interpersonal violence.     

Imagine no religion: Heretical disgust,anger and the symbolic purity of mind

Immoral actions, including physical/sexual (e.g., incest) and social (e.g., unfairness) taboos, are often described as disgusting. But what about immoral thoughts, more specifically, thoughts that violate religious beliefs? Do heretical thoughts taint the purity of mind? The present research examined heretical disgust using self-report measures and facial electromyography. Religious thought violations consistently elicited both self-reported disgust and anger. Feelings of disgust also predicted harsh moral judgement, independent of anger, and were mediated by feelings of “contamination”. However, religious thought violations were not associated with a disgust facial expression (i.e., levator labii muscle activity) that was elicited by physically disgusting stimuli. We conclude that people (especially more religious people) do feel disgust in response to heretical thoughts that is meaningfully distinct from anger as a moral emotion. However, heretical disgust is not embodied in a physical disgust response. Rather, disgust has a symbolic moral value that marks heretical thoughts as harmful and aversive.     

Thinking sadly: In favor of an adverbial theory of emotions

Introspective as well as empirical evidence indicates that emotions shape our thinking in numerous ways. Yet, this modificatory aspect of emotions has received relatively little interest in the philosophy of emotion. I give a detailed account of this aspect. Drawing both on the work of William James and adverbialist conceptions of perception, I sketch a theory of emotions that takes these aspects into consideration and suggest that we should understand emotions as manners of thinking.     

Visual perspective in remembering and episodic future thought

According to the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis, remembering and episodic future thinking are supported by a common set of constructive processes. In the present study, we directly addressed this assertion in the context of third-person perspectives that arise during remembering and episodic future thought. Specifically, we examined the frequency with which participants remembered past events or imagined future events from third-person perspectives. We also examined the different viewpoints from which third-person perspective events were remembered or imagined. Although future events were somewhat more likely to be imagined from a third-person perspective, the spatial viewpoint distributions of third-person perspectives characterizing remembered and imagined events were highly similar. These results suggest that a similar constructive mechanism may be at work when people remember events from a perspective that could not have been experienced in the past and when they imagine events from a perspective that could not be experienced in the future. The findings are discussed in terms of their consistency with—and as extensions of—the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis.     

Imagery and verbal thought during rumination and distraction: Does imagery amplify affective response?

Rumination has long been considered a verbal thought process, though emerging evidence suggests that some individuals dwell on maladaptive imagery. This series of studies evaluated imagery and verbal thought during experimentally induced rumination and distraction. In Study 1, imagery and verbal thought during rumination resulted in similar increases in negative affect. Greater imagery during distraction, on the other hand, was associated with greater decreases in negative affect while verbal thought was not related to affect change. Given that greater verbal thought was reported in the rumination condition and greater imagery was reported in the distraction condition, Study 2 evaluated whether the rumination/distraction induction was confounded by concurrent induction of imagery or verbal thought. The rumination prompts induced both rumination and verbal thought and the distraction prompts induced both distraction and imagery. Using a revised induction, Study 3 tested whether imagery and verbal thought during rumination and distraction impacted affective response. Rumination maintained negative affect and distraction relieved negative affect, regardless of the degree to which imagery or verbal thought was experienced. This paper provides evidence that imagery-based rumination is just as impairing as verbally-based rumination and highlights imagery-based distraction as a potentially effective alternative to rumination.     

The paradox of the universal triangle: Concepts,language, and prototypes

For over 300 years, the humble triangle has served as the paradigmatic example of the problem of abstraction. How can we have the idea of a general triangle even though every experience with triangles is with specific ones? Classical cognitive science seemed to provide an answer in symbolic representation. With its easily enumerated necessary and sufficient conditions, the triangle would appear to be an ideal candidate for being represented in a symbolic form. I show that it is not. Across a variety of tasks—drawing, speeded recognition, unspeeded visual judgments, and inference—representations of triangles appear to be graded and context dependent. I show that using the category name “triangle” activates a more prototypical representation than using an arguably coextensive cue, “three-sided polygon”. For example, when asked to draw “triangles” people draw more typical triangles than when asked to draw “three-sided polygons”. Altogether, the results support the view that (even formal) concepts have a graded and flexible structure, which takes on a more prototypical and stable form when activated by category labels.