Why are moderators of self-other agreement difficult to establish?

Agreement between the self and other rated personality profiles was studied in two samples involving 11,096 speakers of two languages, Dutch and Estonian, who completed two different personality questionnaires, the NEO-PI-3 and HEXACO-PI-R. An outstanding agreement was achieved in the most occasions: in only 4–6% of dyadic pairs was the correlation between two randomly paired profiles higher than the actually observed correlation between true pairs. As in previous studies, we found that age and sex of participants and length of acquaintance had no significant effect on the level of self-other agreement. However, intimate knowledge helped married and unmarried couples in both samples be more accurate in their personality judgments; family members, in turn, had knowledge that made them more accurate than two people who were just acquaintances or friends. We believe that these outcomes can be explained by the contention that the judgment of another’s personality is a relatively simple task, which is accomplishable for most people most of the time. In other words, because judging another person’s personality is an easy task, we are not able to determine “good targets,” “good judges,” or “good traits.” Perhaps it is only “good information” which determines the closeness of the target-judge relationship, and which has a small but reliable impact on the level of self-other agreement. This explains why it is so difficult to find individual differences in the ability to judge another person’s personality.     

Veracity is in the eye of the beholder: A lens model examination of consistency and deception

Research has attempted to explain perceived cues to deception based upon self-report of what participants believe are ‘good’ cues to deception, or self-report of what cues participants say they base their veracity judgements on. However, it is not clear to what extent participants can accurately self-report what influences their decision-making. Using a within-subjects design, 285 participants completed a questionnaire regarding their beliefs about deception before rating a selection of truthful and deceptive statements on a variety of cues. Expert coders also rated the statements for the same cues. Laypeople and expert coders do not conceptualise between-subject consistency in the same way. A lens model showed that whilst perceptions of cues, such as consistency and amount of detail, influence veracity judgements, these perceptions (and overall veracity judgements) are mostly inaccurate. Fundamentally, there seems to be inconsistencies between how deception research examines consistency and how it is understood and used by laypeople.     

Active (not passive) spatial imagery primes temporal judgements

In order to identify the cognitive processes associated with target tracking, a dual-task experiment was carried out in which participants undertook a dynamic multiple-object tracking task first alone and then again, concurrently with one of several secondary tasks, in order to investigate the cognitive processes involved. The research suggests that after designated targets within the visual field have attracted preattentive indexes that point to their locations in space, conscious processes, vulnerable to secondary visual and spatial task interference, form deliberate strategies beneficial to the tracking task, before tracking commences. Target tracking itself is realized by central executive processes, which are sensitive to any other cognitive demands. The findings are discussed in the context of integrating dynamic spatial cognition within a working memory framework.     

词频、可预测性及合理性对目标词首次注视位置的影响

采用三项实验分别考察了目标词的词频、可预测性和合理性对读者眼动模式的影响。结果显示:(1)词频、可预测性和合理性对目标词语的凝视时间和总注视时间都有显著影响,但在首次注视时间上主效应不显著;(2)词频和可预测性不影响目标词的跳读率和再注视概率,而合理性对目标词的再注视概率产生显著的影响;(3)远注视点眼跳倾向于将首次注视位置着落于目标词的开端部位,而近注视点眼跳倾向于将首次注视着落于目标词的中央部位;词频、可预测性和合理性均不影响首次注视位置。     

An Alternate Method of Deriving Priorities and Related Inferences for Group Decision Making in Analytic Hierarchy Process

Some work has been carried out in the past on statistically deriving priorities in Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP). In AHP, the aggregated worths of the alternatives, when compared with respect to several criteria, are estimated in a hierarchical comparisons model introduced by Saaty. In this setup, statistical models are used for Saaty's method of scaling in paired comparisons experiments in any level of the hierarchy. At the end, the final priority weights of the alternatives and related inferences are developed with appropriate statistical methods. Existing statistical methods in the literature assume independence of the entries of the paired comparison matrix. However, these entries are highly dependent among themselves. In this article, we propose a statistical method that allows for the dependence among the entries of the pairwise comparisons matrix. The proposed method is then illustrated with a numerical example. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the influence of affective states on intuitive coherence judgements

Recent research has shown that coherence judgements of semantically related word triads are facilitated by a subtle positive response triggered by their increased fluency of processing. Such positive affective response serves as a cue indicating semantic coherence. However, we argue that the fluency of processing is not the only source of affective response that can influence intuitive judgements. The present study investigated differential influences of mood and affective valence of solution words on intuitive coherence judgements. We show that affective cues resulting from processing fluency can be strengthened or weakened by inducing positive or negative affective response through the activation of solutions to semantically coherent triads. Also, mood is shown to impact the breadth of activated associations therefore affecting not only judgements of semantic coherence but also solvability of word triads. We discuss the implications of our findings for how people might form intuitive judgements of semantic coherence.     

Towards a pattern-based logic of probability judgements and logical inclusion “fallacies”

Probability judgements entail a conjunction fallacy (CF) if a conjunction is estimated to be more probable than one of its conjuncts. In the context of predication of alternative logical hypothesis, Bayesian logic (BL) provides a formalisation of pattern probabilities that renders a class of pattern-based CFs rational. BL predicts a complete system of other logical inclusion fallacies (IFs). A first test of this prediction is investigated here, using transparent tasks with clear set inclusions, varying in observed frequencies only. Experiment 1 uses data where BL makes dominant predictions; Experiment 2's predictions were less clear, and we additionally investigated judgements about the second-most probable hypotheses. The results corroborated a pattern-probability account and cannot be easily explained by other theories of CFs (e.g. inverse probability, confirmation). IFs were not limited to conjunctions, but rather occurred systematically for several logical connectives. Thus, pattern-based probability judgements about logical relations may constitute a basic class of intuitive but potentially rational probability judgements.