In the Vicinity of the Human

Abstract

Beginning with the situated character of the question concerning the human, this paper argues that the problem of the human is itself inextricably bound to the problem of situation or place. Consequently, any genuine philosophical anthropology must take the form of a philosophical topology. This line of argument is developed through the work Abraham Heschel, Martin Heidegger, Martin Buber, and also Helmut Plessner.     

Oikonomia,Incarnation and Immediacy: The Figure of the Jew in St John of Damascus

Abstract

This paper investigates the role of oikonomia in the writings of St John of Damascus and how that role is integral to the construction of the figure of the Jew.     

Between Luxury and Need: The Idea of Distance in Philosophical Anthropology

Abstract

This paper offers a critical analysis of the use of the idea of distance in philosophical anthropology. Distance is generally presented in works of philosophical anthropology as the ideal coping strategy, which rests in turn on the thesis of the instinct deficiency of the human species. Some of the features of species life, such as its sophisticated use of symbolic forms, come to be seen as necessary parts of this general coping strategy, rather than a merely expressive outlet, incidental to the ultimate goal of life preservation. The paper analyses the arguments used in support of the thesis of instinct deficiency in Hans Blumenberg and considers their implications for the status of symbolic expression in species life. It contrasts the approach this thesis involves with one that proceeds by presenting and arguing from biological evolutionary evidence. The contrast is used to examine the questions: in what sense instinct deficiency is specifically anthropological, and in what precise sense philosophical anthropology is ‘philosophical’.     

The evidential status of philosophical intuition

Philosophers have traditionally held that claims about necessities and possibilities are to be evaluated by consulting our philosophical intuitions; that is, those peculiarly compelling deliverances about possibilities that arise from a serious and reflective attempt to conceive of counterexamples to these claims. But many contemporary philosophers, particularly naturalists, argue that intuitions of this sort are unreliable, citing examples of once-intuitive, but now abandoned, philosophical theses, as well as recent psychological studies that seem to establish the general fallibility of intuition.In the first two sections of this paper, I evaluate these arguments, and also the counter-arguments of contemporary defenders of tradition. In the next two sections, I sketch an alternative account of the role of philosophical intuitions that incorporates elements of traditionalism and naturalism - and defend it against other such views. In the final section, however, I discuss intuitions about conscious experience, and acknowledge that my view may not extend comfortably to this case. This may seem unfortunate, since so much contemporary discussion of the epistemology of modality seems motivated by worries about the mind-body problem, and informed by the position one wishes to endorse. But, as I argue, if conscious experience is indeed an exception to the view I suggest in this paper, it is an exception that proves - and can illuminate - the rule.     

Quality Instances and the Structure of the Concrete Particular

In this paper, I examine a puzzle that emerges from what J. P. Moreland has called the traditional realist view of quality instances. Briefly put, the puzzle is to figure out how quality instances fit into the overall structure of a concrete particular, given that the traditional realist view of quality instances prima facie seems incompatible with what might be called the traditional realist view of concrete particulars. After having discussed the traditional realist views involved and the puzzle that emerges from their juxtaposition, I propose an alternative realist view of quality instances which resolves the puzzle. In short, the puzzle is solved by treating the distinction between a concrete particular and its quality instances as a distinction of reason, and by adopting the view that the individuating element of a concrete particular must also serve as its unifying element – a view which Moreland, one of traditional realism’s most stalwart contemporary defenders, rejects.     

Teilen,Trennen und Vereinen: EPR ohne Holismus

Dividing, Separating and Unifying. EPR Without Holism. In the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics parts of composed systems are correlated in a non-causal way, they are ontologically dependent on each other. In this paper I try to defend traditional realism giving a non-holistic interpretation of the EPR-paradox. An analysis of events in the macroscopic world shows that dividing and unifying objects is quite dif-ferent from changing (modifying) objects. In application to quantum mechanics I argue that a measurement at a given single-system changes (modifies) this object, but the EPR-measurement divides the given object. Therefore this given object is an undivided and dividable One and not a composed system. If parts are produced (by EPR-measurement) correlations do not occur.

---

Teilen, Trennen und Vereinen: EPR ohne Holismus

     

关于全科医学兴起和发展的哲学审视

全科医学的兴起已经成为"必然",当今医学科学的发展应该对这种"必然"做出理性的思考.全科医学的兴起和发展隐含着对现代医疗中失人性化倾向的反动,揭示了人道主义精神在现代医疗中的回归.全科医疗与专科医疗是一种互补关系,共同丰富和完善医疗卫生服务体系.     

临床医生应具有很高的哲学修养

人体的复杂性和人命关天的特殊性决定了临床工作具有持久的挑战性.无论是病因的诊断,治疗方案的选择,还是治疗效果的判断都给临床医生的哲学思维提出很高的要求.因此,临床医生不仅要注重积累自己的专业知识和临床经验,而且要努力提高自己的哲学修养.     

与时偕行趣时变通--《周易》"时"之观念析

本文围绕着<周易>经传中关于"时"的观念问题进行辨析,综合考察了易学史上对"时"之观念进行象数模拟和义理思考的主要形式与内容,并分析了<周易>"时"之观念的现代启示意义.     

Minding Minding God: A Response to Spezio and Bielfeldt

Abstract. Michael Spezio and Dennis Bielfeldt have each raised important issues with regard to my positions in Minding God: Theology and the Cognitive Sciences. In this article I respond to several of their criticisms, including issues of the nature of theology, my stance on epistemology and realism, and issues of physicalism, freedom, and determinism.