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121.
《Cognition》2014,130(3):335-347
Reasoning under uncertainty is the bread and butter of everyday life. Many areas of psychology, from cognitive, developmental, social, to clinical, are interested in how individuals make inferences and decisions with incomplete information. The ability to reason under uncertainty necessarily involves probability computations, be they exact calculations or estimations. What are the developmental origins of probabilistic reasoning? Recent work has begun to examine whether infants and toddlers can compute probabilities; however, previous experiments have confounded quantity and probability—in most cases young human learners could have relied on simple comparisons of absolute quantities, as opposed to proportions, to succeed in these tasks. We present four experiments providing evidence that infants younger than 12 months show sensitivity to probabilities based on proportions. Furthermore, infants use this sensitivity to make predictions and fulfill their own desires, providing the first demonstration that even preverbal learners use probabilistic information to navigate the world. These results provide strong evidence for a rich quantitative and statistical reasoning system in infants. 相似文献
122.
123.
Ownership Status and the Representation of Assets of Uncertain Value: The Balloon Endowment Risk Task (BERT)
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Owners tend to overvalue possessions relative to non‐owners: a phenomenon known as the endowment effect. In three experiments, using markets for goods of uncertain value, we investigated whether this can be partly attributed to misperceiving an asset's profitability or to uncertainty about a good's utility. To test our hypotheses, we devised the Balloon Endowment Risk Task, in which participants can sell or buy their right to participate in the Balloon Analogue Risk Task. Once purchased/retained, a virtual balloon is pumped to accrue money, which is lost if the balloon bursts. Participants first learn about the risky asset (balloon) by observing others playing the Balloon Analogue Risk Task before they enter the market. In Experiment 1, we replicated the endowment effect; yet, owners and non‐owners predicted pumping the same number of times and subsequently did so when given that opportunity. In Experiments 2 and 3, the level of uncertainty about the balloon's profitability was manipulated by modifying the number of bursts that participants viewed in the initial learning stage. When more diagnostic information was provided, making the average burst point easier to estimate and reducing value uncertainty and increasing confidence in valuation, the endowment effect diminished although mean estimates of the average burst point did not differ between owners and non‐owners. Thus, endowment effects were partly attributable to value uncertainty but could not be explained by owners and non‐owners having divergent perceptions of the asset's payoff distribution. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
124.
Nicolas Gauvrit Kinga Morsanyi 《Advances in cognitive psychology / University of Finance and Management in Warsaw》2014,10(4):119-130
The equiprobability bias (EB) is a tendency to believe that every process in
which randomness is involved corresponds to a fair distribution, with equal
probabilities for any possible outcome. The EB is known to affect both children
and adults, and to increase with probability education. Because it results in
probability errors resistant to pedagogical interventions, it has been described
as a deep misconception about randomness: the erroneous belief that randomness
implies uniformity. In the present paper, we show that the EB is actually not
the result of a conceptual error about the definition of randomness. On the
contrary, the mathematical theory of randomness does imply uniformity. However,
the EB is still a bias, because people tend to assume uniformity even in the
case of events that are not random. The pervasiveness of the EB reveals a
paradox: The combination of random processes is not necessarily random. The link
between the EB and this paradox is discussed, and suggestions are made regarding
educational design to overcome difficulties encountered by students as a
consequence of the EB. 相似文献
125.
In everyday decision making, people often face decisions with outcomes that differ on multiple dimensions. The trade‐off in preferences between magnitude, temporal proximity, and probability of an outcome is a fundamental concern in the decision‐making literature. Yet, their joint effects on behavior in an experience‐based decision‐making task are understudied. Two experiments examined the relative influences of the magnitude and probability of an outcome when both were increasing over a 10‐second delay. A first‐person shooter video game was adapted for this purpose. Experiment 1 showed that participants waited longer to ensure a higher probability of the outcome than to ensure a greater magnitude when experienced separately and together. Experiment 2 provided a precise method of comparing their relative control on waiting by having each increase at different rates. Both experiments revealed a stronger influence of increasing probability than increasing magnitude. The results were more consistent with hyperbolic discounting of probability than with cumulative prospect theory's decision weight function. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
126.
The appeal to expert opinion is an argument form that uses the verdict of an expert to support a position or hypothesis. A previous scheme‐based treatment of the argument form is formalized within a Bayesian network that is able to capture the critical aspects of the argument form, including the central considerations of the expert's expertise and trustworthiness. We propose this as an appropriate normative framework for the argument form, enabling the development and testing of quantitative predictions as to how people evaluate this argument, suggesting that such an approach might be beneficial to argumentation research generally. We subsequently present two experiments as an example of the potential for future research in this vein, demonstrating that participants' quantitative ratings of the convincingness of a proposition that has been supported with an appeal to expert opinion were broadly consistent with the predictions of the Bayesian model. 相似文献
127.
非参数认知诊断分类方法非常适合课堂评估,其诊断结果采用0-1形式而缺乏概率化表征,不能精细地区分被试属性掌握程度的差异或变化,还缺乏可用于评价真实测验分类结果的信度和效度指标。要刻画被试属性掌握程度的差异,首要的问题是要为非参数认知诊断方法提供一种可以量化属性掌握概率的方法。针对此问题,基于二项分布和玻尔兹曼分布提出非参数认知诊断方法下诊断结果的概率化表征方法,并用于构建分类准确性和分类一致性指标。模拟研究与实测数据分析结果显示:概率化表征方法与非参数认知诊断方法的分类结果高度一致;概率化表征方法与认知诊断模型所得的属性掌握概率十分接近;概率化表征方法所得的属性(模式)掌握概率可用于计算属性(模式)分类准确性和分类一致性指标,在实际测验情景下可作为信度和效度指标,评价诊断结果的重测一致率和判准率。 相似文献
128.
本研究采用“数字-字母转换任务”区分高低认知灵活性者, 构建概率配对模式相同但形式不同的两个概率类别学习任务, 借助ERP技术探讨认知灵活性对概率类别学习任务的作用特点与机制。结果发现, 本研究的两个任务中, 高认知灵活性组的规则习得水平均优于低认知灵活性组, 认知灵活性能促进概率类别的学习。同时, 对不同学习阶段的ERPs分析结果显示, 高认知灵活性者在概率类别学习中的优势源于反馈加工过程。 相似文献
129.
How Affect Shapes Risky Choice: Distorted Probability Weighting Versus Probability Neglect
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People's choices between prospects with relatively affect‐rich outcomes (e.g., medical side effects) can diverge markedly from their choices between prospects with relatively affect‐poor outcomes (e.g., monetary losses). We investigate the cognitive mechanisms underlying this “affect gap” in risky choice. One possibility is that affect‐rich prospects give rise to more distortion in probability weighting. Another is that they lead to the neglect of probabilities. To pit these two possibilities against each other, we fitted cumulative prospect theory (CPT) to the choices of individual participants, separately for choices between options with affect‐rich outcomes (adverse medical side effects) and options with affect‐poor outcomes (monetary losses); additionally, we tested a simple model of probability neglect, the minimax rule. The results indicated a qualitative difference in cognitive mechanisms between the affect‐rich and affect‐poor problems. Specifically, in affect‐poor problems, the large majority of participants were best described by CPT; in affect‐rich problems, the proportion of participants best described by the minimax rule was substantially higher. The affect gap persisted even when affect‐rich outcomes were supplemented by numerical information, thus providing no support for the thesis that choices in affect‐rich and affect‐poor problems diverge because the information provided in the former is nonnumerical. Our findings suggest that the traditional expectation‐based framework for modeling risky decision making may not readily generalize to affect‐rich choices. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
130.