Mosques,Churches, and Civic Skill Opportunities in Indonesia

This article examines the role of houses of worship as institutions where individuals acquire civic skills that can be deployed for political participation in the world's largest Muslim‐majority democracy: Indonesia. Drawing on participant observation and interviews in Muslim, Protestant, and Catholic religious communities in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, this article investigates three questions: (1) What opportunities exist for individuals worshipping in Indonesian churches and mosques to develop and practice civic skills as part of their religious engagement? (2) Does civic skill opportunity vary across religious denominations? and (3) What factors might explain variation across different religious settings? The study shows that mosques offer fewer prospects for their worshippers to develop civic skills than do churches. These denominational differences can be explained by a house of worship's management practices, which are shaped by its degree of autonomy, style of worship, and the relative size of the religious denomination.     

The mirror and the hammer: the politics of resacralization

The paper consists of the opening chapter of Andrew Samuels’ book The Political Psyche, published in 1993, together with a retrospective introduction. In the chapter, the author discussed the possibilities and limitations of applying depth psychological thinking to social and political problematics. He situates the attempt to make such applications within a wider movement to refresh and reform Western political endeavours. He terms this wider project ‘resacralization’. The author cautions against psychological reductionism and a simplistic approach to market‐based capitalism, calling for a transformation of the latter to the degree possible. He links sociopolitical criticism and psychological writings on numinous experience, thereby connecting the worlds of politics and depth psychology without losing their separate and unique qualities.     

Does the Awareness of Mortality Shape People's Openness to Violence and Conflict? An Examination of Terror Management Theory

Terror management theory (TMT) proposes that evoking death‐related thoughts (mortality salience; MS) in individuals or groups can lead to stronger worldview defence and greater support for extremist violence. In three experiments, we tested whether an MS manipulation, and associated moderators, increased support for extremist violence. In Australian university students, Study 1 found no statistically significant main or moderated effects for MS on measures of extremist violence. However, participants exposed to the MS manipulation reported increases in conservative religiosity (belief in divine power). In Study 2, the MS manipulation had no significant effect on support for extremist violence for Australian university students primed with an antiviolent extremism norm. And in young Australian Jewish people (Study 3), the MS manipulation did not increase support for violence against migrants. However, there was an increase in support for policies that act to fight against violent extremism in Iraq and Syria in those exposed to the MS manipulation. Across three studies, we find little support for the hypothesis that MS results in increased support for violent extremism. Larger more methodological sound studies are needed to address inconsistencies in the evidence surrounding TMT and the MS hypothesis, at least in regards to violence and extremism.     

Playing the Woman Card: Ambivalent Sexism in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Race

Late in the 2016 U.S. Presidential primary, Donald Trump attacked Hillary Clinton for playing the “woman’s card.” Theories of system justification suggest that attitudes about gender, particularly endorsement of hostile and benevolent sexism, likely shaped reactions to this campaign attack. Using a set of two studies, we find that hostile sexists exposed to the attack showed increased support for Trump and decreased support for Clinton. Benevolent sexists, however, reacted to Trump’s statements with increased support for Clinton, consistent with benevolent sexism’s focus on protecting women (Study 1). We further found that the woman card attack produced distinct emotional reactions among those with low and high levels of hostile and benevolent sexism. The attack also increased political participation among hostile sexists (Study 2). Our results offer new insights into the role of sexism in the 2016 presidential contest and further the discipline’s understanding of the gendered dimension of negative campaigning.     

Political Attitudes and the Processing of Misinformation Corrections

Misinformation often continues to influence people’s memory and inferential reasoning after it has been retracted; this is known as the continued influence effect (CIE). Previous research investigating the role of attitude‐based motivated reasoning in this context has found conflicting results: Some studies have found that worldview can have a strong impact on the magnitude of the CIE, such that retractions are less effective if the misinformation is congruent with a person’s relevant attitudes, in which case the retractions can even backfire. Other studies have failed to find evidence for an effect of attitudes on the processing of misinformation corrections. The present study used political misinformation—specifically fictional scenarios involving misconduct by politicians from left‐wing and right‐wing parties—and tested participants identifying with those political parties. Results showed that in this type of scenario, partisan attitudes have an impact on the processing of retractions, in particular (1) if the misinformation relates to a general assertion rather than just a specific singular event and (2) if the misinformation is congruent with a conservative partisanship.     

The role of right-wing authoritarianism and political sophistication in shaping attitudes toward redistribution

Using data from the Austrian National Election Study (Study 1) and the American National Election Study (Study 2), this research investigated the role of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) in shaping attitudes toward governmental action related to the redistribution of wealth. We show that RWA is a relevant variable in explaining attitudes toward redistribution policies, and that the association between RWA and redistribution attitudes is moderated by political sophistication. RWA was associated with opposition to redistribution policies among individuals high in political sophistication, while among individuals low in political sophistication, RWA was either associated with support for redistribution policies (Study 1) or unrelated to redistribution attitudes (Study 2). Results suggest that exposure to the political discourse in a society affects how psychological needs and motives are related to preferences regarding the redistribution of wealth through the government.     

The Political Consequences of Combat: Post‐Traumatic Stress and Political Alienation Among Vietnam Veterans

On average, veterans are more civically and politically engaged than civilians. Previous research on the effects of military service, however, did not account for differences in veterans’ combat experiences. Using survey data from a representative sample of Vietnam veterans, this study presents evidence that veterans who were exposed to severe combat trauma and veterans who exhibited attitudes and fears associated with post‐traumatic stress had significantly lower levels of political efficacy and trust. The negative consequences of combat exposure and post‐traumatic stress are not mitigated when veterans have quality social support or when they seek professional counseling. These findings inform political psychology and hold implications for claims regarding the empowering influence of service in the U.S. military, increased political engagement, in particular. Among Vietnam veterans, exposure to severe combat trauma and post‐traumatic stress were both associated with reduced political efficacy and trust.     

When Beliefs Lead to (Im)Moral Action: How Believing in Torture's Effectiveness Shapes the Endorsement of Its Use

Does believing in torture's effectiveness shape the endorsements of its use? Using a multimethod approach across six studies, we provide converging evidence that efficacy beliefs can help increase understanding of individual differences and situational influences on torture support. Studies 1a and 1b found that torture opinions contained more efficacy‐based language than other types of harm and that people relied more on torture efficacy than torture's inherent morality when conveying their views. Study 2 assessed predictors of torture favorability including effectiveness and other key covariates, revealing that efficacy beliefs strongly predicted torture favorability—an association that retained its predictive validity above and beyond individual differences known to influence torture support. Mediation analyses further showed that efficacy beliefs explained key associations with torture support. Studies 3 and 4 used moral dilemmas requiring decisions about torture versus other harm. Results showed that individuals who believed harm would be effective were more likely to endorse its use; this was especially evident for torture judgments. Study 5 replicated the torture‐efficacy effect while also revealing efficacy effects for other interrogation techniques, thus suggesting the effect is driven more by the instrumental objective of torture than harm or moral violations. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

Position,Preference and Personality: A Microlevel Explanation of Negativity in Day‐To‐Day Politics

While many scholars investigate the determinants of negativity in the political sphere, it remains largely unclear why some politicians are more negative than others. Studies thus far lack explanations at the individual level, and they almost exclusively focus on negativity during electoral races. Surveying national and regional representatives in Belgium (N = 228), this study seeks to explain individual politicians’ willingness to go negative during everyday politics. The results show that negativity is not so much related to institutionally driven differences between representatives but more to politicians’ personal characteristics and preference roles. Negative politics, hence, is not an inevitable result of institutional structures, rules, and norms, but rather depends on the characteristics and motivations of the individual representatives citizens elect.