迎接心理学发展的第三波

心理学自冯特始便存在两种类型,自然科学的心理学和人文的心理学.本土心理学依据“一种心智,多种心态”的原则,建构了儒家关系主义理论和自我曼陀罗模型,这种含摄文化的理论解决了冯特以科学方法研究文化的难题.批判实在论和多重哲学典范的结合,奠定了华人本土心理学科学哲学基础,在此基础上,华人本土心理学将迎来心理学发展的第三波.     

PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY,ETHICS, AND LOVE: TOWARD A NEW RELIGION AND SCIENCE DIALOGUE

Religion and science dialogues that orbit around rational method, knowledge, and truth are often, though not always, contentious. In this article, I suggest a different cluster of gravitational points around which religion and science dialogues might usefully travel: philosophical anthropology, ethics, and love. I propose seeing morality as a natural outgrowth of the human desire to establish and maintain social bonds so as not to experience the condition of being alone. Humans, of all animals, need to feel loved—defined as a compassionate present‐with in dynamic dyadic relation such that one experiences the sense of mattering—but that need has an equally natural tendency to be met by creating biased us‐and‐them distinctions. A “critical” natural ethics, then, is one in which we become aware of and work to undermine our tendency to reify in‐group distinctions between “us” and “them.” Religious communities that work intentionally on this can be seen, to some extent, as laboratories of love—or as sites for co‐creating knowledge in perilous times.     

与时偕行趣时变通--《周易》"时"之观念析

本文围绕着<周易>经传中关于"时"的观念问题进行辨析,综合考察了易学史上对"时"之观念进行象数模拟和义理思考的主要形式与内容,并分析了<周易>"时"之观念的现代启示意义.     

Three problems for the evolutionary debunking argument

In attempting to debunk moral realism through an appeal to evolutionary facts, debunkers face a series of problems, which we label the problems of scope, corrosiveness, and post-hoc justification. To overcome these problems, debunkers must assume certain metaphysical or epistemological positions, or otherwise pre-establish them. In doing so, they must assume or pre-establish the very conclusion they seek in advancing the argument. This means that such debunking arguments either beg the question against the moral realist or are undermined as standalone metaethical arguments.     

心理治疗流派的哲学基础、差异与整合

以精神分析、来访者中心疗法、认知行为疗法这三大当代主流心理治疗流派为对象,分析了其哲学基础,并对这三大流派的临床应用效果作出评价。从本体论和认识论的角度,对各流派理论的主要哲学基础进行简单的划分,发现有的偏向于唯心主义,有的则偏向于唯物主义,哲学取向上有着本质的不同,但各流派的临床适应证相似。总的说来,疗效无明显差异,均各有利弊,各流派应取长补短,走向心理治疗整合,以期提高心理治疗效果并缩短其疗程。     

On Quantitative and Qualitative Parsimony

The distinction between quantitative and qualitative parsimony is supposed to allow David Lewis to dismiss one of the charges against his modal realism: that is, the charge of bloated ontology. The aim of this paper is to undermine Lewis's response to this objection. In order to do this, a distinction between multipliable and nonmultipliable objects is introduced. Based on this it is argued that the acceptance of Lewis's response requires one to believe in modal realism in the first place—that is, one has to believe in the view that the existence of nonactual spatiotemporal worlds does not affect the quality of the ontological commitment. Although the paper focuses on the problem of the metaphysics of possible worlds, this should be regarded merely as a case study. Accordingly, the results of this analysis should find applications in other metaphysical debates as well.     

Bildung as an essential disposition in becoming a reflective practitioner: practical application of philosophical hermeneutics to second language teacher education

For a few decades, reflective practice has been employed in second language teacher education (SLTE) as ‘a means by which practitioners can develop a greater level of self-awareness about the nature and impact of their performance, an awareness that creates opportunities for professional growth and development’. Dewey, who initiated the concept of reflective thinking in teacher education, emphasized one’s attitudes toward engagement in reflective process. One such disposition is open-mindedness, ‘a willingness to entertain different perspectives… and acknowledgement of the limitations of one’s own perspectives’. Regarding this concept of open-mindedness, Gadamer, who established philosophical hermeneutics, provided profound insights by using the German word Bildung, which is often translated as education, culture, or self-cultivation. Through this concept, Gadamer emphasized not only one’s open and introspective disposition toward new experience but also one’s mode of being. This paper explores this notion of Bildung and examines its possible practical application to SLTE in combination with reflective practice. Referring to Grondin’s notion that education is to raise true questions, I will argue for the importance of nurturing Bildung of preservice second language teachers and of second language teacher educators.     

A “RESOLUTE” LATER WITTGENSTEIN?

Abstract: “Resolute readings” initially started life as a radical new approach to Wittgenstein's early philosophy, but are now starting to take root as a way of interpreting the later writings as well—a trend exemplified by Stephen Mulhall's Wittgenstein's Private Language (2007) as well as by Phil Hutchinson's “What's the Point of Elucidation?” (2007) and Rom Harré's “Grammatical Therapy and the Third Wittgenstein” (2008). The present article shows that there are neither good philosophical nor compelling exegetical grounds for accepting a resolute reading of the later Wittgenstein's work. It is possible to make sense of Wittgenstein's philosophical method without either ascribing to him an incoherent conception of “substantial nonsense” or espousing the resolute readers' preferred option of nonsense austerity. If the interpretation here is correct, it allows us to recognize Wittgenstein's radical break with the philosophical tradition without having to characterize his achievements in purely therapeutic fashion.     

The Argument from Moral Experience

It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality, has a certain objective-seeming character to it, and that this supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories (according to which morality is a realm of facts or truths) and against anti-objectivist theories like Mackie’s error theory (according to which it is not). In this paper, I argue that our experience of morality does not support objectivist moral theories in this way. I begin by arguing that our moral experience does not have the uniformly objective-seeming character it is typically claimed to have. I go on to argue that even if moral experience were to presuppose or display morality as a realm of fact, we would still need a reason for taking that to support theories according to which it is such a realm. I consider what I take to be the four most promising ways of attempting to supply such a reason: (A) inference to the best explanation, (B) epistemic conservatism, (C) the Principle of Credulity, and (D) the method of wide reflective equilibrium. In each case, I argue, the strategy in question does not support a presumption in favor of objectivist moral theories.