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2.
George E. Yoos 《Argumentation》1988,2(2):191-207
By drawing new distinctions labelled appeal and response to replace traditional rhetorical modes of written discourse, the essay sketches a new perspective about what philosophers are doing rhetorically in doing philosophy. To think of philosophers as simply engaged in argument is an oversimplification and a distortion of what philosophers do. Crucial to doing philosophy are four activities: (1) definition and redefinition of problems and issues that form both the focus of the canonical historical literature of philosophy and what goes on in contemporary philosophy as a discipline, (2) the development and use of formal languages and technical vocabularies to abbreviate and label complexity and to disambiguate and precise distinctions necessary to deal with problems and issues, (3) the development and exploration of argumentative appeals for acceptance or refutation of answers to questions raised by the philosophical problematic, and (4) the development and exploration of explanatory responses to questions raised by the problematic. In so far as these four activities are driven and sanctioned by the current, self-defining philosophical problematic, contemporary philosophy as a body of knowledge is historical, cumulative, and marked by progress, and the doing of philosophy is fundamentally the making of written appeals and responses about its problematic. 相似文献
3.
Hans Jürgen Wendel 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》1992,23(2):323-352
Both radical constructivism and constructionism are naturalized approaches to epistemology. They try to fertilize results from biology and psychology for epistemological aims. They both refuse epistemological realism as unsustainable metaphysics. This raises the problem of the range of the naturalistic approach to epistemology. Constructivism, in both forms, turns out to be untenable because it runs in an aporia: it must borrow from realism either, or it must qualify its own position as a metaphysical one. But therewith, constructivism would be blamed to be metaphysical itself. 相似文献
4.
James W. McAllister 《Metaphilosophy》2023,54(4):507-522
The scientific realism debate in philosophy of science raises some intriguing methodological issues. Scientific realism posits a link between a scientific theory's observational and referential success. This opens the possibility of testing the thesis empirically, by searching for evidence of such a link in the record of theories put forward in the history of science. Many realist philosophers working today propose case study methodology as a way of carrying out such a test. This article argues that a qualitative method such as case study methodology is not adequate for this purpose, for two reasons: to test scientific realism is to pose an effects-of-causes question, and observational and referential success are quantities that theories possess to a greater or lesser degree. The article concludes that an empirical test of scientific realism requires a quantitative method. 相似文献
5.
James Norton 《Metaphilosophy》2023,54(1):3-16
This paper defends the usefulness of the concept of philosophical progress and the common assumption that philosophy and science aim to make the same, or a comparable, kind of progress. It does so by responding to Yafeng Shan's (2022) arguments that the wealth of research on scientific progress is not applicable or useful to philosophy, and that philosophy doesn't need a concept of progress at all. It is ultimately argued that while Shan's arguments are not successful, they reveal the way forward in developing accounts of philosophical progress. 相似文献
6.
Chanwoo Lee 《Ratio》2023,36(3):192-203
The apparent chasm between two camps in metaphysics, analytic metaphysics and scientific metaphysics, is well recognized. I argue that the relationship between them is not necessarily a rivalry; a division of labour that resembles the relationship between pure mathematics and science is possible. As a case study, I look into the metaphysical underdetermination argument for ontic structural realism, a well-known position in scientific metaphysics, together with an argument for the position in analytic metaphysics known as ontological nihilism. I argue that we can ascribe the same schema to both arguments, which indicates that analytic metaphysics can offer an abstract model that scientific metaphysics may find useful. 相似文献
7.
In attempting to debunk moral realism through an appeal to evolutionary facts, debunkers face a series of problems, which we label the problems of scope, corrosiveness, and post-hoc justification. To overcome these problems, debunkers must assume certain metaphysical or epistemological positions, or otherwise pre-establish them. In doing so, they must assume or pre-establish the very conclusion they seek in advancing the argument. This means that such debunking arguments either beg the question against the moral realist or are undermined as standalone metaethical arguments. 相似文献
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Arthur Peacocke 《Zygon》1993,28(4):469-484
Abstract. Variable judgments, both negative and positive, have been made by scientists (mainly physicists and astronomers) on the theological implications of their Findings. It is urged that science and theology are most appropriately related through a critical realist approach. On this basis some implications for our conceptions of God and our scientific perspectives on the created world are explored with respect to both divine Being and divine Becoming. A positive assessment of nature as created concludes the article. 相似文献
10.
Philip Clayton 《Zygon》1993,28(3):361-369
Abstract. The present article continues an earlier critique of Robbins's and Rorty's neopragmatism. Their skepticism about the traditional concept of correspondence and about the criteria for truth are both unjustified, and their own assertion of meaning as usefulness either presupposes a prior notion of linguistic reference or fails to qualify as a sufficient criterion for knowledge. The difficulties with neopragmatism have implications for two other areas of the religion/science discussion, postmodernism and empirical Theology. Postmodernism shares neopragmatism's mistakes regarding the philosophy of language and can be rejected without endangering one's empiricism, humanism, or naturalism. By contrast, the strengths of empirical Theology, and of religious empiricism in general, can be preserved without Robbins's proposed ban on metaphysics. 相似文献