Prime and probability: causal knowledge affects inferential and predictive effects on self-agency experiences

Experiences of having caused a certain outcome may arise from motor predictions based on action–outcome probabilities and causal inferences based on pre-activated outcome representations. However, when and how both indicators combine to affect such self-agency experiences is still unclear. Based on previous research on prediction and inference effects on self-agency, we propose that their (combined) contribution crucially depends on whether people have knowledge about the causal relation between actions and outcomes that is relevant to subsequent self-agency experiences. Therefore, we manipulated causal knowledge that was either relevant or irrelevant by varying the probability of co-occurrence (50% or 80%) of specific actions and outcomes. Afterwards, we measured self-agency experiences in an action–outcome task where outcomes were primed or not. Results showed that motor prediction only affected self-agency when relevant actions and outcomes were learned to be causally related. Interestingly, however, inference effects also occurred when no relevant causal knowledge was acquired.     

主观概率判断中次可加性的三因素实验研究

采用三因素完全随机实验探究主观概率判断是否满足次可加性规律,结果表明:(1)分解方式、分解数量和分解事例的典型性等三个因素对主观概率判断均有显著的影响。(2)次可加性不是一种普遍现象,主观概率判断中也会出现可加性和超可加性:把事件隐分为非典型事例时会出现超可加性,把事件隐分为典型或者典型加非典型性的事例时会出现可加性,而把事件显分时会一致出现次可加性。     

Waiting When Both Certainty and Magnitude Are Increasing: Certainty Overshadows Magnitude

In everyday decision making, people often face decisions with outcomes that differ on multiple dimensions. The trade‐off in preferences between magnitude, temporal proximity, and probability of an outcome is a fundamental concern in the decision‐making literature. Yet, their joint effects on behavior in an experience‐based decision‐making task are understudied. Two experiments examined the relative influences of the magnitude and probability of an outcome when both were increasing over a 10‐second delay. A first‐person shooter video game was adapted for this purpose. Experiment 1 showed that participants waited longer to ensure a higher probability of the outcome than to ensure a greater magnitude when experienced separately and together. Experiment 2 provided a precise method of comparing their relative control on waiting by having each increase at different rates. Both experiments revealed a stronger influence of increasing probability than increasing magnitude. The results were more consistent with hyperbolic discounting of probability than with cumulative prospect theory's decision weight function. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Context affects the interpretation of low but not high numerical probabilities: A hypothesis testing account of subjective probability

Low numerical probabilities tend to be directionally ambiguous, meaning they can be interpreted either positively, suggesting the occurrence of the target event, or negatively, suggesting its non-occurrence. High numerical probabilities, however, are typically interpreted positively. We argue that the greater directional ambiguity of low numerical probabilities may make them more susceptible than high probabilities to contextual influences. Results from five experiments supported this premise, with perceived base rate affecting the interpretation of an event’s numerical posterior probability more when it was low than high. The effect is consistent with a confirmatory hypothesis testing process, with the relevant perceived base rate suggesting the directional hypothesis which people then test in a confirmatory manner.     

Effects of reinforcer probability, delay, and response requirements on the choices of rats and pigeons: possible species differences

In Experiment 1 with rats, a left lever press led to a 5-s delay and then a possible reinforcer. A right lever press led to an adjusting delay and then a certain reinforcer. This delay was adjusted over trials to estimate an indifference point, or a delay at which the two alternatives were chosen about equally often. Indifference points increased as the probability of reinforcement for the left lever decreased. In some conditions with a 20% chance of food, a light above the left lever was lit during the 5-s delay on all trials, but in other conditions, the light was only lit on those trials that ended with food. Unlike previous results with pigeons, the presence or absence of the delay light on no-food trials had no effect on the rats' indifference points. In other conditions, the rats showed less preference for the 20% alternative when the time between trials was longer. In Experiment 2 with rats, fixed-interval schedules were used instead of simple delays, and the presence or absence of the fixed-interval requirement on no-food trials had no effect on the indifference points. In Experiment 3 with rats and Experiment 4 with pigeons, the animals chose between a fixed-ratio 8 schedule that led to food on 33% of the trials and an adjusting-ratio schedule with food on 100% of the trials. Surprisingly, the rats showed less preference for the 33% alternative in conditions in which the ratio requirement was omitted on no-food trials. For the pigeons, the presence or absence of the ratio requirement on no-food trials had little effect. The results suggest that there may be differences between rats and pigeons in how they respond in choice situations involving delayed and probabilistic reinforcers.     

Conditional Probability and Defeasible Inference

We offer a probabilistic model of rational consequence relations (Lehmann and Magidor, 1990) by appealing to the extension of the classical Ramsey–Adams test proposed by Vann McGee in (McGee, 1994). Previous and influential models of non-monotonic consequence relations have been produced in terms of the dynamics of expectations (Gärdenfors and Makinson, 1994; Gärdenfors, 1993).Expectation is a term of art in these models, which should not be confused with the notion of expected utility. The expectations of an agent are some form of belief weaker than absolute certainty. Our model offers a modified and extended version of an account of qualitative belief in terms of conditional probability, first presented in (van Fraassen, 1995). We use this model to relate probabilistic and qualitative models of non-monotonic relations in terms of expectations. In doing so we propose a probabilistic model of the notion of expectation. We provide characterization results both for logically finite languages and for logically infinite, but countable, languages. The latter case shows the relevance of the axiom of countable additivity for our probability functions. We show that a rational logic defined over a logically infinite language can only be fully characterized in terms of finitely additive conditional probability. The research of both authors was supported in part by a grant from NSF, and, for Parikh, also by support from the research foundation of CUNY.     

The precise time course of lexical activation: MEG measurements of the effects of frequency, probability, and density in lexical decision

Visually presented letter strings consistently yield three MEG response components: the M170, associated with letter-string processing (Tarkiainen, Helenius, Hansen, Cornelissen, & Salmelin, 1999); the M250, affected by phonotactic probability, (Pylkk?nen, Stringfellow, & Marantz, 2002); and the M350, responsive to lexical frequency (Embick, Hackl, Schaeffer, Kelepir, & Marantz, 2001). Pylkk?nen et al. found evidence that the M350 reflects lexical activation prior to competition among phonologically similar words. We investigate the effects of lexical and sublexical frequency and neighborhood density on the M250 and M350 through orthogonal manipulation of phonotactic probability, density, and frequency. The results confirm that probability but not density affects the latency of the M250 and M350; however, an interaction between probability and density on M350 latencies suggests an earlier influence of neighborhoods than previously reported.     

The Effects of Framing, Reflection, Probability, and Payoff on Risk Preference in Choice Tasks

A meta-analysis of Asian-disease-like studies is presented to identify the factors which determine risk preference. First the confoundings between probability levels, payoffs, and framing conditions are clarified in a task analysis. Then the role of framing, reflection, probability, type, and size of payoff is evaluated in a meta-analysis. It is shown that bidirectional framing effects exist for gains and for losses. Presenting outcomes as gains tends to induce risk aversion, while presenting outcomes as losses tends to induce risk seeking. Risk preference is also shown to depend on the size of the payoffs, on the probability levels, and on the type of good at stake (money/property vs human lives). In general, higher payoffs lead to increasing risk aversion. Higher probabilities lead to increasing risk aversion for gains and to increasing risk seeking for losses. These findings are confirmed by a subsequent empirical test. Shortcomings of existing formal theories, such as prospect theory, cumulative prospect theory, venture theory, and Markowitz's utility theory, are identified. It is shown that it is not probabilities or payoffs, but the framing condition, which explains most variance. These findings are interpreted as showing that no linear combination of formally relevant predictors is sufficient to capture the essence of the framing phenomenon.     

Interval estimation for the intraclass correlation in dirichlet-multinomial data

When the underlying distribution is discrete with a limited number of categories, methods for interval estimation of the intraclass correlation which assume normality are theoretically inadequate for use. On the basis of large sample theory, this paper develops an asymptotic closed-form interval estimate of the intraclass correlation for the case where there is a natural score associated with each category. This paper employs Monte Carlo simulation to demonstrate that when the underlying intraclass correlation is large, the traditional interval estimator which assumes normality can be misleading. We find that when the number of classes is 20, the interval estimator proposed here can generally perform reasonably well in a variety of situations. This paper further notes that the proposed interval estimator is invariant with respect to a linear transformation. When the data are on a nominal scale, an extension of the proposed method to account for this case, as well as a discussion on the relationship between the intraclass correlation and a kappa-type measure defined here and on the limitation of the corresponding kappa-type estimator are given.The authors wish to thank the Editor, the Associate Editor, and the three referees for many valuable comments and suggestions to improve the clarity of this paper. The works for the first, the third, and the fourth authors were partially supported by grant #R01AR43025-01 from the National Institute of Arthritis and Musculoskeletal and Skin Diseases.     

Effects of social context, reinforcer probability, and reinforcer magnitude on humans' choices to compete or not to compete.

In the first two experiments, subjects' choices to earn points (exchangeable for money) either by competing with a fictitious opponent or by not competing were studied. Buskist, Barry, Morgan, and Rossi's (1984) competitive fixed-interval schedule was modified to include a second response option, a noncompetitive fixed-interval schedule. After choosing to enter either option, the opportunity for reinforcers became available after the fixed-interval's duration had elapsed. Under the no-competition condition, points were always available after the interval had elapsed. Under the competition condition, points were available based on a predetermined probability of delivery. Experiments 1 and 2 examined how reinforcer probabilities and reinforcer magnitudes affected subjects' choices to compete. Several general conclusions can be made about the results: (a) Strong preferences to compete were observed at high and moderate reinforcer probabilities; (b) competing was observed even at very low reinforcer probabilities; (c) response rates were always higher in the competition component than in the no-competition component; and (d) response rates and choices to compete were insensitive to reinforcer-magnitude manipulations. In Experiment 3, the social context of this choice schedule was removed to determine whether the high levels of competing observed in the first two experiments were due to a response preference engendered by the social context provided by the experimenters through instructions. In contrast to the first two experiments, these subjects preferred the 60-s fixed-interval schedule (formerly the no-competition option), indicating that the instructions themselves were responsible for the preference to compete. This choice paradigm may be useful to future researchers interested in the effects of other independent variables (e.g., drugs, social context, instructions) on competitive behavior.