Is Intuition Necessary for Defending Platonism?

G?del asserts that his philosophy falls under the category of conceptual realism. This paper gives a general picture of G?del’s conceptual realism’s basic doctrines, and gives a way to understand conceptual realism in the background of Leibniz’s and Kant’s philosophies. Among philosophers of mathematics, there is a widespread view that Platonism encounters an epistemological difficulty because we do not have sensations of abstract objects. In his writings, G?del asserts that we have mathematical intuitions of mathematical objects. Some philosophers do not think it is necessary to resort to intuition to defend Platonism, and other philosophers think that the arguments resorting to intuition are too na?ve to be convincing. I argue that the epistemic difficulty is not particular to Platonism; when faced with skepticism, physicalists also need to give an answer concerning the relationship between our experience and reality. G?del and Kant both think that sensations or combinations of sensations are not ideas of physical objects, but that, to form ideas of physical objects, concepts must be added. However, unlike Kant, G?del thinks that concepts are not subjective but independent of our minds. Based on my analysis of G?del’s conceptual realism, I give an answer to the question in the title and show that arguments resorting to intuition are far from na?ve, despite what some philosophers have claimed.     

结构实在论评析

The epistemological version of structural realism, proposed by Cao Tianyu, has great influence in the philosophy of science. Syntheses has published a special volume discussing the topic. Cao criticizes anti-realism, as well as the epistemic and ontic versions of structural realism. From the concepts of structure, ontology, and construction, he analyzes the objectivity of scientific theories as having five aspects: construction, historicity, holism, revision, and revolution. This paper systematically analyzes and comments on Cao's structural realism. The author agrees with his criticism of the under-determination thesis, is neutral to his argument against ontological discontinuity, and questions his universal language argument. Translated by Yu Jinlong from Ziran Bianzhengfa Yanjiu 自然辩证法研究 (Studies in Dialectics of Nature), 2006, (11): 34–38     

Ethical Pragmatism

Beginning with a thought experiment about a mysterious Delphic oracle, this article motivates, explains, and attempts to defend a view it calls Ethical Pragmatism. Ethical Pragmatism is the view that we can and should carry on our practice of moral deliberation without reference to moral truths, or more broadly, without reference to metaethics. The defense the article mounts tries to show that neither suspicions about the tenability of fact‐value distinctions, nor doubts about the viability of global pragmatism, nor worries about the “force” of ethical injunctions without reference to moral truths constitute good reason to reject Ethical Pragmatism.     

The Philosophical Use and Misuse of Science

Science is our best way of finding out about the natural world, and philosophers who write about that world ought to be sensitive to the claims of our best science. There are obstacles, however, to outsiders using science well. We think philosophers are prone to misuse science: to give undue weight to results that are untested; to highlight favorable and ignore unfavorable data; to give illegitimate weight to the authority of science; to leap from scientific premises to philosophical conclusions without spelling out their relevance; to treat mere resonance between a scientific theory and a philosophical view as empirical evidence for the philosophical view. This article identifies and illustrates some of the ways in which philosophers misuse science, explains why these pitfalls are easy to fall into, and concludes with suggestions for avoiding them.     

Normative realism and ontology: reply to Clarke-Doane,Rosen, and Enoch and McPherson

In response to comments on my book, Being Realistic about Reasons, by Justin Clarke-Doane, David Enoch and Tristram McPherson, and Gideon Rosen, I try to clarify my domain-based view of ontology, my understanding of the epistemology of normative judgments, and my interpretation of the phenomenon of supervenience.     

What do you mean “This isn’t the question”?

This is a contribution to the symposium on Tim Scanlon’s Being Realistic about Reasons (2014). We have two aims here: First, we ask for more details about Scanlon’s meta-metaphysical view (about his notion of a domain, his criterion of existence, his ambition to remain ontologically thin, and on the role of pragmatic considerations in Scanlon’s picture), showing problems with salient clarifications. And second, we raise independent objections to the view – to its explanatory productivity, its distinctness, and the argumentative support it enjoys.     

Objectivity and reliability

Scanlon’s Being Realistic about Reasons is a beautiful book – sleek, sophisticated, and programmatic. One of its key aims is to demystify knowledge of normative and mathematical truths, realistically construed – i.e. construed, roughly, as being true relevantly independent of minds and languages, when interpreted at face-value. In this article, I develop an epistemological problem that Scanlon fails to explicitly address. I argue that his ‘metaphysical pluralism’ can be understood as a response to that problem. However, it resolves the problem only if it undercuts the objectivity of normative and mathematical inquiry.     

Theorizing inquiry in the moral space of practice

Moral realism has been advanced as a central theme in contemporary hermeneutic thought. From this standpoint, participation in cultural practices is made possible and meaningful by ontologically real moral goods and reference points. Cultural practices thus constitute a moral referential totality for human action. This article suggests that these and related hermeneutic insights offer a unique perspective for taking account of practical involvement in the world and can form the basis of an interpretive frame for research that foregrounds this practice-based moral realism. An emphasis on moral realist concepts such as participation in practice, distinctions of worth, strong evaluations, and moral reference points can allow interrelated phenomena to show up as aspects of a moral ecology and reveal something about their moral significance within a form of practice. Moreover, inquiry of this sort can reveal something about that form of practice as a space of moral possibilities for action.     

Crossan on the Couch, Along with the Rest of Us: Part Two: Six Proposals Toward a New Paradigm for a Psychologically Realistic Approach to the Search for the Historical Jesus as Suggested by the Work of Hal Childs

Building on the theoretical basis spelled out in my first article on Hal Childs' The Myth of the Historical Jesus and the Evolution of Consciousness, the present article engages in dialogue with Crossan's 2000 autobiography, A Long Way From Tipperary. The dialogue focuses on six proposals emerging from Childs' work that advocate the inclusion of psychological realism in rethinking the task, practice, and outcome of historical Jesus research. The six proposals are as follows: first, that psychological realism is an essential part of historical realism; second, that unconscious factors are to be considered at work in the viewer as well as in the viewed in historical Jesus research; third, that every reconstruction of the historical Jesus is mythic; fourth, that the preunderstanding that the Jesus scholar brings to historical Jesus research is generated within a hermeneutical circle constituted by a vast web of relationships, purposes, and meanings that include every aspect of the scholar's life; fifth, that the final goal of historical Jesus research is not the facts about the historic Jesus, but the meaning of these facts as archetypal images for self-understanding, world-understanding, and the evolution of consciousness; and sixth, that the purpose of the Gospel is to evoke new archetypal projections in the reader that can lead to new incarnations of the archetypal Self awakened and informed by the story of Jesus, often as recovered by the Jesus historian.     

Soviet Philosophy Revisited – Why Joseph Bocheński Was Right While Being Wrong

Josef Bocheski, pioneer of the discipline ofphilosophical sovietology and one of the firstto criticize Eurocentric attitudes, emphasizedthe central role of logic and sound argument inacademic philosophy. This helped him todemonstrate both the general flaws of and thedifferences in quality within Sovietphilosophy. His endeavors and results areindispensable for the yet-to-be-written historyof Soviet philosophy. By the same token, itmade him less perceptive of the centralpolitical, not just philosophical, role of thepartijnost'-principle. More recent developmentshave shown both Soviet philosophy andBocheski's own, Neo-Thomist position to bepart of a fundamentally outdated idea ofscientific philosophy. However, the criteria oflogical scrutiny and sound argument have notlost their force within globalizingphilosophical culture.