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11.
Paula A. G. Soneral Sara E. Brownell M. Elizabeth Barnes 《Journal for the scientific study of religion》2023,62(1):184-202
Christians are notably underrepresented in science in part due to long-standing public perceptions of science-religion incompatibility and antireligious bias in science. This research explores whether undergraduates at a Christian university perceive and impose anti-Christian cultural stigma in science. Survey results from 126 biology students revealed that though students generally perceived the culture of science to be anti-Christian, they perceived Christians to have equal opportunities for scientific achievement. Results from a quasi-experimental audit study, in which students evaluated one of two profiles for mock prospective Ph.D. applicants (Christian or undisclosed faith) showed that students did not project anti-Christian stereotypes in terms of competence, hireability, or likeability, but showed some evidence of pro-Christian favorability. Together, this study suggests that the affirmational community of a Christian University may alleviate some negative impacts of anti-Christian stereotypes in academic biology, even as students perceive discrimination against Christians in science and atheists as more scientifically competent. 相似文献
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Régine Debrosse 《European journal of social psychology》2023,53(3):471-485
With increasing awareness about racism, portrayals of communities of colour are shifting away from negative representations. Emphasizing their strengths could counter negative stereotypes about who they are and low expectations for who they can be, but could also backfire. In two experiments centring adolescents (n = 198) and adults of colour (n = 321), the effect of reflecting on a typical strength was moderated by perceived misalignments between racial/ethnic and ideal future selves (i.e., ethnic–ideal self-discrepancy). For participants perceiving them as aligned, reflecting on a typical in-group strength reduced actual–ideal self-discrepancy. However, for participants perceiving them as misaligned, reflecting on a typical in-group strength increased actual–ideal self-discrepancy. Reflecting on a typical strength also indirectly influenced engagement, through actual–ideal self-discrepancy. Reflecting on an atypical in-group strength did not yield significant effects. Thus, emphasizing typical aspects of stigmatized communities, even when positive, sometimes impede identity and motivation. 相似文献
14.
Politicians’ support of or opposition to concrete policies is uniquely consequential for policymaking, public opinion, and a host of other societal outcomes. Explaining their policy positions is therefore a major research agenda in political science. Here, we evaluate the role of politicians’ personality traits, measured with the Big Five typology, in shaping how liberal or conservative their economic and social policy positions are. While existing research establishes this link among nonelites, it is far from obvious that the same holds for politicians, who have systematically different personality profiles, and whose positions are constrained by party lines. Using an in-person study of 893 legislators in five countries who completed personality questionnaires and provided detailed issue positions, we find that Openness to Experience is strongly and positively predictive of politicians’ liberal positions on both economic and social policies, but a null relationship for Conscientiousness. We also find that Extraversion predicts more conservative economic (but not social) policy positions. We discuss implications for the role of elites’ individual characteristics in policymaking. 相似文献
15.
Francesco Rigoli 《Political psychology》2023,44(2):301-318
Research exploring the psychological differences between people supporting extreme versus moderate ideologies is growing. However, this research has rarely examined the domain of values. Here, we explore this domain by assessing the possibility that political extremists discriminate more among values compared to moderates, namely, that extremists exhibit strong commitment toward some values at the expense of other values, whereas moderates would acknowledge a multiplicity of values as equally important. First, we propose a model positing that a value discriminability parameter captures a general tendency to discriminate among values. Second, we test empirically the prediction that, compared to moderates, political extremists exhibit a higher discriminability parameter. This prediction is supported by four studies (including one based on the European Social Survey where representative samples from 29 European countries are examined) where participants reported their ideological orientation and rated the importance of basic human values (we focused on basic values because these transcend the political domain, thus highlighting general effects). Specifically, in all studies we observed a positive correlation between political extremism and residual variability in ratings, a hallmark of a higher discriminability parameter. These findings highlight the value domain as critical to understanding differences between political extremists and moderates. 相似文献
16.
Western scholarship has underlined the relevance of social identity, perceived efficacy, emotions, and cost–benefit assessments as central catalysts of collective action. Little has been done to understand the context-sensitivity of these catalysts by means of cross-culturally comparative designs. The current study explores their context-sensitivity. It aims to find out whether existing opportunity structures in a democratic, nonrepressive country like Germany produce catalysts of collective action different from those produced in an autocratic, repressive country like Turkey. It also aims to understand the role of social media in mobilizing people in these two contexts. Semistandardized interviews with activists were carried out in both countries (n = 18 in Germany and n = 15 in Turkey) and analyzed by means of a cross-culturally comparative inductive coding procedure including initial and focused coding. Results show that collective action is related to different configurations of collective-action catalysts in the two countries. Solidarity concerns at the face of existential risks are more pronounced in Turkey, whereas political-change concerns are more important in Germany. The role of social media accordingly differs, adhering to the different activist goals. Theoretical implications for the role of context in studying collective action are discussed. 相似文献
17.
Fanny Lalot Dominic Abrams Maria S. Heering Jacinta Babaian Hilal Ozkececi Linus Peitz Kaya Davies Hayon Jo Broadwood 《Political psychology》2023,44(5):983-1011
We test the hypothesis that COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy is attributable to distrustful complacency—an interactive combination of low concern and low trust. Across two studies, 9,695 respondents from different parts of Britain reported their level of concern about COVID-19, trust in the UK government, and intention to accept or refuse the vaccine. Multilevel regression analysis, controlling for geographic area and relevant demographics, confirmed the predicted interactive effect of concern and trust. Across studies, respondents with both low trust and low concern were 10%–22% more vaccine hesitant than respondents with either high trust or high concern, and 26%–29% more hesitant than respondents with both high trust and high concern. Results hold equally among White, Black, and Muslim respondents, consistent with the view that regardless of mean-level differences, a common process underlies vaccine hesitancy, underlining the importance of tackling distrustful complacency both generally and specifically among unvaccinated individuals and populations. 相似文献
18.
Linet R. Durmuşoğlu Sarah L. de Lange Theresa Kuhn Wouter van der Brug 《Political psychology》2023,44(3):583-601
Research shows that parents have a strong influence on the party preferences of their children. Yet little is known about how such preferences are transmitted in multiparty systems with weak party identification and high electoral volatility. We propose a model of intergenerational transmission that includes both direct effects of parents' party preferences on those of their children, as well as indirect effects through left–right and issue positions. We test this model with original survey data of Dutch adolescents (14–20 years old) and their parents (N = 751 adolescent-parent pairs). We find two paths through which parents exert influence on the party preferences of their adolescent children. On the first path, parental party preferences function as a direct predictor of adolescent party preferences. On the second path, adolescent left–right and issue positions function as a mediator between parental left–right and issue positions and adolescent party preferences, with the effect of left–right positions being stronger than that of issue positions. The frequency with which adolescents discuss political topics with their parents moderates these effects. 相似文献
19.
Anna Kende Hadi Sam Nariman Boglárka Nyúl Constantina Badea Barbara Lášticová Yara Mahfud Andreea Gruev-Vintila Anca Minescu Ashley O'Connor Mihaela Boza Xenia Daniela Poslon Miroslav Popper Márton Hadarics 《Political psychology》2023,44(5):1077-1095
The way politicians talk about minorities institutes the normative context of intergroup relations. We investigated how endorsement of different political discourses predicts donation and collective action intentions by majority members toward the Roma in five European countries. The survey was conducted online using samples demographically similar to the populations of Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, France, and Ireland (N = 5,054). First, results showed that accepting paternalistic discourse versus discourse promoting allyship were not distinguishable; both promoted higher moral inclusion which in turn predicted higher prosocial intentions. Second, donations (i.e., immediate relief) and collective action (i.e., social change action) were driven by identical factors. Third, acceptance of openly hostile political discourse neither predicted moral exclusion, nor lower prosocial intentions. In summary, our research provides important evidence that when it comes to Roma—non-Roma relations, the previously established distinction between solidarity intentions that aim to solidify status relations versus bring about social change is completely blurred, presumably because of the social context in which any positive message communicates moral inclusion challenging the hostile status quo. 相似文献
20.
A. Timur Sevincer Cindy Galinsky Lena Martensen Gabriele Oettingen 《Political psychology》2023,44(4):829-855
Indices of gender equality provide an inconsistent picture of current gender inequality in countries with relatively high equality. We examined women's and men's subjectively perceived gender inequality and their support for gender equality in the general population and in politicians, respectively, in three countries with relatively high gender equality: the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany (total N = 1,612). In both women's and men's perceptions, women were treated more unequally than men. However, the inequality that women perceived was larger than the inequality men perceived. Additionally, women reported they personally experience less inequality than women as a group (person-group discrepancy). Finally, women's and men's left/liberal (vs. right/conservative) political ideology turned out to be a relatively more powerful predictor of support for gender equality than perceived personal and societal inequality. We discuss reasons for why political ideology emerged as the strongest predictor of equality support and sketch out implications for policy efforts toward promoting gender equality. 相似文献