Motivating Political Participation Among Youth: An Analysis of Factors Related to Adolescents’ Political Engagement

Prior research has identified political efficacy and political interest as strong predictors of political participation, but few studies have examined these two attitudes in tandem or compared their relative importance vis‐à‐vis political participation. Drawing on the expectancy‐value model of motivation, we begin to address this research gap while also considering several related issues. Our sample includes a diverse group of high school students in grades 10, 11, and 12 (N = 422) from the midwestern United States. Through quantitative analyses of participants’ survey data, we found that political interest (a central aspect of value) and political efficacy (closely related to expectancy) predicted participants’ expected future political participation, controlling for background characteristics—and that political interest was a particularly strong predictor. In addition, we identified political‐engagement differences on various demographic measures, such as grade level. We also found a significant interaction between political interest and internal political efficacy, suggesting that high levels of both attitudes can have an especially positive effect on adolescents’ political participation. We discuss the implications of these findings for researchers and educators interested in fostering political engagement among youth.     

Rousing the Partisan Combatant: Elite Incivility,Anger, and Antideliberative Attitudes

The claim that elite political incivility can rouse partisan, antideliberative attitudes has many adherents, but the empirical record demonstrating a relationship is surprisingly limited. Yet the extant research suggests that incivility can stimulate aversive feelings, of the sort that discrete and dimensional theories of emotion predict should induce a partisan, antideliberative mode of citizenship among those exposed. Leveraging two online experiments, I address the questions of whether elite incivility provokes anger, rather than enthusiasm and anxiety, and whether the affective reactions induced by incivility yield the changes in deliberative attitudes that theories of emotion predict. I find that elite incivility, when counterattitudinal, rouses anger, which in turn can provoke an active and combative form of partisan citizenship. Despite claims to the contrary, the link between proattitudinal incivility, anger, and antideliberative attitudes is less clear. The results provide insight into the dynamics of discourse in the digital age, when affective polarization is the norm and elites commonly employ uncivil rhetoric.     

Voting “Against Islamization”? How Anti‐Islamic Right‐Wing,Populist Political Campaign Ads Influence Explicit and Implicit Attitudes Toward Muslims as Well as Voting Preferences

We explore the effects of anti‐Islamic right‐wing, populist political campaign ads on voting intention for a right‐wing populist party using a quota‐based online experiment (N = 174). Additionally, we investigate implicit attitudes (i.e., automatic affective associations) and explicit attitudes (i.e., overtly expressed evaluations) toward Muslims as underlying mechanisms of these effects. We find that exposure to the political campaign ads prompts explicit hostile attitudes toward Muslims mediated by implicit attitudes. Explicit attitudes in turn shape voting intention. Moreover, implicit attitudes toward Muslims predict voting preference beyond the influence of explicit attitudes. Thus, resentments toward Muslims may foster voters’ support for anti‐Islamic right‐wing populist parties even “under the radar” of conscious awareness. In sum, this study demonstrates for the first time the entire process of right‐wing, populist political campaign ads’ effects on voting preferences via implicit and explicit attitudes toward Muslims.     

公平感对社会认知的影响:经济因素的调节作用

目的及方法:基于中国综合社会调查2010年数据,采用多层结构方程模型,探究中国民众公平感对社会认知的作用,及经济因素在其中的调节效应。研究结果:第一,公平感越高,则社会冲突感越低,外在政治效能感越高,越倾向于对社会不平等进行内部归因,即对于社会的整体认知更加积极; 第二,经济因素能调节公平感与社会不平等内归因的关系,具体而言,经济水平越低,则公平感对于社会不平等的内部归因正向预测作用越大。     

The use of the political categories of Brexiter and Remainer in online comments about the EU referendum

In June 2016, the United Kingdom held a referendum on EU membership; 52% of those who voted, voted to leave, and 48% voted to remain. During the referendum campaign, two identities emerged: “Brexiter” and “Remainer,” which remained salient post‐referendum. This study explores how the categories of Brexiter and Remainer were deployed by posters online. Data comprise comment threads collected from four online newspapers both during the campaign and after the vote, which focus on the Brexit campaign promise: “We send £350m a week to the EU. Let's fund our NHS instead.” We draw on membership categorization analysis and discursive psychology to analyse when categories were made salient and what responses to the invocation of categories were. Analysis revealed that posters explicitly categorize the out‐group and in doing so implicitly define their group. Posters resisted other political identities when attributed to them in relation to the referendum. The analysis shows how Brexiter and Remainer are new, albeit contested, political categories and identities in their own right, with other political identities resisted when used. The paper highlights implications for the political system in the United Kingdom and for social divisions within U.K. society.     

Examining how people reason about controversial scientific topics

Improving scientific literacy requires examining both what people believe about scientific issues and why they hold those beliefs. We examined how people justified their agreement with statements regarding evolution, climate change, genetically modified foods, and vaccinations. Participants rated their level of agreement with statements reflecting the scientific consensus on these topics, then responded to open-ended questions asking them to justify their position and to generate challenges to their belief. Responses to individual difference measures allowed us to assess the relationship between participants’ positions on these scientific issues and cognitive style, conspiracy ideation, religious service attendance, and political ideology. Qualitative analyses revealed inconsistent and topic-specific patterns of reasoning. Additionally, greater agreement with scientific conclusions was related to a greater predisposition towards analytical thinking and stronger self-reported political liberalism. These findings provide a next step for better understanding why some individuals reject science and for developing more effective means of improving science acceptance.     

Liberal–conservative dimension of moral concerns underlying political faction formation in Taiwan

Moral foundations theory provides a framework for understanding the traditional liberal–conservative dichotomy in political factions. Typically, factions on the liberal side are more concerned with individualizing foundations—including care/harm and fairness/cheating—for the protection of individual rights and welfare whereas factions on the conservative side are concerned with both individualizing and binding foundations—including loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, and sanctity/degradation—for the maintenance of existing social ethics. Our research extended this framework to the analysis of Taiwanese political factions, which are not distributed conspicuously along the liberal–conservative line but instead on whether Taiwan should become a legally independent state or unify with the People's Republic of China (Mainland China). Our results indicate that despite the scarce use of the terms liberal or left and conservative or right in common communication, a liberal–conservative dimension underlies the Taiwanese political spectrum. Specifically, supporters of Taiwan independence exhibit liberal‐like moral concerns whereas supporters of China unification and the status quo demonstrate conservative‐like moral concerns. Moreover, indirect effects exist through moral foundations from political factions to stances on social issues; this is especially prevalent in the case of Taiwan independence camp's clear support for the legalization of same‐sex marriage, a stance resulting from anti‐authoritarian moral and political characteristics.     

Open-minded cognition: The attitude justification effect

Abstract

Although open-mindedness is generally valued, people are not equally open-minded in all situations. Open-mindedness is viewed as socially desirable when individuals encounter viewpoints that are compatible with conventional social norms. However, open-mindedness is viewed in less desirable terms when individuals encounter viewpoints that undermine these norms. The perceived desirability of open-mindedness is also influenced by the individual’s personal attitudinal convictions. Individuals ‘inflate’ the normative appropriateness of open-mindedness when it serves to reinforce their convictions, but devalue the normative appropriateness of open-mindedness when it serves to contradict these convictions. Conversely, normative prohibition of closed-mindedness is exaggerated when a closed-minded orientation threatens the individual’s personal attitudinal convictions, but is minimized (or reversed) when a closed-minded orientation reinforces these convictions. Paradoxically, the perceived appropriateness of open-mindedness is engendered (at least in part) by the motivation to confirm one’s prior attitudinal convictions. Evidence of this attitude justification effect is obtained in two experiments.     

Political consumer behaviour among university students in Brazil and Germany: The role of contextual features and core political values

This study investigates the relationship between political consumerism and core political values (CPVs) among university students in Brazil (N = 414) and Germany (N = 222). Despite the prerequisite to endorse values that are compatible with political consumerism, contextual features of one's immediate environment might affect overall levels of political consumerism. Our results show that political consumerism is significantly associated with higher income in Brazil (but not in Germany). After controlling for income, political consumerism was practised more frequently in Germany than in Brazil, in urban compared with rural areas, and was not dependent on gender. The urban–rural split was stronger in Brazil than in Germany. These results confirm our hypothesis that contextual features are associated with political consumerism. Furthermore, the political value Equality positively predicted political consumerism in both countries. In contrast, Traditional Morality and support of Free Enterprise negatively predicted political consumerism, although the effect sizes of these relationships were only small. These results suggest that political consumerism among university students is widespread in Germany but not in Brazil. Interestingly, regardless of its low prevalence in Brazil, political consumerism is positively associated with the CPV of Equality among university students in both countries.     

When criticism is ineffective: The case of historical trauma and unsupportive allies

Three studies examined the effect of historical trauma reminders and criticism from international allies on attitudes toward current conflicts. In Study 1, Israeli participants (N = 116) were primed with the Holocaust, and read either that the U.S. President Obama supports Israel's right to defend itself and attack Iran, or that he opposes such action. Then, support for preemptive violence was assessed. Study 2 (N = 133) replicated this design, comparing inclusive and exclusive framings of the Holocaust. Study 3 (N = 478), examined the effect of Holocaust reminders and criticism from the European Union on attitudes toward militant policies against Palestinians. All three studies found that Holocaust primes juxtaposed with international criticism increased support for aggression, especially under exclusive framings of the Holocaust. Study 3, however, found this effect only among left‐wing participants. These findings indicate that when historical trauma is salient, international criticism may be ineffective and may even backfire.