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91.
92.
I respond to the four symposiasts who commented on my recent book Religion Is Not About God (2005)—religious studies scholars Donald Braxton and David Klemm, philosopher William Rottschaefer, and cognitive scientist Leslie Marsh. Various general and specific points relative to the nature of religion and the future of religion are either clarified or defended. Among the issues that receive attention are (1) the status and adequacy of my proposals for religious naturalism: Can it motivate wholeness, and is it finally a form of pantheism? (2) ritual practices, particularly those of Christianity, reinterpreted within the framework of religious naturalism; and (3) the adequacy of any naturalistic position to account for subjective properties of consciousness. 相似文献
93.
The Argument from Moral Experience 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Don Loeb 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2007,10(5):469-484
It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality,
has a certain objective-seeming character to it, and that this supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories (according
to which morality is a realm of facts or truths) and against anti-objectivist theories like Mackie’s error theory (according
to which it is not). In this paper, I argue that our experience of morality does not support objectivist moral theories in
this way. I begin by arguing that our moral experience does not have the uniformly objective-seeming character it is typically
claimed to have. I go on to argue that even if moral experience were to presuppose or display morality as a realm of fact,
we would still need a reason for taking that to support theories according to which it is such a realm. I consider what I
take to be the four most promising ways of attempting to supply such a reason: (A) inference to the best explanation, (B)
epistemic conservatism, (C) the Principle of Credulity, and (D) the method of wide reflective equilibrium. In each case, I
argue, the strategy in question does not support a presumption in favor of objectivist moral theories.
相似文献
Don LoebEmail: |
94.
陈刚 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2009,4(3):437-453
Scientific progress in the 20th century has shown that the structure of the world is hierarchical. A philosophical analysis of the hierarchy will bear obvious significance for metaphysics and philosophy in general. Jonathan Schaffer’s paper, “Is There a Fundamental Level?”, provides a systematic review of the works in the field, the difficulties for various versions of fundamentalism, and the prospect for the third option, i.e., to treat each level as ontologically equal. The purpose of this paper is to provide an argument for the third option. The author will apply Aristotle’s theory of matter and form to the discussion of the hierarchy and develop a theory of form realism, which will grant every level with “full citizenship in the republic of being.” It constitutes an argument against ontological and epistemological reductionism. A non-reductive theory of causation is also developed against the fundamental theory of causation. 相似文献
95.
Derek Henry Brown 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(3):377-394
I defend indirect perceptual realism against two recent and related charges to it offered by A. D. Smith and P. Snowdon, both
stemming from demonstrative reference involving indirect perception. The needed aspects of the theory of demonstratives are
not terribly new, but their connection to these objections has not been discussed. The groundwork for my solution emerges
from considering normal cases of indirect perception (e.g., seeing something depicted on a television) and examining the role
this indirectness plays in demonstrative assertions. I argue that indirectness routinely if not typically plays a justificatory
role in such judgements, and not a semantic one, and that the same can be said of such judgements when considered within the
indirect realist framework. The denial of this, on my analysis, is essential to the criticisms of Snowdon and Smith. The discussion
is extended to include scenarios involving the sorts of misconceptions Smith employs.
相似文献
Derek Henry BrownEmail: |
96.
REALISM WITHOUT TRUTH: A REVIEW OF GIERE'S SCIENCE WITHOUT LAWS AND SCIENTIFIC PERSPECTIVISM
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Timothy D. Hackenberg 《Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior》2009,91(3):391-402
An increasingly popular view among philosophers of science is that of science as action—as the collective activity of scientists working in socially‐coordinated communities. Scientists are seen not as dispassionate pursuers of Truth, but as active participants in a social enterprise, and science is viewed on a continuum with other human activities. When taken to an extreme, the science‐as‐social‐process view can be taken to imply that science is no different from any other human activity, and therefore can make no privileged claims about its knowledge of the world. Such extreme views are normally contrasted with equally extreme views of classical science, as uncovering Universal Truth. In Science Without Laws and Scientific Perspectivism, Giere outlines an approach to understanding science that finds a middle ground between these extremes. He acknowledges that science occurs in a social and historical context, and that scientific models are constructions designed and created to serve human ends. At the same time, however, scientific models correspond to parts of the world in ways that can legitimately be termed objective. Giere's position, perspectival realism, shares important common ground with Skinner's writings on science, some of which are explored in this review. Perhaps most fundamentally, Giere shares with Skinner the view that science itself is amenable to scientific inquiry: scientific principles can and should be brought to bear on the process of science. The two approaches offer different but complementary perspectives on the nature of science, both of which are needed in a comprehensive understanding of science. 相似文献
97.
Previous research has shown that playing violent video game exposure can increase aggressive thoughts, aggressive feelings, and physiological arousal. This study compared the effects that playing a realistic violent, unrealistic violent, or nonviolent video game for 45 min has on such variables. For the purpose of this study, realism was defined as the probability of seeing an event in real life. Participants (N=74; 39 male, 35 female) played either a realistic violent, unrealistic violent, or nonviolent video game for 45 min. Aggressive thoughts and aggressive feelings were measured four times (every 15 min), whereas arousal was measured continuously. The results showed that, though playing any violent game stimulated aggressive thoughts, playing a more realistic violent game stimulated significantly more aggressive feelings and arousal over the course of play. Aggr. Behav. 35:213–224, 2009. © 2009 Wiley‐Liss, Inc. 相似文献
98.
99.
Feng Ye 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2007,2(4):614-628
The indispensability argument for abstract mathematical entities has been an important issue in the philosophy of mathematics.
The argument relies on several assumptions. Some objections have been made against these assumptions, but there are several
serious defects in these objections. Ameliorating these defects leads to a new anti-realistic philosophy of mathematics, mainly:
first, in mathematical applications, what really exist and can be used as tools are not abstract mathematical entities, but
our inner representations that we create in imagining abstract mathematical entities; second, the thoughts that we create
in imagining infinite mathematical entities are bounded by external conditions.
__________
Translated from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Researches), 2006, (8): 74–83 相似文献
100.
Jan Woleński 《Studia Logica》2007,86(3):479-497
This paper proposes a formal framework for the cognitive relation understood as an ordered pair with the cognitive subject
and object of cognition as its members. The cognitive subject is represented as consisting of a language, conequence relation
and a stock of accepted theories, and the object as a model of those theories. This language allows a simple formulation of
the realism/anti-realism controversy. In particular, Tarski’s undefinability theorem gives a philosophical argument for realism
in epistemology.
Special Issue Formal Epistemology II. Edited by Branden Fitelson 相似文献