Religious Right,Religious Left,Both, or Neither? Understanding Religio‐Political Identification

In this article we analyze the effects of religious, political, socioeconomic, and demographic variables on religious Americans’ propensity to identify with religio‐political movements. Using data from the 2013 Economic Values Survey collected by the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI), we sort nonsecular Americans into four categories: religious right, religious left, both religious right and religious left, or neither religious right nor the religious left. We estimate a multinomial logit model in which we depict religio‐political identification as a function of religious affiliation, worship attendance, religious embeddedness, religious convictions, political attitudes, and socioeconomic and demographic controls. We find that a wide range of religious, political, and socioeconomic/demographic variables affect individuals’ identification with the religious right and/or religious left. Our empirical results also permit us to analyze the seeming paradox of identifying with both the religious right and the religious left. We find that individuals who identify with both movements come from the ranks of the highly religious, those who believe that being moral requires one to believe in God, Tea Party supporters, strong partisans, those with lower education and income, older individuals, and blacks and Hispanics.     

Right- and left-wing prejudice toward dissimilar groups in cultural and economic domains

According to recent studies, people on both the political right and left show prejudice toward groups whose beliefs are in conflict with their own. This prediction applies to both cultural and economic dimensions of political beliefs. In three studies (N = 499) we demonstrate that people on both the cultural and economic right and left show negative attitudes toward groups on the other side of the given spectrum and that underlying this effect is the perception of value violation. In two out of three studies, we manipulated the extremity of target worldviews to further explore the causal chain between political beliefs, the perception of value violation, and prejudice. Our results showed a high degree of symmetry between the political left and right in their attitudes toward groups with dissimilar beliefs. However, although people on both sides of the political spectrum show prejudice toward each other, people on the cultural and economic right seem to be more sensitive to value violations than people on the left.     

Liberalism and Conservatism,for a Change! Rethinking the Association Between Political Orientation and Relation to Societal Change

According to common wisdom, which is supported by extant psychological theorizing, a core feature of political conservatism (vs. liberalism) is the resistance to (vs. acceptance of) societal change. We propose that an empirical examination of the actual difference in political liberals’ and conservatives’ attitudes toward change across different sociopolitical issues may call into question this assumed association between political orientation and relation to change. We examined this proposition in four studies conducted in Germany. In Study 1, we assessed lay people's intuitions about liberals’ and conservatives’ attitudes toward change. Results of this study concur with theoretical assumptions that liberals accept and conservatives resist change. In Study 2a, Study 2b, and Study 3, self‐identified liberals and conservatives were asked whether they would resist or accept change on various sociopolitical issues. Results of these studies suggest that both conservatives and liberals resist and accept societal changes, depending on the extent to which they approve or disapprove of the status quo on a given sociopolitical issue. Overall, our findings provide no evidence for a one‐directional association between political orientation and the tendency to accept or resist change. These findings therefore challenge theoretical and lay assumptions regarding general, context‐independent psychological differences underlying political ideologies.     

Deep Alignment with Country Shrinks the Moral Gap Between Conservatives and Liberals

Moral foundations theory suggests that relative to liberals, conservatives care more about values that are believed to bind group members together: loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and purity/degradation. In contrast, we propose that individuals who are deeply aligned (“fused”) with their group should display elevated commitment to group‐oriented moral values, regardless of their political orientation. The results of three studies supported this hypothesis. The tendency for conservatives to endorse the binding foundations more than liberals only emerged among weakly and moderately fused Americans. In fact, liberals strongly fused with the United States endorsed “binding” foundations more than average conservatives and to the same extent as strongly fused conservatives. These results indicate that to fully understand moral prerogatives, one must consider the nature of the connections people form to the group, as well as their political orientation.     

Emotion,Sophistication and Political Behavior: Evidence From a Laboratory Experiment

The way emotions affect political behavior has been a central theme in politics since ancient times, but it is only in the past few decades that it has been the focus of rigorous empirical inquiry. Recent empirical research suggests that emotions may affect different groups of people in distinct ways, but experimental evidence remains scant. Through a double‐blind experiment, this article investigates the degree to which emotions (shame and anger) motivate people with different levels of political sophistication to be more politically active. The findings are two‐fold: (1) Once treated with shame, more sophisticated individuals are more likely to change their political behavior than less sophisticated ones; and (2) once treated with anger, it is people with low levels of prior political involvement who are more likely to report a change in their behavior. The findings highlight the potential of going beyond the existing investigations by adding shame in empirical analyses of how emotions affect behavioral change. The evidence here also shows that different emotions might display different patterns of interaction with sophistication. Practically, the findings point to an emotional venue for the mobilization of citizens who are generally difficult to engage in political life.     

孙中山的心理建设思想及其现实意义

心理建设思想是孙中山革命和建设理论的重要内容。目前, 学术界对孙中山的思想在哲学、政治、文化等领域, 做了较多研究, 而从心理学视角的探索还较少。孙中山非常重视人的心理对社会政治的巨大作用, 强调心理建设对于人类发展和进步的重要意义。心理建设在他的革命与建国方略中具有极为重要的地位, 他创造性地提出了“知难行易”的命题, 强调了科学认知的艰难和重要性, 体现了孙中山独特的知行观。突出了心理建设在革命与建设中的核心价值和引领作用, 主张心理建设与社会发展和国家建设相联系。在当今时代中, 孙中山的心理建设思想依旧熠熠生辉, 他的奋斗精神、思路与方法已经成为我们实现民族复兴和现代化建设的宝贵精神财富, 具有重要的启迪作用和现实意义。     

政德——政权兴亡的生命线

中国自古就存在政治伦理 ,即“政德”。汉初的思想家们更加重视“政德” ,将其视为一切政权的生命线。     

综论我国古代易学及相关术数学的政治决策作用

我国古代的预测学,主要由原始占卜术、《周易》占筮学、术数学三部分组成。由于落后生产力条件的制约,我国历代的预测学术在各种政治决策中都起着至为重要的作用。本文以学术文化对政治决策的影响为视点,分别从三个方面梳理和论证古代预测学术变异发展的脉络及其决策功用:原始占卜术对上古政治决策的左右;《周易》原理在政治决策中的功用;易学术数的发展对政治决策的影响。文中对易学与术数关系研究方面存在的个别问题,也发表了看法。     

The Perceiver's Share: Realism, Scepticism, and Response Dependence

Abstract: Response‐dispositional (RD) properties are standardly defined as those that involve an object's appearing thus or thus to some perceptually well‐equipped observer under specified epistemic conditions. The paradigm instance is that of colour or other such Lockean “secondary qualities”, as distinct from those—like shape and size—that pertain to the object itself, quite apart from anyone's perception. This idea has lately been thought to offer a promising alternative to the deadlocked dispute between hard‐line ‘metaphysical’ realists and subjectivists, projectivists, social constructivists, or hard‐line anti‐realists. A chief source text is Plato's Euthyphro, where the issue is posed in ethical terms: do the gods infallibly approve virtuous acts on account of their divine moral omniscience or are virtuous acts just those the gods approve? Among the areas proposed as amenable to an RD approach are epistemology, ethics, political theory, and philosophy of mathematics. It is claimed that by making due allowance for the involvement of normalised or optimised human responses one can steer a course between the twin poles of an objectivist realism that places truth beyond our cognitive grasp and an epistemic conception that confines truth within the limits of humanly attainable proof, knowledge, or verification. Here I argue—on the contrary—that RD approaches can be shown to offer nothing more than a variant of the same old realist versus anti‐realist dilemma. That is, they work out either as a trivial (tautologous) claim that ‘truth’ simply equates with ‘best judgement’ in the ideal (quasi‐objective) limit or as the claim—advanced by anti‐realists like Michael Dummett—that we cannot form any adequate conception of objective (recognition‐transcendent) truths. After looking at this issue in various contexts of debate, I conclude that one useful (if pyrrhic) outcome is to demonstrate the non‐availability of any middle‐ground stance. We are left with the strictly unavoidable choice between a realist or objectivist approach and one that assimilates truth to the consensus of accredited best opinion. This latter amounts to a roundabout, elaborately qualified version of the anti‐realist case.     

Making a Party Leader Less of a Party Member: The Impact of Ambivalence on Assimilation and Contrast Effects in Political Party Attitudes

The present study tested the degree to which attitudes about a political party would be influenced by the context in which the party leader was rendered cognitively accessible. A sample of British undergraduates evaluated Prime Minister Tony Blair before expressing their opinion about the Labour party. In one condition, the two items were structured such that Blair was expected to be included in participants' representation of the party. In a second condition, the same items were structured such that Blair was expected to be excluded from participants' representation of the party. The results supported the hypothesis that manipulating the context in which Blair was made salient would produce different effects on a subsequent judgment of the Labour party, but only among politically ambivalent respondents.