用哲学思维引领肝癌的现代治疗理念

肝癌的现代治疗原则已从单一的外科手术切除发展为多学科参与、多技术应用、多阶段序贯的综合治疗。但是,这一理念还远没有成为肝癌临床实践中一以贯之的追求,相关学科之间缺乏经常性的、实质性的、富有成效的合作。其深层次的原因,是医师们专业越来越细化,仅仅从各自专业的视角看肝癌,缺乏哲学层面的深度思考。本文分别从医学本质、肝脏在人...     

胶囊内镜阅图技巧与哲学思维

胶囊内镜开创了内镜新纪元,为临床医生了解小肠疾病提供了有力的武器。然而,该技术进入临床时间尚短且尚未普及,很多阅图诊断问题仍然困扰着很多医生。作者试图将自己在胶囊内镜诊断中的技巧、经验、教训以哲学思维进行归纳总结,希望能为胶囊内镜的诊断技术普及、提高起到抛砖引玉的作用。     

运动预防骨质疏松症的哲学思考

从运动角度对骨质疏松的防治进行哲学思考,指出在临床实践指导中,医务工作者要做到运动与骨质疏松者的有机结合,应从以下几个方面进行着手;（1）运动预防骨质疏松具有普遍性;（2）运动是预防骨质疏松的关键;（3）为骨质疏松患者,制定个体化运动方案。     

Stable Strategies for Personal Development

In her short story “Stable Strategies for Middle Management,” Eileen Gunn imagines a future in which Margaret, an office worker, seeks radical genetic enhancements intended to help her secure the middle-management job she wants. One source of the story’s tension and dark humor is dramatic irony: readers can see that the enhancements Margaret buys stand little chance of making her life go better for her; enhancing is, for Margaret, probably a prudential mistake. This paper argues that our positions in the real world are sufficiently similar to Margaret’s position in Gunn’s fictional world that we should take this story seriously as grounding an argument from analogy for the conclusion that radical genetic enhancements are, for us, probably a prudential mistake. The paper then defends this method. When the question at hand is one of speculative ethics, there is no method better fit to the purpose than argument from analogy to speculative fiction.     

Place and Philosophical Topography: Responding to Bubbio,Farin and Satne

ABSTRACT

Diego Bubbio, Ingo Farin and Glenda Satne have advanced a range of comments, questions and challenges relating to the ideas and arguments set out in the new edition of my Place and Experience (2018). Rather than address each of my interlocutors separately, my responses here are organized around four main topics: the relation between space and place, including the nature of space; the relation between place and subjectivity, and the foundational role of place; the relation between place and conceptuality; and the relation between place and normativity.     

《易纬·乾凿度》的哲学思考

《易纬·乾凿度》是汉代一部非常重要的易学和哲学著作 ,其用象数方式编织的天道观 ,不仅包含了阴阳卦气思想 ,同时还继承了老子和《中庸》的本体论思想以及儒家的价值理想 ,是我们研究汉代哲学思想不可或缺的资料。《乾凿度》提出的“易者 ,易也 ,变易也 ,不易也”勾画出了一幅理想的宇宙社会图景 ,其中既有高妙的本体论思想 ,又有对社会秩序的思考。《乾凿度》还借助道家思想和孟京以来的卦气说 ,建构了一套完整的宇宙生成模式。尽管这种生成模式不甚深刻 ,也有一定缺陷 ,但却体现出很强的时代特色。同时 ,在这个宇宙生成模式背后包含着作者深切的人文精神和深沉的忧患意识 ,体现了汉代易学“天人之学”的精神实质     

Using Linguistic Corpora as a Philosophical Tool

The central aims of this paper are to show how linguistic corpora have been used and can be used in philosophy and to argue that linguistic corpora and corpus analysis should be added to the philosopher’s toolkit of ways to address philosophical questions. A linguistic corpus is a curated collection of texts representing language use that can be queried to answer research questions. Among many other uses, linguistic corpora can help answer questions about the meaning of words and the structure of discourse. Through a discussion of examples, the paper shows that there are many philosophical questions that can be addressed by using a linguistic corpus. However, linguistic corpora need not (and often cannot) replace traditional philosophical methods. Lastly, it argues that the special properties of linguistic corpora, including their independence and the current ease and cheapness of access, make them an indispensable resource for philosophers.     

On the relation between conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics

In recent years, there has been growing discussion amongst philosophers about “conceptual engineering”. Put roughly, conceptual engineering concerns the assessment and improvement of concepts, or of other devices we use in thought and talk (e.g., words). This often involves attempts to modify our existing concepts (or other representational devices), and/or our practices of using them. This paper explores the relation between conceptual engineering and conceptual ethics, where conceptual ethics is taken to encompass normative and evaluative questions about concepts, words, and other broadly “representational” and/or “inferential” devices we use in thought and talk. We take some of the central questions in conceptual ethics to concern which concepts we should use and what words should mean, and why. We put forward a view of conceptual engineering in terms of the following three activities: conceptual ethics, conceptual innovation, and conceptual implementation. On our view, conceptual engineering can be defined in terms of these three activities, but not in a straightforward, Boolean way. Conceptual engineering, we argue, is made up of mereologically complex activities whose parts fall into the categories associated with each of these three different activities.