ENTRUSTING THE LIFE THAT HAS EVOLVED: A RESPONSE TO MICHAEL RUSE'S RUSE

Abstract. This piece challenges Michael Ruse on three points: (1) The charge that Christian myth and doctrine are incredible fails to take into account the scholarship that has clarified the genre to which myth belongs and its function. (2) Naturalistic explanations, like Ruse's, have fully as much difficulty dealing with questions of purpose and evil as religion does. (3) The concept of "deception" has a number of inherent problems that Ruse fails to consider, of which the chief is that it requires a certainty about truth and falsity that Ruse cannot and does not claim to possess.     

Including a Spiritual Dimension in Family Therapy: Ethical Considerations

The inclusion of a spiritual dimension in family therapy theory and clinical practice may well be viewed as an important professional challenge of the nineties. Following a working definition of terms, this paper explores the ethical complexities inherent in operationalizing a spiritual orientation in therapy in light of the following principles adopted from medical ethics: Respect for clients' autonomy, safeguarding clients' welfare, protecting them from harm, and treating them justly and honestly.     

A. F. Losevs personalistische ontologie

A. F. Losev, one of the most important Russian philosophers and historians of ancient aesthetics and culture in the 20th century, develops in his ‘Dialectics of the Myth’ (Dialektika mifa), 1930, a personalistic ontology by using elements of neoplatonic philosophy and Orthodox Christian belief. According to Losev reality in all its different expressions and ontological strata must be understood as “mythical”, i.e. as “living mutual exchange of subject and object”. The subjective and personal aspect of reality is not grounded in man’s epistemic relation to it alone; reality in itself has to be characterized as personal and subjective. The main philosophical opponent is Descartes, the founder of “modern rationalism and mechanism”.

     

Synapses,Schizophrenia, and Civilization: What Made Homo Sapient?

Progress in technology has allowed dynamic research on the development of the human brain that has revolutionized concepts. Particularly, the notions of plasticity, neuronal selection, and the effects of afferent stimuli have entered into thinking about brain development. Here I focus on development from the age of four years to early adulthood, during which a 30 percent reduction in some brain synapses occurs that is out of proportion to changes in neuronal numbers. This corresponds temporally with changes in normal child behavior from the loose‐associative, almost schizoid, thinking and art of the four‐year‐old to the more trained, or disciplined, or acculturated—and restrained—personality of the young adult. I propose that the synaptic changes can best be thought of as a winnowing process likely subject to environmental influences. Acquisition of language and the ability to link linguistic cognition to the plastic development of the brain provide a potentially powerful means of explaining the evolutionally explosive development of human cognition and culture. Schizophrenia, a disease that can be envisioned as representing a derangement of synaptic maturation, may provide an entry into the search for genes controlling the processes mediating the unprecedented development of Homo sapiens over the past 40,000 to 70,000 years. The recently completed mapping of the genome of the chimpanzee provides a new frame of reference that may speed the search.     

National Context,Parental Socialization,and the Varying Relationship Between Religious Belief and Practice

Parents are crucial agents of religious socialization, but the broader social environment is also influential. A key question is whether parents are more or less influential when their religious beliefs and practices are not shared by people around them. Current thinking on the issue has largely been shaped by Kelley and De Graaf, who argued that parental religious socialization matters most in secular countries. We maintain that that conclusion is mistaken: levels of parental and national religiosity are both important, but their effects are largely independent of each other. Kelley and De Graaf's findings rely on the assumption that religious belief and practice are different expressions of the same underlying phenomenon (religiosity) and vary in the same way across time and space. These measures are not equivalent, however. In relatively religious societies, belief in God is widespread even among those who do not attend services, whereas in societies where religious involvement is low, nonchurchgoers tend to be nonbelievers.     

Are high levels of religiosity inconsistent with a high valuation of science? Evidence from the United States,China and Iran

We asked whether high levels of religiosity are inconsistent with a high valuation of science. We explored this possibility in three countries that diverge markedly in the relation between the state and religion. Parents in the United States (n = 126), China (n = 234) and Iran (n = 77) completed a survey about their personal and parental stance towards science. The relation between religiosity and the valuation of science varied sharply by country. In the U.S. sample, greater religiosity was associated with a lower valuation of science. A similar but weaker negative relation was found in the Chinese sample. Parents in the Iranian sample, by contrast, valued science highly, despite high levels of religiosity. Given the small size of our United States and Iranian samples, and the non-probabilistic nature of our samples in general, we caution readers not to generalise our findings beyond the current samples. Despite this caveat, these findings qualify the assumption that religiosity is inconsistent with the valuation of science and highlight the role of sociocultural context in shaping adults' perception of the relation between religion and science.     

CHRISTIANITY,SCIENCE, AND THREE PHASES OF BEING HUMAN

The alleged conflict between religion and science most pointedly focuses on what it is to be human. Western philosophical thought regarding this has progressed through three broad stages: mind/body dualism, Neo‐Darwinism, and most recently strong artificial intelligence (AI). I trace these views with respect to their relation to Christian views of humans, suggesting that while the first two might be compatible with Christian thought, strong AI presents serious challenges to a Christian understanding of personhood, including our freedom to choose, moral choice itself, self‐consciousness, and the relevance of God to our beginning, being, and ending.     

What is philosophy as a way of life? Why philosophy as a way of life?

Despite a recent surge of interest in philosophy as a way of life, it is not clear what it might mean for philosophy to guide one's life, or how a “philosophical” way of life might differ from a life guided by religion, tradition, or some other source. We argue against John Cooper that spiritual exercises figure crucially in the idea of philosophy as a way of life—not just in the ancient world but also today, at least if the idea is to be viable. In order to make the case we attempt to clarify the nature of spiritual exercises, and to explore a number of fundamental questions, such as “What role does reason have in helping us to live well?” Here we distinguish between the discerning and motivational powers of reason, and argue that both elements have limitations as guides to living well.     

Creation and humanity: Veli-Matti Kärkäinen's answer to the ultimate question

This article focuses on the third volume of Vel-Matti Kärkkäinen's systematic theology, titled Creation and Humanity. After a brief overview of the volume the article offers some clarification on the tenth chapter, especially on its interaction with paleontology. After that, two constructive observations follow. The first is related to Kärkkäinen's notion of the embeddedness of human nature, and the second is to further employ systems thinking in his constructive work on creation and human evolution.     

What a drag it is being relational: Developing planetary identities

Feminists scholars, among others, have long argued for a relational understanding of identity and the self. More recently queer theory and the new materialisms have taken that understanding and placed it within an evolutionary and planetary perspective. As most modern, western understandings of law, politics, and ethics take the individual as the base unit for reflection, what might this relational, planetary identity mean in terms of ethics? This brief essay explores some of the religious and theoretical supports for a relational, planetary self, and then develops a type of ethic that is based upon a critical romanticism for the planet.