Motives Don't Matter? Motive Attribution and Counterterrorism Policy

Across three studies, two experiments, and two different countries (Israel and the United States), we examine how perceptions among members of the public regarding the motives of terrorists' influence support for counterterrorist policy. We find that while perceptions that terrorists are motivated by “hatred” (rather than by a “lack of opportunity”—economic or otherwise) strongly correlate with support for harsher counter-tactics, and that these perceptions can be changed by providing information from “experts” on the “true” motivations of the outgroup, these changes in perception do not appear to cause change in support for counterterrorism policy. Our findings suggest that among the public, counterterror policy is not as instrumentally driven as much current research assumes.     

Personal Contact with Refugees is Key to Welcoming Them: An Analysis of Politicians' and Citizens' Attitudes Towards Refugee Integration

Politicians are influential both in directing policies about refugees and in framing public discourse about them. However, unlike other host country residents, politicians' attitudes towards refugees and integration are remarkably understudied. We therefore examine similarities and differences between politicians' attitudes towards refugee integration and those held by citizens. Based on the stereotype content model, we expect that political ideology informs stereotypes about refugees, which subsequently shape attitudes towards refugee integration. Based on the Contact Hypothesis, we further argue that personal contact with refugees reduces negative stereotypes about them—in particular for those endorsing a right-wing ideology. We draw on data collected via two surveys with 905 politicians and 8013 citizens in the Netherlands to show that (1) unlike those with a left-wing orientation, residents (i.e., both politicians and citizens) with a right-wing orientation hold more negative stereotypes about refugees, which in turn relate to more negative attitudes towards refugee integration; (2) personal contact with refugees is associated with less negative stereotypes among residents; and (3) politicians, compared to citizens, report less negative stereotypes and more positive attitudes towards refugee integration. The practical implication of fostering residents' contact with refugees as well as the implications for future research are discussed.     

Redefining the Meaning of Negative History in Times of Sociopolitical Change: A Social Creativity Approach

This article explores the role negative history plays in political discourse on crisis management and how times of sociopolitical change in turn influence the strategies that can be employed to write a positive historical charter. Choosing Germany as a case study, we analyzed how political leaders negotiate Germany's narrative and political role during the European “refugee crisis” in speeches (n = 332) held between 2015 and 2018. Applying a combination of corpus-based and qualitative narrative analysis, we found that the context of a crisis is used to attach new meaning to Germany's role in World War II. By focusing on the lessons learned from history and pointing out the parallels between the current crisis and sociopolitical developments that took place 80 years ago, Germany is presented as the ideal advocate for a free and united Europe, a narrative that legitimizes its advancingly dominant role within the EU and beyond. The analysis demonstrates how times of change can facilitate social creativity strategies for nations whose past is dominated by negative history, with implications for the theory of identity management.     

The COVID-19–Social Identity–Digital Media Nexus in India: Polarization and Blame

Drawing on social identity theory and research on digital media and polarization, this study uses a quasi-experimental design with a random sample (n = 3304) to provide causal evidence on perceptions of who is to blame for the initial spread of COVID-19 in India. According blame to three different social and political entities—Tablighi Jamaat (a Muslim group), the Modi government, and migrant workers (a heterogeneous group)—are the dependent variables in three OLS regression models testing the effect of the no-blame treatment, controlling for Facebook use, social identity (religion), vote in the 2019 national election, and other demographics. Results show respondents in the treatment group were more likely to allay blame, affective polarization (dislike for outgroup members) was social identity based, not partisan based, and Facebook/Instagram use was not significant. Congress and United Progressive Alliance voters in 2019 were less likely to blame the Modi government for the initial spread. Unlike extant research in western contexts, affective and political polarization appear to be distinct concepts in India where social identity complexity is important. This study of the first wave informs perceptions of blame in future waves, which are discussed in conclusion along with questions for future research.     

Phenomenology of the trickster archetype,U.S. electoral politics and the Black Lives Matter movement

This paper examines the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement in cultural, historical and relational contexts at the intersection of the U.S. Civil Rights movement, U.S. Civil Rights legislation, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and reforms thereto in the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision of Shelby County v Holder, 570 U.S.529 (2013). The intergenerational relations between the BLM movement and these ongoing movements for civil and human rights is underscored. In the wake of protests about the sadistic murder of George Floyd, an unarmed African American man, by a Caucasian police officer, the BLM movement has been mischaracterized as an affront to law and order by the Trump-led U.S. administration. The mischaracterization was a re-election campaign effort designed to ignite ‘white fear’, ‘white rage’ and to defend police brutality and systemic racism. Analytical psychology and the phenomenology of the trickster archetype, as amplified from the African-centric perspective in the Yoruba deity Esu-Elegba, are employed to interrogate partisan obstructionist behaviours that assault multicultural democracy in both contemporary U.S. electoral politics and the political economy. The paper concludes with a brief note on the social activism of Fair Fight Georgia and the integration of its agenda into the BLM movement.     

“Together towards a Banquet”: The Feast as Promise and Resistance in Together Towards Life and Contemporary Theological Discourse

This article explores the symbol of the feast, as proposed by the 2012 World Council of Churches’ affirmation Together towards Life: Mission and Evangelism in Changing Landscapes (TTL). The feast is introduced as an appropriate hermeneutic tool to account for the multi-layered and dynamic reality of human life in the presence of others and in the presence of God. Interpreting the feast, together with TTL, as a symbol of the liberation and reconciliation of the whole creation and of the celebration of life in response to the outreaching love of God, the article reflects on some contemporary theological voices arguing that God’s invitation to the feast of God’s kingdom is a central element of Christian existence. Such feasting is, among other things, characterized by the dynamics of facing, the presence of the other, the awareness of human corporeality, and the particularization of the other that can overcome the idolatrous power of death. Entering this conversation, the present article will argue that the symbol of the feast can helpfully be understood in its two-fold dynamics of promise and resistance. While giving assurance about the transformation of all reality in the coming reign of justice and peace, the symbol of the feast, with its emphasis on inclusiveness and equality, also empowers people to resist all life-denying forces. Walking with the rest of the creation “together towards a banquet,” Christians are thus enabled, it will be asserted, to discern and actively live their vocation.     

Religious Engagement,Civic Skills,and Political Participation in Latin America

To what extent has the growth of Evangelicalism in Latin America contributed to political participation across the region? A number of scholars of religion and politics in the United States have suggested that Evangelicalism promotes the development of civic skills necessary for political engagement, while the Catholic Church, due to its hierarchical structure, provides fewer opportunities for skill acquisition. In this paper, we apply this debate to Latin America to test whether civic skills developed in Catholic and Protestant church activities lead to differential participation rates in 18 countries. We utilize the 2014 Pew Religion in Latin America survey to test these effects, and find that Protestant churches do indeed promote skill-developing activities at higher rates, but that Catholics, when involved, are more likely to translate this religious participation into political action. We conclude that political scientists must better understand the organizational role of religion in promoting political engagement worldwide.     

Spontaneous goal versus spontaneous trait inferences: How ideology shapes attributions and explanations

Past research documented liberals’ greater tendency than conservatives to take situational determinants of others’ actions into account when forming causal attributions, and conservatives’ greater tendency to seek consistency. We hypothesize that liberals (vs. conservatives) should be more likely to make spontaneous goal inferences (SGIs). Conservatives, however, should tend to implicitly infer invariant rather than variant characteristics from others’ behaviors, drawing spontaneous trait inferences (STIs) rather than SGIs. Experiment 1 and 2 supported those hypotheses by illustrating differences in the type of implicit inferences formed by liberals and conservatives in a false recognition paradigm common to the STI literature. Experiment 3 revealed similar differences in conservatives’ and liberals’ goal and trait inferences when making open-ended causal explanations for others’ actions.     

Who is more violent in extremist groups? A comparison of leaders and followers

Few prior studies have examined the extent to which the behavior and characteristics of political extremists are related to their position within radical groups. In this paper we concentrate on one of the most fundamental distinctions in groups: That between leaders and followers. Our main goal is to investigate the comparative propensity of leaders and followers to engage in political violence. In a sample of individuals who have committed ideologically motivated political crimes in the United States (N = 1,331). we found that even though leaders were more ideologically committed to the group's goals and ideologies, they were at the same time less likely to engage in violent acts. Moreover, we found that leaders in radical criminal organizations shared many characteristics with leaders in noncriminal organizations. Specifically, in comparison to followers, they were more often male, older, and they were more likely to belong to an ethnic majority. We consider implications for future research and policy of the fundamental conclusion that compared to leaders, followers in terrorist organizations are more likely to engage in violent acts.     

Right-Wing Ideology as a Predictor of Collective Action: A Test Across Four Political Issue Domains

Despite a vast literature documenting motivations for collective action, the role of sociopolitical ideologies, including right-wing ideologies, in predicting collective action is underresearched. Literature on right-wing ideological beliefs suggests that those higher in right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) or social dominance orientation (SDO) hold specific attitudes or endorse specific policies, in part, because of factors such as perceived fear-based threat or empathy. In the present research, structural equation modeling (SEM) was run on pooled data from a diverse Canadian university sample and two American adult samples (total N = 1,469). Participants completed measures of RWA, SDO, fear-based threat, empathy, and domain-specific collective action. Results showed that RWA and SDO both related positively to collective action targeting societal moral breakdown but negatively to collective action aimed at equalizing race relations or fighting climate change. Whereas the indirect effects of right-wing ideologies via fear-based threat or empathy were significant in all four domains for SDO, the indirect effect of RWA was only significant in the climate change domain. Implications are discussed.