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111.
J. Wesley Robbins 《Zygon》1999,34(4):655-666
Pragmatism and critical realism are different vocabularies for talking about the cognitive value of religion and science. Each can be, and has been, used to make the case for cognitive parity between religious and scientific discourse. Critical realism presupposes a particular form of cognitive psychology that entails general skepticism about the external world and forecloses scientific inquiry in the name of a preconceived idea of what the nature of human cognition must be. Thus, of the two, pragmatism is the better vocabulary for fostering mutual understanding between religion and science. 相似文献
112.
Jürgen Dümont 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》1999,30(2):341-364
Two of Hilary Putnam's model-theoretic arguments against metaphysical realism are examined in detail. One of them is developed
as an extension of a model-theoretic argument against mathematical realism based on considerations concerning the so-called
Skolem-Paradox in set theory. This argument against mathematical realism is also treated explicitly. The article concentrates
on the fine structure of the arguments because most commentators have concentrated on the major premisses of Putnam's argument
and especially on his treatment of metaphysical realism. It is shown that the validity of Putnam's arguments is doubtful and
that realists are by no means forced to accept the theses Putnam ascribes to them. It is concluded that Putnam fails to give
convincing arguments for rejecting mathematical or metaphysical realism. Furthermore, Putnam's internal realism is discussed
critically.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
113.
Reinhard Schulz 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》1999,30(2):365-378
Representing and Reconstructing: A Hermeneutical Reply to Ian Hacking. Hacking published in 1983 Representing and Intervening
which has provoked, particularly in the US, the so called realism/anti-realism debate which is still alive today. He lays
claim to anti-realism for theory and to realism for the experiment. Following him, only that which can be used for manipulating
something (e.g., the path of an electon) is realistic. H. Putnam is a severe critic of this dualism. In my paper I am going
to take the Hacking-Putnam controversy as a starting-point for the problem about the determination of the relation between
theory and experiment in the natural sciences. I shall then follow M. Schlick's discussion of this problem and the current
solution to the problem as offered by H. Pietschmann. The differing interpretation of Kant according to the three perspectives
shall be the guideline for the argumentation. The goal of my argumentation is that theory and experiment do not live their
own lives, that in experimenting one always continues traditional chains of action, and that natural science cannot be regarded
independently of the life world it takes place in. This insight into the representing and reconstructing overturns in natural
science, due to the necessity of human decisions, opens up their hermeneutical dimension.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
114.
Valer Ambrus 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》1999,30(1):1-16
Putnam originally developed his causal theory of meaning in order to support scientific realism and reject the notion of incommensurability.
Later he gave up this position and adopted instead what he called ‘internal realism’, but apparently without changing his
mind on topics related to his former philosophy of language. The question must arise whether internal realism, which actually
is a species of antirealism, is compatible with the causal theory of meaning. In giving an answer I begin with an analysis
of the content and metaphysical background of scientific realism. I show that it presupposes metaphysical realism and that
Putnam's philosophical conversion is due to his becoming aware of the latter's incoherence. After giving a brief sketch of
internal realism I conclude by arguing that within this new theoretical framework the causal theory of meaning loses its force
as a weapon against incommensurability.
This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. 相似文献
115.
Ralph Wedgwood 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》1999,2(3):199-215
Non-reductive moral realism is the view that there are moral properties which cannot be reduced to natural properties. If moral properties exist, it is plausible that they strongly supervene on non-moral properties- more specifically, on mental, social, and biological properties. There may also be good reasons for thinking that moral properties are irreducible. However, strong supervenience and irreducibility seem incompatible. Strong supervenience entails that there is an enormous number of modal truths (specifically, truths about exactly which non-moral properties necessitate which moral properties); and all these modal truths must be explained. If these modal truths can all be explained, then it must be a fundamental truth about the essence of each moral property that the moral property is necessarily equivalent to some property that can be specified purely in mental, social and biological terms; and this fundamental truth appears to be a reduction of the moral property in question. The best way to resist this argument is by resorting to the claim that mental and social properties are not, strictly speaking, natural properties, but are instead properties that can only be analysed in partly normative terms. Acceptance of that claim is the price of non-reductive moral realism. 相似文献
116.
Nancy Murphy 《Zygon》1993,28(3):351-359
Abstract. I argue here for a limited version of pragmatism—called conceptual pragmatism—that recognizes that conceptual systems are to be evaluated according to their usefulness for helping us get around in the world. Once a conceptual system is in place, however, the truth of sentences is a matter of both empirical tit and coherence with the rest of our knowledge. The error of critical realists is to fail to take into account the limited conceptual relativity that is to be expected on the basis of conceptual pragmatism. The conceptual realist thesis applies equally in science and theology. 相似文献
117.
Ivan V. Ivanov 《Metaphilosophy》2023,54(5):697-716
This paper makes explicit the basic problem perfect hallucinations pose for perceptual naive realists, more fundamental than the well-trodden Screening-off Problem. The deeper problem offers the basis for an overarching classification of the available naive- realist-friendly approaches to perfect hallucinations. In the course of laying out the challenges to the different types of response, the paper makes a case for the superiority of a particular approach to perfect hallucinations, on which they would be understood as a special kind of perceptual anomaly—arising from a secondary mode of perceptual processing. 相似文献
118.
William James Earle 《Metaphilosophy》2023,54(2-3):341-351
An examination of late Rorty shows that he does not abandon belief in an external world about which we can, and indeed must, acquire knowledge. His disapproval of the correspondence theory of truth does not involve the idea that anything other than local weather, for example, could falsify remarks about local weather. It is just that once we get done looking out the window or, if we are outside, feeling the right kind of drops make contact with our skin, there is nothing else we can do, nothing better, to make ourselves more certain, more cognitively secure. One can see this in the detailed work that enables scientific progress. Science improves itself by doing more of the same. G. E. Moore's famous open question stays open only as a reminder that our fallibility never disappears and that our cognitive security is never better than pro tem. Rorty, as a faithful pragmatist and undogmatic meliorist, thinks this is perfectly O.K. 相似文献
119.
During the last half a century, civil rights movements have been led by people of faith even as they have marched in different directions. Some spoke out for the status quo while others demanded a different vision of justice, some for peace and others for war, for a violence-free life for women and against it. The issues and partisans shift, particularly as the relationship between state and church, faith and politics, has varied from one country to the next. Participation is dangerous, but even more so are inaction, withdrawal, obedience. This issue of Dialog takes another look at the history, philosophy, and practice of Christians. 相似文献
120.
H. Lillehammer 《The Journal of Ethics》2000,4(3):173-190
This paper examines the metaphysically modest view that attributionsof normative reasons can be made true in the absence of a responseindependent normative reality. The paper despairs in finding asatisfactory account of normative reasons in metaphysically modestterms. 相似文献