Cognitive processing of moral and social judgements: A comparison of offenders,students, and control participants

Examining cognitive processes related to offenders’ moral and social judgements is important in order to better understand their criminal behaviour. In the present study, 30 offenders, 30 students, and 24 control participants were administered the moral-conventional judgements computer task, which requires responding under strict time constraints. Participants read scenarios and were asked to judge whether the act was acceptable or unacceptable when rules were either assumed or removed. Additionally, participants completed an executive function (EF) task in order to examine the relation between EF and moral and social judgements. The findings revealed that, as expected, controls and students had faster reaction times (RTs) and a higher percentage of normative judgements than offenders. Additionally, offenders had a low percentage of normative judgements, particularly in the conventional rule removed condition. Finally, RTs of moral and conventional judgements in most conditions were related to EF among students but not controls or offenders. We conclude that offenders, as compared to controls and students, may rely more on rule-oriented responding and may rely less on EF when making moral and social judgements.     

Kant on Truth-Aptness

Many scholars claimed that, according to Immanuel Kant, some judgements lack a truth-value: analytic judgements, judgements about items of which humans cannot have experience, judgements of perception, and non-assertoric judgements. However, no one has undertaken an extensive examination of the textual evidence for those claims.

Based on an analysis of Kant's texts, I argue that: ? according to Kant, only judgements of perception are not truth-apt. All other judgements are truth-apt, including analytic judgements and judgements about items of which humans cannot have experience.

? Kant sometimes states that truth-apt judgements are actual bearers of truth or falsity only when they are taken to state what is actually the case. Kant calls these judgements assertoric. Other texts ascribe truth and falsity to judgements, regardless of whether they are assertoric.

Kant's views on truth-aptness raise challenges for correspondentist and coherentist interpretations of Kant's theory of truth; they rule out the identification of Kant's crucial notion of objective validity with truth-aptness; and they imply that Kant was not a verificationist about truth or meaning.     

The dark side of cognitive illusions: When an illusory belief interferes with the acquisition of evidence‐based knowledge

Cognitive illusions are often associated with mental health and well‐being. However, they are not without risk. This research shows they can interfere with the acquisition of evidence‐based knowledge. During the first phase of the experiment, one group of participants was induced to develop a strong illusion that a placebo medicine was effective to treat a fictitious disease, whereas another group was induced to develop a weak illusion. Then, in Phase 2, both groups observed fictitious patients who always took the bogus treatment simultaneously with a second treatment which was effective. Our results showed that the group who developed the strong illusion about the effectiveness of the bogus treatment during Phase 1 had more difficulties in learning during Phase 2 that the added treatment was effective.     

The Utility of Cognitive Plausibility in Language Acquisition Modeling: Evidence From Word Segmentation

The informativity of a computational model of language acquisition is directly related to how closely it approximates the actual acquisition task, sometimes referred to as the model's cognitive plausibility. We suggest that though every computational model necessarily idealizes the modeled task, an informative language acquisition model can aim to be cognitively plausible in multiple ways. We discuss these cognitive plausibility checkpoints generally and then apply them to a case study in word segmentation, investigating a promising Bayesian segmentation strategy. We incorporate cognitive plausibility by using an age‐appropriate unit of perceptual representation, evaluating the model output in terms of its utility, and incorporating cognitive constraints into the inference process. Our more cognitively plausible model shows a beneficial effect of cognitive constraints on segmentation performance. One interpretation of this effect is as a synergy between the naive theories of language structure that infants may have and the cognitive constraints that limit the fidelity of their inference processes, where less accurate inference approximations are better when the underlying assumptions about how words are generated are less accurate. More generally, these results highlight the utility of incorporating cognitive plausibility more fully into computational models of language acquisition.     

Ethical Judgments of Counselors: Results From a Turkish Sample

The present study examined the ethical judgements of Turkish counselors (N = 767) using a translation of the Gibson and Pope (1993) ethical judgements survey. Items predominantly judged as ethical and unethical, and group differences regarding gender, taking ethics as a course, professional affiliation, and level of academic degree, were investigated. Chi-square analysis, Fishers’s exact test, and Fisher–Freeman–Halton tests were used in statistical analysis. Results revealed that participants predominantly judged breach of confidentiality in cases of child abuse and potential harm toward oneself or others as ethical. Items concerning sexual dual relationships were predominantly perceived as unethical, and male participants were more likely to judge items regarding sexual and nonsexual dual relationships as ethical. Implications for future research and practice are discussed.     

The effect of stimulus variability on children's judgements of quantity

This study investigates the effect of stimulus variability on development of the ability to make quantity judgements related to area. Participants were 241 children (aged 4, 5, 6, 8, and 12 years) and 82 university students, who were asked to compare the quantities in 2 sets of 5 chocolate bars of constant width but variable length. Participants indicated which set contained more chocolate or that the amounts of chocolate were equal. Judgement accuracy of 12-year-olds and adults decreased monotonically as the variance of bar lengths increased. In younger children, performance was low when variance was very low or very high, but accuracy was higher for intermediate levels of variance, thus resulting in an inverted U-shaped effect. This pattern was confirmed in a second experiment in which we controlled for a possible age-related response bias against “equal” judgements. Findings suggest that judgements of quantity are based on a mixture of learned heuristics and comparisons of approximate quantity representations, both of which develop throughout childhood.     

Reasoning in moral conflicts

Following the assumptions of the mental model theory and its account of moral judgements, we argue for a main role of reasoning in moral judgements, especially in dealing with moral conflicts. In four experiments, we invited adult participants to evaluate scenarios describing moral or immoral actions. Our results confirm the predictions deriving from our assumptions: Given a moral or immoral scenario, the manipulation of the propositions which refer to norms and values results in a scenario eliciting a moral conflict (Experiment 1); when invited to create conflict versions from no-conflict versions of moral or immoral scenarios, individuals manipulate the propositions in the scenario which describe norms and values rather than emotional factors (Experiment 2); the evaluation of conflict scenarios takes longer than the evaluation of no-conflict scenarios (Experiment 3), and this is because conflict scenarios involve more deliberative reasoning (Experiment 4). We discuss our results in relation to competing theories of moral judgements.     

Dissimilarity cumulation theory in smoothly connected spaces

This is the third paper in the series introducing the Dissimilarity Cumulation theory and its main psychological application, Universal Fechnerian Scaling. The previously developed dissimilarity-based theory of path length is used to construct the notion of a smooth path, defined by the property that the ratio of the dissimilarity between its points to the length of the subtended fragment of the path tends to unity as the points get closer to each other. We consider a class of stimulus spaces in which for every path there is a series of piecewise smooth paths converging to it pointwise and in length; and a subclass of such spaces where any two sufficiently close points can be connected by a smooth “geodesic in the small”. These notions are used to construct a broadly understood Finslerian geometry of stimulus spaces representable by regions of Euclidean n-spaces. With an additional assumption of comeasurability in the small between the canonical psychometric increments of the first and second kind, this establishes a link between Universal Fechnerian Scaling and Multidimensional Fechnerian Scaling in Euclidean n-spaces. The latter was a starting point for our theoretical program generalizing Fechner’s idea that sensation magnitudes can be computed by integration of a local discriminability measure.     

事件合理性对句子阅读的影响

事件合理性在句子阅读中作用的研究有助于明确句子阅读时各种信息的时间整合进程, 进一步建构语言理解的系统构架。研究表明事件合理性会影响句子阅读。一方面, 句子阅读的很多研究方法都可以用来考察事件合理性; 另一方面, 事件合理性研究结果的解释可以补充句子理解机制。目前研究者们对事件合理性能否即时影响句子阅读存在争议, 而且影响事件合理性的因素有很多, 因此以后的研究应平衡好各种影响因素, 也可采用双语被试来研究句子合理性。     

Facial first impressions from another angle: How social judgements are influenced by changeable and invariant facial properties

First impressions made to photographs of faces can depend as much on momentary characteristics of the photographed image (within‐person variability) as on consistent properties of the face of the person depicted (between‐person variability). Here, we examine two important sources of within‐person variability: emotional expression and viewpoint. We find more within‐person variability than between‐person variability for social impressions of key traits of trustworthiness, dominance, and attractiveness, which index the main dimensions in theoretical models of facial impressions. The most important source of this variability is the emotional expression of the face, but the viewpoint of the photograph also affects impressions and modulates the effects of expression. For example, faces look most trustworthy with a happy expression when they are facing the perceiver, compared to when they are facing elsewhere, whereas the opposite is true for anger and disgust. Our findings highlight the integration of these different sources of variability in social impression formation.