Do we reflect while performing skillful actions? Automaticity,control, and the perils of distraction

From our everyday commuting to the gold medalist’s world-class performance, skillful actions are characterized by fine-grained, online agentive control. What is the proper explanation of such control? There are two traditional candidates: intellectualism explains skillful agentive control by reference to the agent’s propositional mental states; anti-intellectualism holds that propositional mental states or reflective processes are unnecessary since skillful action is fully accounted for by automatic coping processes. I examine the evidence for three psychological phenomena recently held to support anti-intellectualism (choking under pressure, expertise-induced amnesia, and expert confabulation) and argue that it supports neither traditional candidate, but an intermediate attention-control account, according to which the top-down, intention-directed control of attention is a necessary component of skillful action. Only this account recognizes both the role of automatic control in skilled action and the need for higher-order cognition to thread automatic processes together into a unified, skillful performance. This applies to bodily skillful action in general, from the world-class performance of experts to mundane, habitual action. The attention-control account stresses that, for intentions to play their role as top-down modulators of attention, agents must sustain the intention’s activation; hence, the need for reflecting throughout performance.     

Behavior,process, and scale: Comments on Shimp (2020), “Molecular (moment-to-moment) and molar (aggregate) analyses of behavior”

If we study the behavior of organisms, we must understand the ontological status of both “organism” and “behavior.” A living organism maintains itself alive by constantly interacting with the environment, taking in energy and discarding waste. Ontologically, an organism is a process. Its interactions with the environment, which constitute its behavior, are processes also, because the parts of any process are themselves processes. Processes serve functions, and the function of a process must be part of its identity. A process, by definition, extends in time. Time is the fundamental and universal measure of behavior. All processes have the property of scale. Activities of an organism have parts that are themselves activities on a smaller time scale. Scale varies continuously, and behavior may be studied on as large or as small a time scale as seems necessary. When researchers refer to the “structure” of behavior, they refer to smaller-scale activities. Attaching a switch to a lever or key is convenient, but one should never confuse operation of a switch with a unit of behavior. Shimp's (2020) “molecular” measures are small-scale measures. The molecular view based on discrete events has outlived its usefulness and should be replaced by a multiscale molar paradigm.     

Processus d’élaboration et de validation d’un questionnaire portant sur le développement des compétences émotionnelles lors du mentorat

Objective and methodThe aim of this article is to provide a portrait of the emotional competencies developed by school principals (n = 359) in a mentoring context by developing a seven-step questionnaire by Frenette et al. (2019) presenting various proofs of validity.ResultsThe analyses conducted support a factorial structure with two correlated aspects of emotional competencies (self and others). School principals in Quebec develop more emotional competencies related to the aspect of others than for themselves during mentoring. A further analysis indicates that school principals develop more two dimensions of Emotional competencies: Identification and Understanding. The results also show that 77.26 % of respondents indicated that they developed emotional skills during mentoring.ConclusionThe results provided an understanding of the importance of emotional competencies in education, and specifically in school management. It also revealed the importance of emphasizing the role of mentoring in their development. To our knowledge, the questionnaire developed in this study is one of the first to measure the development of emotional competencies during a mentoring relationship.     

Driver conflict response during supervised automation: Do hands on wheel matter?

Securing appropriate driver responses to conflicts is essential in automation that is not perfect (because the driver is needed as a fall-back for system limitations and failures). However, this is recognized as a major challenge in the human factors literature. Moreover, in-depth knowledge is lacking regarding mechanisms affecting the driver response process. The first aim of this study was to investigate how driver conflict response while using highly reliable (but not perfect) supervised automation differ for drivers that (a) crash or avoid a conflict object and (b) report high trust or low trust in automation to avoid the conflict object. The second aim was to understand the influence on the driver conflict response of two specific factors: a hands-on-wheel requirement (with vs. without), and the conflict object type (garbage bag vs. stationary vehicle). Seventy-six participants drove with highly reliable but supervised automation for 30 min on a test track. Thereafter they needed to avoid a static object that was revealed by a lead-vehicle cut-out. The driver conflict response was assessed through the response process: timepoints for driver surprise reaction, hands-on-wheel, driver steering, and driver braking. Crashers generally responded later in all actions of the response process compared to non-crashers. In fact, some crashers collided with the conflict object without even putting their hands on the wheel. Driver conflict response was independent of the hands-on-wheel requirement. High-trust drivers generally responded later than the low-trust drivers or not at all, and only high trust drivers crashed. The larger stationary vehicle triggered an earlier surprise reaction compared to the garbage bag, while hands-on-wheel and steering response were similar for the two conflict object types. To conclude, crashing is associated with a delay in all actions of the response process. In addition, driver conflict response does not change with a hands-on-wheel requirement but changes with trust-level and conflict object type. Simply holding the hands on the wheel is not sufficient to prevent collisions or elicit earlier responses. High trust in automation is associated with late response and crashing, whereas low trust is associated with appropriate driver response. A larger conflict object trigger earlier surprise reactions.