The mental representation of living and nonliving things: Differential weighting and interactivity of sensorial and non-sensorial features

Warrington and colleagues (Warrington & McCarthy, 1983, 1987; Warrington & Shallice, 1984) claimed that sensorial and functional-associative (FA) features are differentially important in determining the meaning of living things (LT) and nonliving things (NLT). The first aim of the present study was to evaluate this hypothesis through two different access tasks: feature generation (Experiment 1) and cued recall (Experiment 2). The results of both experiments provided consistent empirical support for Warrington and colleagues' assumption. The second aim of the present study was to test a new differential interactivity hypothesis that combines Warrington and colleagues' assumption with the notion of a higher number of intercorrelations and hence of a stronger connectivity between sensorial and non-sensorial features for LTs than for NLTs. This hypothesis was motivated by previous reports of an uncrossed interaction between domain (LTs vs NLTs) and attribute type (sensorial vs FA) in, for example, a feature verification task (Laws, Humber, Ramsey, & McCarthy, 1995): while FA attributes are verified faster than sensorial attributes for NLTs, no difference is observed for LTs. We replicated and generalised this finding using several feature verification tasks on both written words and pictures (Experiment 3), including in conditions aimed at minimising the intervention of priming biases and strategic or mnemonic processes (Experiment 4). The whole set of results suggests that both privileged relations between features and categories, and the differential importance of intercorrelations between features as a function of category, modulate access to semantic features.     

Memory for Frequency of Bizarre and Common Stimuli: Limitations of the Automaticity Hypothesis

In 2 experiments, the influence of intention to process frequency on accuracy of memory for frequency of bizarre and common sentences was investigated. The results from multiple regression analyses indicated that intentional processing increased the accuracy of frequency judgments when memory for frequency was tested after a 2-min (Experiment 1) and after a 48-hr (Experiment 2) retention interval. Furthermore, the results of Experiment 2 indicated that unintentional processors tended to overestimate frequencies of bizarre relative to common items after a delay. The implications of the results are discussed with regard to L. Hasher and R. T. Zacks's (1984) automaticity hypothesis, human performance, and the accuracy of judgments of frequency of occurrence of unusual events.     

Ventral encoding of functional affordances: A neural pathway for identifying errors in action

Functional tool usage is a critical aspect of our daily lives. Not only must we know which tools to use for a specific action goal, we must also know how to manipulate those tools in meaningful way to achieve the goal of the action. The purpose of this study was to identify the regions of the brain critical to supporting the process of understanding errors in tool manipulation. Using fMRI, neural activations were recorded while subjects were presented with images demonstrating typical action scenes (screwdriver used on a screw), but with the tool being manipulated either correctly (screwdriver held by handle) or incorrectly (screwdriver held by bit rather than handle). Activations in fMRI for identifying correct over incorrect tool manipulation were seen along the canonical parietofrontal action network, while activations for identifying incorrect over correct tool manipulation were primarily seen at superior temporal areas and insula. We expand our hypotheses about ventral brain networks identifying contextual error to further suggest mechanisms for understanding functional tool actions, which collectively we regard as functional affordances. This proposes a fundamental role for ventral brain areas in functional action understanding.     

Gaze bias: Selective encoding and liking effects

People look longer at things that they choose than things they do not choose. How much of this tendency—the gaze bias effect—is due to a liking effect compared to the information encoding aspect of the decision-making process? Do these processes compete under certain conditions? We monitored eye movements during a visual decision-making task with four decision prompts: Like, dislike, older, and newer. The gaze bias effect was present during the first dwell in all conditions except the dislike condition, when the preference to look at the liked item and the goal to identify the disliked item compete. Colour content (whether a photograph was colour or black-and-white), not decision type, influenced the gaze bias effect in the older/newer decisions because colour is a relevant feature for such decisions. These interactions appear early in the eye movement record, indicating that gaze bias is influenced during information encoding.     

There is no clam with coats in the calm coast: Delimiting the transposed-letter priming effect

In this article, we explore the transposed-letter priming effect (e.g., jugde–JUDGE vs. jupte–JUDGE), a phenomenon that taps into some key issues on how the brain encodes letter positions and has favoured the creation of new input coding schemes. However, almost all the empirical evidence from transposed-letter priming experiments comes from nonword primes (e.g., jugde–JUDGE). Indeed, previous evidence when using word–word pairs (e.g., causal–CASUAL) is not conclusive. Here, we conducted five masked priming lexical decision experiments that examined the relationship between pairs of real words that differed only in the transposition of two of their letters (e.g., CASUAL vs. CAUSAL). Results showed that, unlike transposed-letter nonwords, transposed-letter words do not seem to affect the identification time of their transposed-letter mates. Thus, prime lexicality is a key factor that modulates the magnitude of transposed-letter priming effects. These results are interpreted under the assumption of the existence of lateral inhibition processes occurring within the lexical level—which cancels out any orthographic facilitation due to the overlapping letters. We examine the implications of these findings for models of visual-word recognition.     

No deficiency in left-to-right processing of words in dyslexia but evidence for enhanced visual crowding

Whitney and Cornelissen hypothesized that dyslexia may be the result of problems with the left-to-right processing of words, particularly in the part of the word between the word beginning and the reader's fixation position. To test this hypothesis, we tachistoscopically presented consonant trigrams in the left and the right visual field (LVF, RVF) to 20 undergraduate students with dyslexia and 20 matched controls. The trigrams were presented at different locations (from –2.5° to?+?2.5°) in both visual half fields. Participants were asked to identify the letters, and accuracy rates were compared. In line with the predictions of the SERIOL (sequential encoding regulated by inputs to oscillations within letter units) model of visual word recognition, a typical U-shaped pattern was found at all retinal locations. Accuracy also decreased the further away the stimulus was from the fixation location, with a steeper decrease in the LVF than in the RVF. Contrary to the hypothesis, the students with dyslexia showed the same pattern of results as did the control participants, also in the LVF, apart from a slightly lower accuracy rate, particularly for the central letter. The latter is in line with the possibility of enhanced crowding in dyslexia. In addition, in the dyslexia group but not in the control group the degree of crowding correlated significantly with the students’ word reading scores. These findings suggest that lateral inhibition between letters is associated with word reading performance in students with dyslexia.     

Control processes in voluntary and explicitly cued task switching

Explicitly cued task switching slows performance relative to performing the same task on consecutive trials. This effect appears to be due partly to more efficient encoding of the task cue when the same cue is used on consecutive trials and partly to an additional task-switching process. These components were examined by comparing explicitly cued and voluntary task switching groups, with external cues presented to both groups. Cue-switch effects varied in predictable ways to dissociate explicitly cued and voluntary task switching, whereas task-switch effects had similar characteristics for both instructional groups. The data were well fitted by a mathematical model of task switching that included a cue-encoding mechanism (whereby cue repetition improves performance) and an additional process that was invoked on task-switch trials. Analyses of response-time distributions suggest that this additional process involves task-set reconfiguration that may or may not be engaged before the target stimulus is presented.     

Encoding strategy affects false recall and recognition: Evidence from categorical study material

The present research investigated memory vulnerability to distortions. Different encoding strategies were used when categorized lists were studied. The authors assumed that an imagery strategy would be responsible for decreasing false memories more than a word-whispering strategy, which is consistent with the model of semantic access and previous research in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm (the DRM paradigm; Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). A normative study of category lists and 4 experiments were conducted to verify the memory vulnerability to different encoding strategies (imagery, word-whispering, control). Half of subjects recalled and half recognized previously studied words. The results revealed a marked reduction in false recognition and recall after imagery encoding, relative to after word-whispering encoding.     

Integration of spatial information across vision and language

Three experiments investigated whether spatial information acquired from vision and language is maintained in distinct spatial representations on the basis of the input modality. Participants studied a visual and a verbal layout of objects at different times from either the same (Experiments 1 and 2) or different learning perspectives (Experiment 3) and then carried out a series of pointing judgments involving objects from the same or different layouts. Results from Experiments 1 and 2 indicated that participants pointed equally fast on within- and between-layout trials; coupled with verbal reports from participants, this result suggests that they integrated all locations in a single spatial representation during encoding. However, when learning took place from different perspectives in Experiment 3, participants were faster to respond to within- than between-layout trials and indicated that they kept separate representations during learning. Results are compared to those from similar studies that involved layouts learned from perception only.