Fundamental failure to think logically about scientific questions: An illustration of tunnel vision with the application of Wason's Card Selection Test to criminal evidence

Logic and science are in some respects fundamentally different disciplines, in that for example, application of rules of logic can yield conclusions that are at odds with physical reality. Not surprisingly, people have ample difficulty with logical thinking. Nonetheless, in some instances, logical thinking can fuel empirical decision making. In the current research, it was established that applying rules of logic to a particular area of empirical decision making, that is, criminal fact finding, is indeed quite difficult (Study 1). Furthermore, the ability to think logically was found to be associated with superior evaluation of criminal evidence (Study 2). Implications of these findings are discussed.     

Salience Versus Proportional Reasoning: Rethinking the Mechanism Behind Graphical Display Effects

Two experiments examined predictions from two separate explanations for previously observed display effects for communicating low‐probability risks: foreground:background salience and proportional reasoning. According to foreground:background salience, people's risk perceptions are based on the relative salience of the foreground (number of people harmed) versus the background (number of people at risk), such that calling attention to the background makes the risk seem smaller. Conversely, the proportional reasoning explanation states that what matters is whether the respondent attends to the proportion, which conveys how small the risk is. In Experiment 1, we made the background more salient via color and bolding; in contrast to the foreground:background salience prediction, this manipulation did not influence participants' risk aversion. In Experiment 2, we separately manipulated whether the foreground and the background were displayed graphically or numerically. In keeping with the proportional reasoning hypothesis, there was an interaction whereby participants given formats that displayed the foreground and background in the same modality (graphs or numbers, thereby making the proportion easier to form) saw the probability as smaller and were less risk averse than participants given the information in different modalities. There was also a main effect of displaying the background graphically, providing some support for foreground:background salience. In total, this work suggests that the proportional reasoning account provides a good explanation of many display effects related to communicating low‐probability risks, although there is some role for foreground:background salience as well. Copyright © 2018 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Real Objects Can Impede Conditional Reasoning but Augmented Objects Do Not

In this study, Knauff and Johnson‐Laird's (2002) visual impedance hypothesis (i.e., mental representations with irrelevant visual detail can impede reasoning) is applied to the domain of external representations and diagrammatic reasoning. We show that the use of real objects and augmented real (AR) objects can control human interpretation and reasoning about conditionals. As participants made inferences (e.g., an invalid one from "if P then Q" to "P"), they also moved objects corresponding to premises. Participants who moved real objects made more invalid inferences than those who moved AR objects and those who did not manipulate objects (there was no significant difference between the last two groups). Our results showed that real objects impeded conditional reasoning, but AR objects did not. These findings are explained by the fact that real objects may over‐specify a single state that exists, while AR objects suggest multiple possibilities.     

The object of my aggression: Sexual objectification increases physical aggression toward women

Objectification involves reducing someone to a sexual object, rather than seeing them as a full person. Despite numerous theoretical claims that people are more aggressive toward the objectified, and empirical evidence that objectification is linked to high willingness to aggress, rape proclivity, and aggressive attitudes, no research has examined a causal link between objectification and physical aggression, particularly in the context of provocation. In two experiments, we examined this predicted link. In Experiment 1, using a 2 (objectification: no/yes) × 2 (provocation: no/yes) factorial between‐subjects design, we investigated the effects of objectification, induced via body focus during a face‐to‐face interaction, and provocation on physical aggression toward a female confederate. Our results revealed a significant main effect of provocation, a marginal main effect of objectification, and a significant interaction between these variables. In the absence of a provocation, focusing on a woman's body increased aggression toward her. Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 using a video of a target woman instead of a face‐to‐face interaction. Again, our results showed a significant two‐way interaction between objectification and provocation, wherein objectification increased aggression in the absence of provocation. Overall, this research indicates that objectification can lead to heightened physical aggression toward objectified women.

     

Bi-Directional Relationship Between Self-Regulation and Improved Eating: Temporal Associations With Exercise,Reduced Fatigue,and Weight Loss

ABSTRACT. Severely obese men and women (body mass index ≥ 35 ≤ 55 kg/m²; M_age = 44.8 years, SD = 9.3) were randomly assigned to a 6-month physical activity support treatment paired with either nutrition education (n = 83) or cognitive-behavioral nutrition (n = 82) methods for weight loss. Both groups had significant improvements in physical activity, fatigue, self-regulation for eating, and fruit and vegetable intake. Compared to those in the nutrition education group, participants in the behavioral group demonstrated greater overall increases in fruit and vegetable intake and physical activity. These group differences were associated with changes that occurred after Month 3. Increased physical activity predicted reduced fatigue, β = ?.19, p =.01. A reciprocal relationship between the mediators of that relationship, which were changes in self-regulation and fruit and vegetable intake, was identified. There was significantly greater weight loss over six months in the behavioral nutrition group when contrasted with the nutrition education group. Self-regulation for eating and fruit and vegetable intake were significant predictors of weight loss over both three and six months. Findings enabled a better understanding of psychosocial effects on temporal aspects of weight loss and may lead to more effective behavioral treatments for weight loss.     

Increasing Awareness of Potentially Helpful Motivations and Techniques for Forgiveness

The authors examined 3 motives and 3 techniques for forgiveness to assess differences between people high or low in dispositional forgiveness (HDF and LDF, respectively). HDF participants rated all motives as more compelling and familiar than did LDF participants. Forgiveness being the right thing to do was rated as more persuasive and familiar; however, mental and physical health benefits were rated as compelling but less familiar forgiveness motives. LDF participants rated the various techniques as less familiar and more difficult compared with HDF participants. Overall, participants rated forgive and forget as the most familiar but most difficult technique to implement.     

Predicting Political Biases Against the Occupy Wall Street and Tea Party Movements

Accusations of hypocrisy have flown against both supporters and opponents of the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) and Tea Party movements. Integrating the ideologically objectionable premise model (IOPM), a newly devised model of political judgment, with political tolerance research, we find that how the political activities of OWS and Tea Party demonstrators are described determines whether or not biases against these groups emerge among people low and high in right‐wing authoritarianism (RWA). Specifically, people low in RWA were more biased against the Tea Party than OWS regardless of whether the groups engaged in normatively threatening or reassuring political behavior, whereas people high in RWA were more biased against OWS than the Tea Party when the groups engaged in normatively threatening (and therefore objectionable), but not normatively reassuring (and therefore acceptable) behavior. These findings further support the IOPM's contention that premise objectionableness, not right‐wing orientation, determines biases in political judgment.     

The Wished‐For Always Wins Until the Winner Was Inevitable All Along: Motivated Reasoning and Belief Bias Regulate Emotion During Elections

How do biases affect political information processing? A variant of the Wason selection task, which tests for confirmation bias, was used to characterize how the dynamics of the recent U.S. presidential election affected how people reasoned about political information. Participants were asked to evaluate pundit‐style conditional claims like “The incumbent always wins in a year when unemployment drops” either immediately before or immediately after the 2012 presidential election. A three‐way interaction between ideology, predicted winner (whether the proposition predicted that Obama or Romney would win), and the time of test indicated complex effects of bias on reasoning. Before the election, there was partial evidence of motivated reasoning—liberals performed especially well at looking for falsifying information when the pundit's claim predicted Romney would win. After the election, once the outcome was known, there was evidence of a belief bias—people sought to falsify claims that were inconsistent with the real‐world outcome rather than their ideology. These results suggest that people seek to implicitly regulate emotion when reasoning about political predictions. Before elections, people like to think their preferred candidate will win. After elections, people like to think the winner was inevitable all along.     

Causal Networks or Causal Islands? The Representation of Mechanisms and the Transitivity of Causal Judgment

Knowledge of mechanisms is critical for causal reasoning. We contrasted two possible organizations of causal knowledge—an interconnected causal network, where events are causally connected without any boundaries delineating discrete mechanisms; or a set of disparate mechanisms—causal islands—such that events in different mechanisms are not thought to be related even when they belong to the same causal chain. To distinguish these possibilities, we tested whether people make transitive judgments about causal chains by inferring, given A causes B and B causes C, that A causes C. Specifically, causal chains schematized as one chunk or mechanism in semantic memory (e.g., exercising, becoming thirsty, drinking water) led to transitive causal judgments. On the other hand, chains schematized as multiple chunks (e.g., having sex, becoming pregnant, becoming nauseous) led to intransitive judgments despite strong intermediate links ((Experiments 1–3). Normative accounts of causal intransitivity could not explain these intransitive judgments (Experiments 4 and 5).