The Life and Works of a Bottom-Up Thinker

A brief account is given of the author's life as a physicist and then a priest. The twin foundations of the author's theological endeavors have been a respect for traditional Christian thinking, though not exempting it from revision where this is needed, and a style of argument termed bottom-up thinking, which seeks to proceed from experience to understanding. The diversity of the world faith traditions is perceived as a major source of perplexity. A revised and modest natural theology and the issue of divine action have been at the top of a science and theology agenda. A defense is sketched in realist terms of the metaphysical strategy of using an ontological interpretation of the unpredictabilities of chaos theory to support a notion of top-down causality through active information. The success of Christian theology as a resource of total explanation depends on a credible account of eschatological hope. Reference is made to practical experience of ethics in the public square.     

郭璞易学思想考

在易学史上,郭璞精湛的易占一直为人推重,而其颇具特色的易学思想却往往被忽视,或语焉不详。笔者在深入研读郭璞诗赋文的基础上,结合其行状,对其易学思想予以全面梳理。本文主要做了三项工作：一是结合郭璞的诗赋,指出郭璞对周易义理的承袭与发挥;一是结合《晋书》本传、郭璞《易洞林》,从取象运数、据象成辞及阴阳灾异说两方面,深入阐析郭璞对焦（赣）、京（房）、管（辂）易象数学的继承与发展;一是结合郭璞的行状,指出郭璞在易占实践上为改革易占方法、完善易占辞以适应现实需要所作出的贡献, 从而表明郭璞是位既重义理又重象数,既重理论又重实践的易学大师。     

ALIVE AND KICKING: A REVIEW OF HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORISM,EDITED BY WILLIAM O'DONOHUE AND RICHARD KITCHENER

Behaviorists have struggled and continue to struggle with basic questions about behavior, such as how to define behavior, how to talk about behavior in relation to environment, and what constitutes an adequate explanation of behavior. Skinner made huge progress on these questions, because of his emphasis on the generic character of stimuli and responses, his advocacy of rate as a datum, his introduction of stimulus control, and his reliance on selection by consequences as a mode of explanation. By no means, however, did he provide final answers. In particular, Skinner fell short because he never escaped from the limitations imposed by thinking in terms of contiguity and discrete events and because he never specified a useful role for theory. The 14 chapters in this book offer varying degrees of clarity on the ways in which behaviorists and behaviorally oriented philosophers dealt with basic questions in the past and are dealing with them in the present, post‐Skinner. They are reviewed individually, because they are uneven in quality. Overall, the book is a useful tool for gaining historical and philosophical background to behaviorism and for getting some idea of behaviorists' current directions.     

Intuitions,Biases, and Extra-Wide Reflective Equilibrium

It seems that intuitions are indispensable in philosophical theorizing. Yet, there is evidence that our intuitions are heavily influenced by biases. This generates a puzzle: we must use our intuitions, but we seemingly cannot fully trust those very intuitions. This paper develops a methodology for philosophical theorizing that attempts to avoid this puzzle. Specifically, it develops and defends a methodology it calls Extra-Wide Reflective Equilibrium. It argues that this method allows us to use intuitions, while also providing a mechanism to check the influence of bias on our intuitions. In section 1, it defends the claim that intuitions are indispensable in philosophical theorizing. In section 2, it outlines recent arguments against the reliability of intuitions. In section 3, it explains and defends its account of Extra-Wide Reflective Equilibrium.     

Is backing grounding?

Separatists are grounding theorists who hold that grounding relations and metaphysical explanations are distinct, yet intimately connected in the sense that grounding relations back metaphysical explanations, just as causal relations back causal explanations. But Separatists have not elaborated on the nature of the ‘backing’ relation. In this paper, I argue that backing is a form of (partial) grounding. In particular, backing has many of the properties commonly attributed to grounding, and taking backing to be partial grounding allows Separatists to make the most of their position vis-à-vis their Unionist opponents.     

Philosophy in Mediis Rebus

Philosophy should begin in the middle of things. I distinguish two ways in which I think that philosophy should begin in the middle of things, and then I describe the two dominant approaches to analytic philosophy today: scientific pragmatism and conceptual analysis (or, more broadly, "a priorism"). After giving reasons for dissatisfaction with both of these dominant approaches, I set out my own view – Practical Realism – and argue for the merits of its methodological and metaphysical components.     

论李鼎祚的《周易集解》

唐人李鼎祚的《周易集解》是现存最早的两汉象数易学文献,具有独一无二的文献价值。然李鼎祚的《周易集解》作为经学的解释文本是其所处时代学术思想的集中体现,他以两汉以来的象数易学及唐代易学中的"新义"反对孔颖达的《周易正义》,反映了唐代易学发展的新动向;李鼎祚的《周易集解》强烈地批判了王弼等玄学派易学"以无为本"的哲学观念,在整个易学哲学发展史中,成为沟通汉代易学与宋代易学的重要纽带。     

BEALER ON THE AUTONOMY OF PHILOSOPHICAL AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE

Abstract: In a series of influential articles, George Bealer argues for the autonomy of philosophical knowledge on the basis that philosophically known truths must be necessary truths. The main point of his argument is that the truths investigated by the sciences are contingent truths to be discovered a posteriori by observation, while the truths of philosophy are necessary truths to be discovered a priori by intuition. The project of assimilating philosophy to the sciences is supposed to be rendered illegitimate by the more or less sharp distinction in these characteristic methods and its modal basis. In this article Bealer's particular way of drawing the distinction between philosophy and science is challenged in a novel manner, and thereby philosophical naturalism is further defended.