From Design to Self-organization,or: A Proper Structure for a Proper Function

It is suggested that Charles Sanders Peirce's triadic semiotics provides a framework for a diagrammatic representation of a sign's proper structure. The action of signs is described at the logical and psychological levels. The role of (unconscious) abductive inference is analyzed, and a diagram of reasoning is offered. A series of interpretants transform brute facts into interpretable signs thereby providing human experience with value or meaning. The triadic structure helps in de-mystifying the relations between Penrose's three worlds when the latter are considered as constituting a semiotic triangle. Conference “Dynamic Ontology: An Inquiry into Systems, Emergence, Levels of Reality, and Forms of Causality” University of Trento, Italy, September 7–11, 2004.     

Possible-Worlds Semantics for Modal Notions Conceived as Predicates

If is conceived as an operator, i.e., an expression that gives applied to a formula another formula, the expressive power of the language is severely restricted when compared to a language where is conceived as a predicate, i.e., an expression that yields a formula if it is applied to a term. This consideration favours the predicate approach. The predicate view, however, is threatened mainly by two problems: Some obvious predicate systems are inconsistent, and possible-worlds semantics for predicates of sentences has not been developed very far. By introducing possible-worlds semantics for the language of arithmetic plus the unary predicate , we tackle both problems. Given a frame <W,R> consisting of a set W of worlds and a binary relation R on W, we investigate whether we can interpret at every world in such a way that A holds at a world wW if and only if A holds at every world vW such that wRv. The arithmetical vocabulary is interpreted by the standard model at every world. Several paradoxes (like Montague's Theorem, Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem, McGee's Theorem on the -inconsistency of certain truth theories, etc.) show that many frames, e.g., reflexive frames, do not allow for such an interpretation. We present sufficient and necessary conditions for the existence of a suitable interpretation of at any world. Sound and complete semi-formal systems, corresponding to the modal systems K and K4, for the class of all possible-worlds models for predicates and all transitive possible-worlds models are presented. We apply our account also to nonstandard models of arithmetic and other languages than the language of arithmetic.     

Necessary versus Probable Cause

One finds in the systems of natural languages some explicit means of elaborating not only upon the directness of the causal relationship believed to exist between two events X and Y (i.e. some means of specifying just how inevitably event X gives or gave rise to event Y), but also some manner of indicating just who or what is understood to be the primary instigator of the caused event. The goal of the present paper is to explore these notions in detail and arrive at a formal, logic-based means of capturing them.     

Everyday Life Reasoning, Possible Worlds and Cultural Processes

Discussing Faiciuc’s paper, I first tackle the problem of fallacies in deductive reasoning showing how, in a possible world theory, non correct forms of reasoning can be useful strategies for discovery, providing these strategies remain at a hypothesis level. Secondly, everyday reasoning and its specificity in comparison to logical-normative one are analyzed. This topic stresses the notion of interpretation and, in this context, the role of the community and of cultural canons shared by the subject. From this point of view, reasoning does not occur, only, in the brain of a person but in everyday exchanges occurring between individuals and the history of their community.

A Conundrum Concerning Creation

In this paper, I expose a conundrum regarding divine creation as Leibniz conceives of such creation. What energizes the conundrum is that the concept of omnibenevolence—“consequential omnibenevolence”—that the Leibnizian argument for the view that the actual world is the best of all possible worlds presupposes, appears to sanction the conclusion that God has no practical reasons to create the actual world.

艾勒悖论再探——三结果决策的齐当别式表征:“好-坏”抑或“最好-最坏”?

艾勒悖论的第一项决策任务属于三结果决策任务,这对齐当别模型以及鉴别其不同判断任务间的优势都具有特殊意义。本研究通过3项子研究系统的探讨了不同表征方式("最好-最坏","好-坏")、不同判断任务(经典判断任务与联合判断任务)、不同数量级的结果值(万元级、百万元级以及亿元级)以及不同决策情境(迫选,非迫选)上,齐当别模型对艾勒悖论的解释力。结果显示:无论是迫选情境还是非迫选情境,经典的艾勒悖论均可被齐当别模型解释,但应基于"好-坏"而非"最好-最坏"表征维度;齐当别模型的联合判断任务在三结果决策任务上的预测力也再次被证明优于经典判断任务。     

Leibniz,creation and the best of all possible worlds

Leibniz argued that God would not create a world unless it was the best possible world. I defend Leibniz’s argument. I then consider whether God could refrain from creating if there were no best possible world. I argue that God, on pain of contradiction, could not refrain from creating in such a situation. I conclude that either this is the best possible world or God is not our creator.