ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: EPISTEMOLOGICAL ARGUMENTS

This essay presents an analysis of different processes of machine learning: supervised, unsupervised, and semisupervised, through the prism of the epistemologies of several prominent Islamic philosophical schools. I discuss the way each school conceptualizes the ontological absolute (immortality, death, afterlife) and the way this shapes their respective epistemologies. I present an analysis of the different machine learning processes through the prism of the epistemological constructs of each of these philosophic traditions. I conclude with the argument that more scholars from the Islamic philosophical tradition should engage in the debates about the development of artificial intelligence and its implications, given that many Muslim countries are among the leaders in this development and its application in everyday life.     

Religion and the Human Rights Idea

Three recent books focus, in different ways, on the idea of human rights and its relation to religion and religious ethics. All three books discussed here address criticisms of the human rights idea and seek to establish the relationship of religion and human rights with regard to the field of policy. The present discussion begins with an overview that places these three books in the larger context of the development of the human rights idea and its historical relationship with religion. It then turns to Little's book, next to the collection of essays edited by Twiss, Simion, and Petersen, which is described internally as a Festschrift for Little, and then to Hogan's book, and in the final section it explores comparisons among the books.     

Who buys New Energy Vehicles in China? Assessing social-psychological predictors of purchasing awareness,intention, and policy

This paper investigates the salience of social-psychological factors in explaining why drivers purchase (or fail to purchase) New Energy Vehicles (NEVs)—including hybrid electric vehicles, battery electric vehicles, and fuel cell electric vehicles—in China. A questionnaire measuring six dimensions (including attitudes, subjective norms, perceived behavioral control, personal norms, low-carbon awareness and policy) was distributed in Tianjin, where aggressive policy incentives for NEVs exist yet adoption rates remain low. Correlation analysis and hierarchical multiple regression analyses are applied data collected through 811 valid questionnaires. We present three main findings. First, there is an “awareness-behavior gap” whereby low-carbon awareness has a slight moderating effect on purchasing behavior via psychological factors. Second, subjective norms has a stronger influence on intention to purchase New Energy Vehicles than other social-psychological factors. Third, acceptability of government policies has positive significant impact on adoption of New Energy Vehicles, which can provide reference potential template for other countries whose market for New Energy Vehicles is also in an early stage.     

Estimation of indifference points with an adjusting-delay procedure.

In a series of conditions, pigeons chose between 1.5 s and 3 s of access to grain, each preceded by some delay. The delay that preceded the small reinforcer was constant throughout a condition. The delay that preceded the large reinforcer was increased or decreased a number of times each session in order to estimate an "indifference point," a delay at which the subject chose each alternative about equally often. The experiment was designed to determine whether variations in any of four features of this adjusting-delay procedure would systematically alter the estimated indifference points. The four features were the total trial duration, the number of center-key responses necessary to begin a trial, the number of choice trials that preceded each change in the adjusting delay, and step size--the size of each increment and decrement in the delay. Manipulation of the first three features had no systematic effects on the indifference points. As step size was increased from 0.5 s to 6 s, within-session variability of the adjusting delay steadily increased, and the 6-s step size produced larger indifference-point estimates for some subjects. The results suggest that, within certain limits, these procedural features can be altered without affecting the indifference-point estimates, but that the use of a large step size can distort the estimates. Some theoretical implications of the relative constancy of indifference points across these procedural variations are discussed.     

Self-control in mentally retarded adolescents: choice as a function of amount and delay of reinforcement.

Three severely mentally retarded adolescents were studied under discrete-trial procedures in which a choice was arranged between edible reinforcers that differed in magnitude and, in some conditions, delay. In the absence of delays the larger reinforcer was consistently chosen. Under conditions in which the smaller reinforcer was not delayed, increasing the delay to delivery of the larger reinforcer decreased the percentage of trials in which that reinforcer was chosen. All subjects directed the majority of choice responses to the smaller reinforcer when the larger reinforcer was sufficiently delayed, although the value at which this occurred differed across subjects. Under conditions in which the larger reinforcer initially was sufficiently delayed to result in preference for the smaller one, progressively increasing in 5-s increments the delay to both reinforcers increased percentage of trials with the larger reinforcer chosen. At sufficiently long delays, 2 of the subjects consistently chose the larger, but more delayed, reinforcer, and the 3rd subject chose that reinforcer on half of the trials. These results are consistent with the findings of prior studies in which adult humans responded to terminate noise and pigeons responded to produce food.     

Changes in functional response units with briefly delayed reinforcement

In two experiments, key-peck responding of pigeons was compared under variable-interval schedules that arranged immediate reinforcement and ones that arranged unsignaled delays of reinforcement. Responses during the nominal unsignaled delay periods had no effect on the reinforcer presentations. In Experiment 1, the unsignaled delays were studied using variable-interval schedules as baselines. Relative to the immediate reinforcement condition, 0.5-s unsignaled delays decreased the duration of the reinforced interresponse times and increased the overall frequency of short (<0.5-s) interresponse times. Longer, 5.0-s unsignaled delays increased the duration of the reinforced interresponse times and decreased the overall frequency of the short interresponse times. In Experiment 2, similar effects to those of Experiment 1 were obtained when the 0.5-s unsignaled delays were imposed upon a baseline schedule that explicitly arranged reinforcement of short interresponse times and therefore already generated a large number of short interresponse times. The results support earlier suggestions that the unsignaled 0.5-s delays change the functional response unit from a single key peck to a multiple key-peck unit. These findings are discussed in terms of the mechanisms by which contingencies control response structure in the absence of specific structural requirements.     

Concurrent-schedule performance: Effects of relative and overall reinforcer rate

Six pigeons were trained to respond on two keys, each of which provided reinforcers on an arithmetic variable-interval schedule. These concurrent schedules ran nonindependently with a 2-s changeover delay. Six sets of conditions were conducted. Within each set of conditions the ratio of reinforcers available on the two alternatives was varied, but the arranged overall reinforcer rate remained constant. Each set of conditions used a different overall reinforcer rate, ranging from 0.22 reinforcers per minute to 10 reinforcers per minute. The generalized matching law fit the data from each set of conditions, but sensitivity to reinforcer frequency (a) decreased as the overall reinforcer rate decreased for both time allocation and response allocation based analyses of the data. Overall response rates did not vary with changes in relative reinforcer rate, but decreased with decreases in overall reinforcer rate. Changeover rates varied as a function of both relative and overall reinforcer rates. However, as explanations based on changeover rate seem unable to deal with the changes in generalized matching sensitivity, discrimination accounts of choice may offer a more promising interpretation.     

Canonical analysis of two convex polyhedral cones and applications

Canonical analysis of two convex polyhedral cones consists in looking for two vectors (one in each cone) whose square cosine is a maximum. This paper presents new results about the properties of the optimal solution to this problem, and also discusses in detail the convergence of an alternating least squares algorithm. The set of scalings of an ordinal variable is a convex polyhedral cone, which thus plays an important role in optimal scaling methods for the analysis of ordinal data. Monotone analysis of variance, and correspondence analysis subject to an ordinal constraint on one of the factors are both canonical analyses of a convex polyhedral cone and a subspace. Optimal multiple regression of a dependent ordinal variable on a set of independent ordinal variables is a canonical analysis of two convex polyhedral cones as long as the signs of the regression coefficients are given. We discuss these three situations and illustrate them by examples.     

ON MARTIN EGER'S "A TALE OF TWO CONTROVERSIES"

Abstract. Criticisms are presented against Eger's challenge to the demarcation between the natural sciences and ethics. Arguments are given both against his endorsement of the "new" philosophy of science and against his rejection of the fact-value dichotomy. However, his educational recommendations are reinforced rather than weakened by these criticisms     

The rhetorical foundation of philosophical argumentation

The rejection of rhetoric has been a constant theme in Western thought since Plato. The presupposition of such a debasement lies at the foundation of a certain view of Reason that I have called propositionalism, and which is analyzed in this article. The basic tenets of propositionalism are that truth is exclusive, i.e. it does not allow for any alternative, and that there is always only one proposition which must be true, the opposite one being false. Necessity and uniqueness are the ideals of propositionalism. But the question of the necessity of such a necessity is bound to arise. Foundationalism and propositionalism are intrinsically related. Since necessity excludes alternatives, rhetoric, which is based on the possibility of opposite standpoints, is unavoidably devalued as the crippled child of Reason, identical to sophistry or eristic. But propositionalism cannot justify itself and provide a justification for its own foundation without circle or contraditction. Since it responds to the problem of eradicating problems and alternatives through propositional entities, propositionalism is ultimately based on questioning to which it replies in the mode of denial. The unavowed foundation of Reason is therefore the question of questioning, even though this very question is suppressed as propositionalism. The trace of such a question is not only historical, but can also be seen, for instance, in the role played by the principle of contradiction in the constitution of propositional Reason (Artitotle): opposite propositions are not the expression of a problematic situation, they are either possible or successively unique propositions.We want to replace propositionalism by problematology which allows for the conceptualization of alternatives, thereby rendering a true rhetoric possible. Argumentation cannot then be equated with eristic any more, as propositionalism maintained.Rationality must be seen as having questioning as its true starting-point. Reason must be rhetorical if it is to survive the death of propositionalism which took place after the radical criticisms of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. Even if it is still hard ffor philosophers and rhetoricians to think within another framework and even though they prefer endlessly to deconstauct the old one instead of changing it, problematology is bound to impose itself as the new voice for rationality, because Reason has always endeavored to solve problems. Propositionalism has been only one way of conceiving problems, based on the view that solutions could be but the suppression of questioning.