Knowledge and True Belief at Theaetetus 201a–c

This paper examines a passage in the Theaetetus (201a–c) where Plato distinguishes knowledge from true belief by appealing to the example of a jury hearing a case. While the jurors may have true belief, Socrates puts forward two reasons why they cannot achieve knowledge. The reasons for this nescience have typically been taken to be in tension with each other (most notably by Myles Burnyeat). This paper proposes a solution to the putative difficulty by arguing that what links the two cases of nescience is that in neither case do the jurors act from an epistemic virtue and that doing so is a necessary condition of knowledge. Appreciating that it is a necessary condition of knowledge that it be the result of an epistemic agent's agency in a distinctive way provides a satisfying solution to the difficulty Burnyeat detected and also does justice to an otherwise neglected aspect of Plato's epistemology: his talk of cognitive capacities and virtues and his focus on what it is that is active and passive in epistemic processes.     

Political agency and violence: understanding the causes of the Mountain Meadows Massacre

ABSTRACT

In contrast to political power – a generalised capacity for modifying the behaviour of other actors – the article conceptualises political agency as the actions of political actors which actually cause other actors to behave in a certain way. Analysing agency consists of identifying agents, actual veto players whose (in)actions lead to the outcomes in question, and explaining the causal relation between their (in)actions and the behaviour of other actors. Thus conceptualised, agency becomes an empirically grounded, value-free synonym for the more emotionally charged notions of political or moral responsibility. This model of political agency is then applied to an empirical analysis of the Mountain Meadows Massacre, a mass murder of emigrants in Utah committed by Mormons and Native Americans in 1857. Three categories of factors are invoked – cultural, institutional and behavioural – to recreate the chain of necessary, sufficient, SUIN and INUS causes which led up to the event.     

Self-Reference enhances memory for multi-element events judged likely to happen in young and older adults

ABSTRACT

We investigated whether the strategy of self-reference can benefit memory for multi-element events, a kind of relational memory that is relatively less studied but highly relevant to daily life. Young and older adults imagined different person-object-location events with reference to themselves and two famous others (i.e., George Clooney and Oprah Winfrey), rated the likelihood that each event would happen, and then completed incidental memory tests on different pairs of elements within the event. We found that self-reference enhanced memory for object-location and person-object pairs in both age groups. Such self-reference effects were observed consistently only for events rated as likely to happen. There was also an overall memory advantage for the higher-likelihood events, which did not differ between young and older adults. Further, the self-reference effects were not correlated with memory functioning in either age group. Retrieval of within-event associations showed a significant level of dependency, which did not differ as a function of reference condition or likelihood category. These findings highlight the ways in which self-reference and prior knowledge improve relational memory, and suggest that the advantage of self-reference is not attributable to increased dependence of elements within complex events.     

Platonic Knowledge and the Standard Analysis

Abstract

In this paper I explore Plato’s reasons for his rejection of the so‐called standard analysis of knowledge as justified true belief. I argue that Plato held that knowledge is an infallible mental state in which (a) the knowable is present in the knower and (b) the knower is aware of this presence. Accordingly, knowledge (epistēmē) is non‐propositional. Since there are no infallible belief states, the standard analysis, which assumes that knowledge is a type of belief, cannot be correct. In addition, I argue that Plato held that belief (doxa) is only possible for the sort of being capable of knowledge. This is because self‐reflexivity is necessary for infallible knowledge and self‐reflexivity is only possible if the intellect is immaterial. This capacity for self‐reflexivity is also essential for belief, since beliefs are, paradigmatically, not dispositions but self‐reflexive mental states.     

Entitlement to Self‐Knowledge and Brute Error

Abstract

I discuss Burge’s argument that our entitlement to self‐knowledge consists in the constitutive relation between the second‐order review of thoughts and the thoughts reviewed, and defend it against Peacocke’s criticism. I then argue that though our entitlement to self‐knowledge is neutral to different environments, as Burge claims, the consideration of Burge’s own notion of brute error shows that Burge’s effort to reconcile externalism and self‐knowledge is not successful.     

Knowledge of Memory Aging Across the Lifespan

ABSTRACT. The authors examined knowledge of normal and pathological memory aging in a lifespan sample of 198 individuals who ranged in age from 13 to 88 years. Participants completed the Knowledge of Memory Aging Questionnaire (Cherry, Brigman, Hawley, & Reese, 2003). The authors hypothesized that high school students would be less knowledgeable about memory aging issues than college students, middle-aged, and community-dwelling older adults. Consistent with this hypothesis, response accuracy was lower for high school students compared to their older counterparts. Follow-up analyses revealed that high school students’ responses to a subset of questions that tap ageist views of adult cognition were less accurate than the other age groups, implying a response bias toward stereotypical images of memory aging. Implications for research and the design of instructional materials to increase people's knowledge about normative changes in adult cognition are discussed.     

Children's Understanding of Behavioral Consequences of Epistemic States: A Comparison of Knowledge,Ignorance, and False Belief

The author addressed the issue of the simultaneity of false belief and knowledge understanding by investigating children's ability to predict the behavioral consequences of knowledge, ignorance, and false belief. The second aim of the study was to explore the role of counterfactuals in knowledge understanding. Ninety-nine (99) children, age 3–7 years old, completed the unexpected transfer task and a newly designed task in which a protagonist experienced 1 of the following 4 situations: knowing a fact, not knowing a fact, knowing a procedure, and not knowing a procedure. The results showed that factual ignorance was as difficult as false belief for the children, whereas the other conditions were all easier than false belief, suggesting that the well-known lag between ignorance and false belief may be partly methodologically based. The results provide support for a common underlying conceptual system for both knowing and believing, and evidence of the role of counterfactual reasoning in the development of epistemic state understanding. Methodological variations of the new task are proposed for future research.     

Motor Learning as a Function of KR Schedule and Characteristics of Task-Intrinsic Feedback

Forty participants (age range = 18–35 years) practiced 1 of 2 versions of an aiming task (with or without spring resistance). Knowledge of results (KR) was provided to them either immediately or after a delay of 2 trials. Immediate KR led to significantly more accurate performance during the 80 trials in acquisition but significantly less accurate performance on a 40-trial retention test given 24 hr after practice. In addition, the spring version of the task was performed significantly less accurately than the no-spring version on the 24-hr retention test. Most important, a significant interaction on the 24-hr retention test revealed that performance of the no-spring version of the task, when KR had been given after a 2-trial delay, was significantly more accurate than performance of the other 3 combinations of task version and KR schedule. The results suggest that KR dependency in motor skill learning is related to familiarity with task-intrinsic feedback in addition to the schedule on which KR is presented.     

Contextual Interference in Movements of the Same Class: Differential Effects on Program and Parameter Learning

Contextual interference effects in motor learning usually were not found when the tasks to be learned presumably required the same generalized motor program (GMP) and differed only with regard to the movement parameters (see Lee, Wulf, & Schmidt, 1992; Magill & Hall, 1990). Thus, tasks requiring different motor programs (e.g., different relative timings) seemed to be a prerequisite for random practice to be more effective than blocked practice. However, the previous studies (that did not find random/blocked differences) used global error measures that confounded errors in relative timing and errors in absolute timing. In the present study, subjects practiced three movement patterns that had the same relative timing (requiring the same GMP) but different overall durations (requiring different parameters). Errors in relative timing and in absolute timing were assessed separately. The results indicate that random practice is more effective for the learning of relative timing (GMP learning) and less effective for the learning of absolute timing (parameter learning) than blocked practice. Preliminary ideas as to the reasons for this effect are discussed.