Does the Awareness of Mortality Shape People's Openness to Violence and Conflict? An Examination of Terror Management Theory

Terror management theory (TMT) proposes that evoking death‐related thoughts (mortality salience; MS) in individuals or groups can lead to stronger worldview defence and greater support for extremist violence. In three experiments, we tested whether an MS manipulation, and associated moderators, increased support for extremist violence. In Australian university students, Study 1 found no statistically significant main or moderated effects for MS on measures of extremist violence. However, participants exposed to the MS manipulation reported increases in conservative religiosity (belief in divine power). In Study 2, the MS manipulation had no significant effect on support for extremist violence for Australian university students primed with an antiviolent extremism norm. And in young Australian Jewish people (Study 3), the MS manipulation did not increase support for violence against migrants. However, there was an increase in support for policies that act to fight against violent extremism in Iraq and Syria in those exposed to the MS manipulation. Across three studies, we find little support for the hypothesis that MS results in increased support for violent extremism. Larger more methodological sound studies are needed to address inconsistencies in the evidence surrounding TMT and the MS hypothesis, at least in regards to violence and extremism.     

Playing the Woman Card: Ambivalent Sexism in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Race

Late in the 2016 U.S. Presidential primary, Donald Trump attacked Hillary Clinton for playing the “woman’s card.” Theories of system justification suggest that attitudes about gender, particularly endorsement of hostile and benevolent sexism, likely shaped reactions to this campaign attack. Using a set of two studies, we find that hostile sexists exposed to the attack showed increased support for Trump and decreased support for Clinton. Benevolent sexists, however, reacted to Trump’s statements with increased support for Clinton, consistent with benevolent sexism’s focus on protecting women (Study 1). We further found that the woman card attack produced distinct emotional reactions among those with low and high levels of hostile and benevolent sexism. The attack also increased political participation among hostile sexists (Study 2). Our results offer new insights into the role of sexism in the 2016 presidential contest and further the discipline’s understanding of the gendered dimension of negative campaigning.     

Political Attitudes and the Processing of Misinformation Corrections

Misinformation often continues to influence people’s memory and inferential reasoning after it has been retracted; this is known as the continued influence effect (CIE). Previous research investigating the role of attitude‐based motivated reasoning in this context has found conflicting results: Some studies have found that worldview can have a strong impact on the magnitude of the CIE, such that retractions are less effective if the misinformation is congruent with a person’s relevant attitudes, in which case the retractions can even backfire. Other studies have failed to find evidence for an effect of attitudes on the processing of misinformation corrections. The present study used political misinformation—specifically fictional scenarios involving misconduct by politicians from left‐wing and right‐wing parties—and tested participants identifying with those political parties. Results showed that in this type of scenario, partisan attitudes have an impact on the processing of retractions, in particular (1) if the misinformation relates to a general assertion rather than just a specific singular event and (2) if the misinformation is congruent with a conservative partisanship.     

The role of right-wing authoritarianism and political sophistication in shaping attitudes toward redistribution

Using data from the Austrian National Election Study (Study 1) and the American National Election Study (Study 2), this research investigated the role of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) in shaping attitudes toward governmental action related to the redistribution of wealth. We show that RWA is a relevant variable in explaining attitudes toward redistribution policies, and that the association between RWA and redistribution attitudes is moderated by political sophistication. RWA was associated with opposition to redistribution policies among individuals high in political sophistication, while among individuals low in political sophistication, RWA was either associated with support for redistribution policies (Study 1) or unrelated to redistribution attitudes (Study 2). Results suggest that exposure to the political discourse in a society affects how psychological needs and motives are related to preferences regarding the redistribution of wealth through the government.     

The Political Consequences of Combat: Post‐Traumatic Stress and Political Alienation Among Vietnam Veterans

On average, veterans are more civically and politically engaged than civilians. Previous research on the effects of military service, however, did not account for differences in veterans’ combat experiences. Using survey data from a representative sample of Vietnam veterans, this study presents evidence that veterans who were exposed to severe combat trauma and veterans who exhibited attitudes and fears associated with post‐traumatic stress had significantly lower levels of political efficacy and trust. The negative consequences of combat exposure and post‐traumatic stress are not mitigated when veterans have quality social support or when they seek professional counseling. These findings inform political psychology and hold implications for claims regarding the empowering influence of service in the U.S. military, increased political engagement, in particular. Among Vietnam veterans, exposure to severe combat trauma and post‐traumatic stress were both associated with reduced political efficacy and trust.     

When Beliefs Lead to (Im)Moral Action: How Believing in Torture's Effectiveness Shapes the Endorsement of Its Use

Does believing in torture's effectiveness shape the endorsements of its use? Using a multimethod approach across six studies, we provide converging evidence that efficacy beliefs can help increase understanding of individual differences and situational influences on torture support. Studies 1a and 1b found that torture opinions contained more efficacy‐based language than other types of harm and that people relied more on torture efficacy than torture's inherent morality when conveying their views. Study 2 assessed predictors of torture favorability including effectiveness and other key covariates, revealing that efficacy beliefs strongly predicted torture favorability—an association that retained its predictive validity above and beyond individual differences known to influence torture support. Mediation analyses further showed that efficacy beliefs explained key associations with torture support. Studies 3 and 4 used moral dilemmas requiring decisions about torture versus other harm. Results showed that individuals who believed harm would be effective were more likely to endorse its use; this was especially evident for torture judgments. Study 5 replicated the torture‐efficacy effect while also revealing efficacy effects for other interrogation techniques, thus suggesting the effect is driven more by the instrumental objective of torture than harm or moral violations. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

Trust,Distrust, and Security: An Untrustworthy Immigrant in a Trusting Community

In security studies, there is an unquestioned assumption of a linear link between trust and security. However, such an assumption neglects complex identity dynamics that can be involved in trust‐building discourses for engendering security. There needs to be greater examination into what is meant by trust, and upon what, and whom, and how the politics of identity works in social trust building and how states can influence this process. This article contributes to the literature on trust, security, and identity in International Relations (IR) by making a case for a conceptual focus on the formation of particularized distrust towards “the other” as a corollary to trust and security of “the self.” It is argued that in the construction of a political community where security is associated with trust, particularized distrust can also be promoted through institutional discourses—strengthening the “trusting we” by constructing “the other” who can challenge social trust and feelings of security associated with it. The argument is illustrated through critically examining a state‐level narrative in Norway in relation to “the other,” that is, the immigrant. Through this illustrative example, mutual constitutiveness of trust and distrust in a self/other discursive construction will be shown.     

面孔吸引力和信息正确性对幼儿选择性信任的影响

实验1采用3×2×2 的混合设计, 考察4~6岁幼儿获取全新信息时基于面孔吸引力的选择性信任及其特点。结果显示：(1) 4~6岁的男孩和女孩均表现出对高面孔吸引力者的选择性信任。(2)在选择性信任程度方面：5岁比4岁高, 而4岁和6岁之间、5岁和6岁之间则相同; 女孩在询问任务中比男孩表现出更高的选择性信任, 在赞同任务中则相同。那么, 幼儿的这种选择性信任是否受到信息正确性的调节?为此, 实验2采用2×3的被试间设计, 探讨信息提供者提供信息的正确性对4~6岁幼儿基于面孔吸引力的选择性信任的影响。结果显示：在正确性为50% vs. 50%条件下, 幼儿未对信息提供者产生选择性信任; 在正确性为25% vs. 75%条件下, 幼儿对提供较大正确性信息的低面孔吸引力者产生了选择性信任。研究结果表明：(1)在信息缺乏时, 4~6岁幼儿普遍存在有偏见的选择性信任; 女孩比男孩更易受到社会偏见因素的影响。(2)在信息明确时, 4~6岁幼儿也能做出相对理性的选择性信任。     

Position,Preference and Personality: A Microlevel Explanation of Negativity in Day‐To‐Day Politics

While many scholars investigate the determinants of negativity in the political sphere, it remains largely unclear why some politicians are more negative than others. Studies thus far lack explanations at the individual level, and they almost exclusively focus on negativity during electoral races. Surveying national and regional representatives in Belgium (N = 228), this study seeks to explain individual politicians’ willingness to go negative during everyday politics. The results show that negativity is not so much related to institutionally driven differences between representatives but more to politicians’ personal characteristics and preference roles. Negative politics, hence, is not an inevitable result of institutional structures, rules, and norms, but rather depends on the characteristics and motivations of the individual representatives citizens elect.     

Motivating Political Participation Among Youth: An Analysis of Factors Related to Adolescents’ Political Engagement

Prior research has identified political efficacy and political interest as strong predictors of political participation, but few studies have examined these two attitudes in tandem or compared their relative importance vis‐à‐vis political participation. Drawing on the expectancy‐value model of motivation, we begin to address this research gap while also considering several related issues. Our sample includes a diverse group of high school students in grades 10, 11, and 12 (N = 422) from the midwestern United States. Through quantitative analyses of participants’ survey data, we found that political interest (a central aspect of value) and political efficacy (closely related to expectancy) predicted participants’ expected future political participation, controlling for background characteristics—and that political interest was a particularly strong predictor. In addition, we identified political‐engagement differences on various demographic measures, such as grade level. We also found a significant interaction between political interest and internal political efficacy, suggesting that high levels of both attitudes can have an especially positive effect on adolescents’ political participation. We discuss the implications of these findings for researchers and educators interested in fostering political engagement among youth.