清代学者焦循独特的易学构架

本文考述了焦循的旁通、相错、时行三说,并在此基础之上提出了一系列看法：1．焦循以普遍联系和爻位运动的观点研究《周易》,把《周易》六十四卦视为具有内在联系的“生生不息”的动态系统,比之孤立、静止地研究《周易》一卦一爻,更有意义。2．焦循独特的易学构架是建立在客观分析的考据基础之上,不宜武断否定。3．焦循易学构架并非纯象数的研究,而是以象数为载体,阐发儒家的道德义理和自己“修齐治平”的政治理想。4．焦循以“声训”为媒介的两卦或数卦之间的关联是否《周易》本义值得讨论,其“声训”缺乏充分的文献旁证是一大缺憾。     

脑认知功能及其哲学思考

近年来,国内外形成了脑认知功能的新热潮。从哲学思维的角度,分析了脑认知功能研究的发展概况。首先,在科学实践基础上,人们对大脑功能侧化问题进行了研究;其次,从联系的观点出发,现在人们更倾向于双脑协同是完成心理活动的神经学基础;最后,从系统的、发展的观点出发,赫曼提出了“全脑概念”,增加了边缘系统与神经心理功能的关系研究。     

交叉学科——神经眼科学

神经眼科学是一门交叉学科,至少横跨了眼科、神经内科和神经外科。在神经眼科疾病的诊断上,以各个专科有限的专业知识来分析整个人体复杂的病情,难免会有其局限性或引起判断失误。我国神经眼科学发展缓慢,神经眼科这一交叉学科是相关科室的共同薄弱环节,因此有必要对神经眼科学进行探讨和哲学思考,以引起更多的重视。     

MOTIVES FOR PHILOSOPHIZING DEBUNKING AND WITTGENSTEIN'S PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

Abstract: In this article I contest a reading of Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations —a reading of it as debunking philosophy. I concede that such a reading is not groundless, but I show why it is nonetheless mistaken. To do so, I distinguish two different ways of viewing Philosophical Investigations and its concern with philosophical problems, an External View and an Internal View. On the External View, readers of the book are taken to know ahead of time what philosophical problems are. On the Internal View, readers are not taken to know this ahead of time: the task of the book is to disclose what philosophical problems are, to show them coming into being. One thing disclosed is our participatory role in philosophical problems coming to be. Learning about the nature of philosophical problems is thus learning about our own nature; metaphilosophical knowledge is in part self-knowledge. If the Internal View is correct (as I believe it is), then Philosophical Investigations does not debunk philosophy but provides a different conception of philosophy and the philosopher's task.     

‘Why not Lukács?’ or: on Non-Bourgeois Bourgeois Being

The Lukács Circle in Szeged, a spontaneous, unofficial organization of young Hungarian scholars and philosophy teachers, characteristically represented Georg Lukács' influence on young Hungarian intelligentsia in the period of late socialism. In this paper, the author recalls and critically analyses the intellectual milieu and motives that led a considerable part of young Hungarian intelligentsia of that time to make a cult of Lukács' philosophy. The key to the analysis is the ambiguous character of the political feelings and philosophical orientation of many young people in the period of late socialism and the paradoxical non-bourgeois bourgeois character of Lukács' philosophy. Lukács' young followers were dissatisfied with the political conditions of real socialism and with official Marxism. However, they considered themselves Marxists and were convinced by the anti-capitalist, romantic idea of democratic socialism. In the eyes of his young followers, Lukács was a genuine philosopher whose teaching was interwoven by his wide-ranging bourgeois middle-class education, promising both a real philosophical alternative to official Marxism and a high-level philosophical foundation for a non-capitalist but democratic future human history. The author argues that Lukács' philosophy did not satisfy these expectations. In his political philosophy, the philosopher could not move away from the mythological idea concerning the leading role of the communist party and therefore could not elaborate a genuine philosophical foundation for the idea of democratic socialism. Despite the superiority of his philosophy, his methodology and approach to the history of philosophy failed to provide a real philosophical alternative to the Bolshevik tradition of Marxism.     

From Nature to Culture? Diogenes and Philosophical Anthropology

This essay is concerned with the central issue of philosophical anthropology: the relation between nature and culture. Although Rousseau was the first thinker to introduce this topic within the modern discourse of philosophy and the cultural sciences, it has its origin in Diogenes the Cynic, who was a disciple of Socrates. In my essay I (1) historically introduce a few aspects of philosophical anthropology, (2) deal with the nature–culture exchange, as introduced in Kant, then I (3) relate this topic to the Ancient Cynic Diogenes. Surprisingly, although we usually identify Critical Theory and Freudian psychoanalysis as theories that have shown that cultural progress should not be comprehended as a development from nature to culture, and that instead it should be conceived as a development from culture against (external as well as internal) nature, I show that Cynicism can be conceived as a vivid example within the history of our culture that reveals a double sense of repression and alienation, which is part of human civilization and mankind.     

Philosophy,writing, and liberation

In responding to the three creative interpretive discussions in the symposium on my book Philosophy and the Art of Writing, this paper explores the different styles of philosophical discourse and their role in the practice of philosophy as a way of life that extends beyond the discursive and that combines self-cultivation with care for others in the ethical-aesthetic pursuit of living beauty. In advocating this aesthetic model of philosophical life over a purely therapeutic model, I suggest how the former can incorporate the latter's concerns for spiritual health and liberation. In developing my response to the symposiasts while elaborating on the themes of my book, I consider issues of ineffability, creative performance, embodiment, truth, heroism, vulnerability, possession, art, spirituality, love, and liberation.     

Philosophers ought to develop,theorize about,and use philosophically relevant AI

The transformative power of artificial intelligence (AI) is coming to philosophy—the only question is the degree to which philosophers will harness it. This paper argues that the application of AI tools to philosophy could have an impact on the field comparable to the advent of writing, and that it is likely that philosophical progress will significantly increase as a consequence of AI. The role of philosophers in this story is not merely to use AI but also to help develop it and theorize about it. In fact, the paper argues that philosophers have a prima facie obligation to spend significant effort in doing so, at least insofar as they should spend effort philosophizing.     

Frank Ebersole on Wittgenstein and Pictures in Philosophy

How do we get into trouble in philosophy, and what do pictures have to do with it? This article addresses Frank Ebersole's thoughts on (Wittgenstein's remarks on) pictures in philosophy. It identifies the puzzlement generated for Ebersole by what Wittgenstein says and also considers some puzzling aspects of Ebersole's own renderings of pictures. It distinguishes between the philosophical picture and the pictorial form in which it may be crystalized and shows how philosophy's reliance on situationally disembedded grammatical stories (pictorial or not) leads us into trouble. Accordingly, responding to such trouble consists not in recovering the picture, in the sense of a single “object” or image we had before our mind's eye, but in—what is better described as Ebersole's strategy of—supplying a grammatical example (pictorial or otherwise) to go with our thinking, an example that makes what we think and say clear to ourselves.