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461.
Maria Rosa Antognazza 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(2):283-309
In this paper I will discuss certain aspects of Leibniz's theory and practice of ‘soft reasoning’ as exemplified by his defence of two central mysteries of the Christian revelation: the Trinity and the Incarnation. By theory and practice of ‘soft’ or ‘broad’ reasoning, I mean the development of rational strategies which can successefully be applied to the many areas of human understanding which escape strict demonstration, that is, the ‘hard’ or ‘narrow’ reasoning typical of mathematical argumentation.1 These strategies disclose an ‘other’ reason, i.e. a complementary set of arguments and methods developed by Leibniz in order to deal with crucial issues such as the ‘weighting’ of probabilities and truths of fact. I will argue that one of the most compelling examples of the importance and fertility of Leibniz's ‘other’ reason is provided by his solution to the problems posed by the unique epistemological status of theological mysteries. 相似文献
462.
Paul Forster 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(1):163-195
Helmholtz's theory of space had significant impact on Schlick's early ‘critical realist’ point of view. However, it will be argued in this paper that Schlick's appropriation of Helmholtz's ideas eventually lead to a rather radical transformation of the original Helmholtzian position. 相似文献
463.
Christophe Erismann 《British Journal for the History of Philosophy》2013,21(1):39-59
The fourth-century thinker and theologian Gregory of Nyssa was a convinced realist about universals. According to him, there is just one substance man for all the individuals of the species man and this universal substance is completely instantiated by each individual. In two of his treatises – the Ad Ablabium and the Ad Graecos – he draws linguistic consequences from this realist position. This enquiry results in the thesis according to which it is incorrect to use natural kind terms (such as names of species) in the plural form, because that would involve stating a plurality of substances, when in fact there is just one substance for all the individuals of a given kind. In consequence, since the substance of all individual human beings is the same, the word ‘man’ can only be used adequately in the singular form. In this contribution, Gregory's reasoning is reconstructed. In the second part of the paper, the posterity of his theory and its endorsement by Theodore Abū Qurrah at the turn of the eighth and ninth centuries are examined. 相似文献
464.
Pekka Korpinen 《World Futures: Journal of General Evolution》2013,69(1):35-46
Well‐known epochs of style such as Romanticism, Realism, Impressionism, Cubism, etc. are combined with historical facts of economic long cycles. It turns out that long depressions/declines correlate with Romantic movements in style whereas long periods of prosperity coincide with realism. Basic innovations in painting do not cluster in difficult economic times. The evidence indicates almost the contrary. 相似文献
465.
P.D. Magnus 《Metaphilosophy》2013,44(1-2):48-52
Philosophy of science in the past half century can be seen as a reaction against logical empiricism's focus on modern logic as the format in which debates should be expressed and on physics as the canonical science. These reactions have resulted in a fragmentation of the field. Although this provides ways forward for disparate philosophies of various sciences, it threatens the very possibility of general philosophy of science. The debate that most obviously continues to be conducted at the general level—the debate about scientific realism—only does so because of a dangerous naïveté. Nevertheless, this article suggests that there is a place for general work not by starting at the highest level of abstraction but instead by abstracting general lessons from actual science. 相似文献
466.
Xavier Vanmechelen 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(2):126-139
Abstract Although irrationality always presupposes rationality, I think there are good arguments to claim that sometimes rationality presupposes irrationality.This paper tries to show how irrational action can support rationality in two ways: it can develop and preserve rationality. I also argue that sometimes the development and the conservation of rationality can only be realized by irrational action. 相似文献
467.
Henk bij de Weg 《Philosophical explorations》2013,16(1):17-30
Abstract In this paper I discern two concepts of meaning: meaning O ‐ which is assigned by us on the basis of our commonsense conception in order to constitute our own daily reality — and meaning I, which we assign when we interpret reality scientifically. Authors who contend that the commonsense conception is nothing but a kind of scientific theory, do not see that the two fields of life have their own concept of meaning. Commonsense and science are not separate from each other, however: though both have their own practices, the way we interpret reality scientifically presupposes our commonsense conception. 相似文献
468.
Jeff Malpas 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(2):201-215
Abstract What is the relation between our beliefs, or thoughts in general, and the perceptual experience of the world that gives rise to those beliefs? Donald Davidson is usually taken to have a well‐known answer to this question that runs as follows: while our beliefs are, at least in part, caused by our experience, such experience does not thereby count as providing a rational ground for those beliefs; our beliefs are thus evidentially grounded in other beliefs, but not in the experience that gives rise to them. John McDowell, among others, has challenged this Davidsonian picture on the grounds that it actually severs the connection between beliefs and their proper evidential grounds. Against such a view, this paper argues the Davidsonian position grounds belief in the specificity of our own locatedness in the world, and in the more general and prior embeddedness of belief in the world that is a part of the very concept of belief. 相似文献
469.
Simon Truwant 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(5):696-715
AbstractBoth Kant and Levinas state that traditional ontology is a type of philosophy that illegitimately forces the structure of human reason onto other beings, thus making the subject the center and origin of all meaning. Kant’s critique of the ontology of his scholastic predecessors is well known. For Levinas, however, it does not suffice. He rejects what we could call an ‘existential ontology’: a self-centered way of living as a whole, of which all philosophical ontology is but a branch. Alternatively, he presents an ethical way of living centered on ‘the Other’. Kant also, however, eventually turns to ethics to uncover a more fundamental domain of meaning. Hence, both thinkers ultimately agree about the primacy of ethics over theory. Despite this concurrence, Levinas nevertheless criticizes all aspects of Kant’s turn towards ethics: his reason for making this turn, the kind of critique that he applies to this domain, and the outcome thereof. These three points reflect Levinas’ more general critique that Kant did not succeed in overcoming ontological discourse. This paper shows how Kant can reply to, and overcome, each of Levinas’ three critiques. In this way, I reveal certain commonalities between these two thinkers that commentators still often overlook. 相似文献
470.
We distinguish and discuss two different accounts of the subject matter of theories of reference, meta-externalism and meta-internalism. We argue that a form of the meta-internalist view, “moderate meta-internalism”, is the most plausible account of the subject matter of theories of reference. In the second part of the paper we explain how this account also helps to answer the questions of what kind of concept reference is, and what role intuitions have in the study of the reference relation. 相似文献