科学实在主义对现代心理学的影响

科学实在主义认为科学理论应该超越数据去假设不可观察的实体的存在,它为现代心理学提供了本体论支持。该文以科学实在主义为基本框架,从发展历程与发展趋势等方面重新思考了它对现代心理学的影响,为心理学研究带来了新的方法论意义。     

由角膜新生血管的治疗引发的思考

探讨角膜新生血管的有效治疗措施。运用现代医学知识,以创造性思维突破常规, 多因素多环节不同水平干扰发病过程。创造性思维可寻找有效的辅助治疗措施。在角膜新生血管的治疗中正确运用哲学观点,充分发挥创造性思维能力,可降低本病的致盲率和后遗症的发生率,促进人类健康生存,提高生活质量。     

Why modal fictionalism is not self-defeating

Gideon Rosen’s [1990 Modal fictionalism. Mind, 99, 327–354] Modal Fictionalist aims to secure the benefits of realism about possible-worlds, whilst avoiding commitment to the existence of any world other than our own. Rosen [1993 A problem for fictionalism about possible worlds. Analysis, 53, 71–81] and Stuart Brock [1993 Modal fictionalism: A response to Rosen. Mind, 102, 147–150] both argue that fictionalism is self-defeating since the fictionalist is tacitly committed to the existence of a plurality of worlds. In this paper, I develop a new strategy for the fictionalist to pursue in response to the Brock–Rosen objection. I begin by arguing that modal fictionalism is best understood as a paraphrase strategy that concerns the propositions that are expressed, in a given context, by modal sentences. I go on to argue that what is interesting about paraphrastic fictionalism is that it allows the fictionalist to accept that the sentence ‘there is a plurality of worlds’ is true without thereby committing her to the existence of a plurality of worlds. I then argue that the paraphrastic fictionalist can appeal to a form of semantic contextualism in order to communicate her status as an anti-realist. Finally, I generalise my conception of fictionalism and argue that Daniel Nolan and John O’Leary-Hawthorne [1996 Reflexive fictionalisms. Analysis, 56, 26–32] are wrong to suggest that the Brock-Rosen objection reveals a structural flaw with all species of fictionalism.

The ontological commitments of inconsistent theories

In this paper I present an argument for belief in inconsistent objects. The argument relies on a particular, plausible version of scientific realism, and the fact that often our best scientific theories are inconsistent. It is not clear what to make of this argument. Is it a reductio of the version of scientific realism under consideration? If it is, what are the alternatives? Should we just accept the conclusion? I will argue (rather tentatively and suitably qualified) for a positive answer to the last question: there are times when it is legitimate to believe in inconsistent objects.     

缺血性卒中治疗中的若干启示

脑卒中具有高发病率、高病死率、高度致残的临床特点。目前对缺血性卒中的治疗已取得了重大进展,但它仍是内科临床工作中最具挑战性的任务之一。哲学反思对科学的发展具有指导作用,本文从哲学的角度对缺血性卒中的治疗策略和措施进行综合分析,以把握其最新的发展趋势。     

问诊的诊断价值及其方法学探讨

问诊作为临床诊断的开始和方法,具有促进医患良性沟通、明确诊断、减少医疗纠纷和贯彻新医学模式的重要价值。问诊过程中,医生除了注重其技术性和程序性内容以外,更要坚持哲学的普遍联系、辨证发展、病人个体差异和巧用过渡性语言等思维方法。     

Psychotherapy’s Philosophical Values: Insight or Absorption?

According to insight-oriented psychotherapies, the change clients undergo during therapy results from insights gained into the “true” nature of the self, which entail greater self-knowledge and self-understanding. In this paper, I question such claims through a critical examination of the epistemological and metaphysical values underlying such forms of therapy. I claim that such psychotherapeutic practices are engaged in a process that subtly “absorbs” clients into the therapist’s philosophical framework which is characterized by a certain problematic conception of subjectivity, knowledge, and reality. Through mechanisms which are intrinsic to the therapeutic encounter, such as suggestion and power, such therapies construct and reconfigure clients along the lines of socially accepted norms and values. Consequently, insight-oriented psychotherapy results in a deceptive form of social control.     

Propositions, Sets, and Worlds

If we agree with Michael Jubien that propositions do not exist, while accepting the existence of abstract sets in a realist mathematical ontology, then the combined effect of these ontological commitments has surprising implications for the metaphysics of modal logic, the ontology of logically possible worlds, and the controversy over modal realism versus actualism. Logically possible worlds as maximally consistent proposition sets exist if sets generally exist, but are equivalently expressed as maximally consistent conjunctions of the same propositions in corresponding sets. A conjunction of propositions, even if infinite in extent, is nevertheless itself a proposition. If sets and hence proposition sets exist but propositions do not exist, then whether or not modal realism is true depends on which of two apparently equivalent methods of identifying, representing, or characterizing logically possible worlds we choose to adopt. I consider a number of reactions to the problem, concluding that the best solution may be to reject the conventional model set theoretical concept of logically possible worlds as maximally consistent proposition sets, and distinguishing between the actual world alone as maximally consistent and interpreting all nonactual merely logically possible worlds as submaximal. I am grateful to the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study in the Humanities and Social Sciences (NIAS), Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), for supporting this among related research projects in philosophical logic and philosophy of mathematics during my Resident Research Fellowship in 2005-2006.     

One hundred and fifty years of philosophy

Looking back from 2049 over one-hundred and fifty years of philosophy, a student's essay reveals what became of rival strands in Western philosophy – with a sidelong glance at the special Topoi issue on the theme “Philosophy: What is to be Done?” that was published almost half a century earlier.     

循证医学证据的哲学蕴义

循证医学的核心理念是开发利用最佳证据用以指导临床医疗实践。从认识论的角度看,其证据的本质仍然是通过以病人为研究对象的临床医学研究所获得的知识信息,但却是经过分层滤过、系统综合和翻译转化的知识信息,是可以用于提高临床诊断、治疗水平和服务质量的,即可以直接转化为“现实生产力”的可运用的知识信息。