"感"·"象"·"数"--《周易》经传象数观念的哲学人类学释读

象数观念是<周易>经传乃至易学中的基础和核心观念.历来对象数观念的理解和解释,往往局限于象数观念本身,而对<周易>经传的产生背景、以及其中的另一个重要观念--"感",则关注不够.本文从哲学人类学的视角,在考察<周易>经传的产生背景以及"感"、"象"、"数"三者之间关系的基础上,认为<周易>经传中的象数观念其实是原始时代的感性具体的思维方式及其宇宙观的积淀.具体说来,"数"也是"象",它们本来都是"互渗"或"交感"的中介;换句话说,<周易>经传象数观念的最终依据其实是感;象数因感而蕴涵着向天道观和伦理观发挥的可能性.     

THE CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHICAL EXPERIENCE

Abstract: We often speak about religious experience, and sometimes we speak about metaphysical experience. Yet we seldom hear about philosophical experience. Is philosophy purely a matter of theories and theses, or does it have an experiential aspect? In this article, I argue for the following three claims. First, there is something we might call philosophical experience, and there is nothing mystical about it. Second, philosophical experiences are expressed in something quite similar to what Kant called “aesthetic judgements.” Third, philosophical experiences are expressed by using words in what Wittgenstein called “secondary sense.” Finally, I try to show the educational significance of pursing philosophical experiences. Through articulating them one might find one's ground, and through articulating them in a less private and more universal form one might raise oneself to universality. Thus, in expressing philosophical experiences one aspires to speak in a universal voice.     

论先秦与古希腊神话的精神向度

神话是一种原始文化积淀,是各个民族在发轫时期的精神遗存,中国和希腊神话作为两个伟大民族文化的发源和民族意识的深沉积淀,表现出不同的神话精神特征。     

朱熹对宋代易学的发展——兼论朱熹、程颐易学思想之异同

朱熹提出《易》之本义为卜筮的见解,由此对程颐易学和义理学派提出批评。朱熹主张区分《周易》经传,提出易学发展阶段说。通过比较《周易本义》和《周易程氏传》,可见两者之异同。朱熹以象数、卜筮求易理,把义理学派与象数学派统一起来,从而发展了宋代易学。     

The Philosophical Use and Misuse of Science

Science is our best way of finding out about the natural world, and philosophers who write about that world ought to be sensitive to the claims of our best science. There are obstacles, however, to outsiders using science well. We think philosophers are prone to misuse science: to give undue weight to results that are untested; to highlight favorable and ignore unfavorable data; to give illegitimate weight to the authority of science; to leap from scientific premises to philosophical conclusions without spelling out their relevance; to treat mere resonance between a scientific theory and a philosophical view as empirical evidence for the philosophical view. This article identifies and illustrates some of the ways in which philosophers misuse science, explains why these pitfalls are easy to fall into, and concludes with suggestions for avoiding them.     

Soviet Philosophy Revisited – Why Joseph Bocheński Was Right While Being Wrong

Josef Bocheski, pioneer of the discipline ofphilosophical sovietology and one of the firstto criticize Eurocentric attitudes, emphasizedthe central role of logic and sound argument inacademic philosophy. This helped him todemonstrate both the general flaws of and thedifferences in quality within Sovietphilosophy. His endeavors and results areindispensable for the yet-to-be-written historyof Soviet philosophy. By the same token, itmade him less perceptive of the centralpolitical, not just philosophical, role of thepartijnost'-principle. More recent developmentshave shown both Soviet philosophy andBocheski's own, Neo-Thomist position to bepart of a fundamentally outdated idea ofscientific philosophy. However, the criteria oflogical scrutiny and sound argument have notlost their force within globalizingphilosophical culture.     

The skillful means and meanings of philosophy: Attention and immersion in the philosophical art of writing

This response to Richard Shusterman's Philosophy and the Art of Writing focuses on his concern that philosophy is, first and foremost, a way of life, illustrated in the West by the Socratic ideal of the philosopher and in the East by the example of the scholar-artist-gentleman. This paper examines the process of Buddhist meditation and the process of creating novels, supplementing the authors Shusterman carefully examines with examples from Black American literature, the author's own teacher John Gardner, and artistic colleagues the author has known. The basic thrust of the response is that the skillful means used in writing can indeed be a form of self-creation, but it can also be a means of liberation from the self.     

Can philosophy be an academic discipline?

Richard Rorty notoriously maintained that philosophy is not an academic discipline. He thought that the only viable candidate for philosophy to be an academic discipline—where philosophy consists in a collection of permanent, pure topics—depends on a Cartesian conceptual framework. Once we overcome this framework, he maintained, there will be nothing left to be the distinct subject matter of philosophy. This article argues that there is a conception of philosophy that can be an academic discipline, even if we take Rorty's challenge seriously. It remains even if we overcome the Cartesian conceptual framework. In the end the article goes beyond Rorty's challenge and considers two further criteria for philosophy to be an academic discipline: that it have a distinct method, and that it be able to be done for the public good. The article argues that philosophy can fulfill these two criteria, and therefore that it can be an academic discipline.     

Truth and consequences

In his 1987 paper “Truth or Consequences,” Dan Brock describes a deep conflict between the goals and virtues of philosophical scholarship and public policymaking: whereas the former is concerned with the search for truth, the latter must primarily be concerned with promoting good consequences. When philosophers are engaged in policymaking, he argues, they must shift their primary goal from truth to consequences—but this has both moral and methodological costs. Brock’s argument exemplifies a pessimistic, but not uncommon, view of the possible shape and nature of applied philosophy. The present paper paints a richer and more optimistic picture. It argues that the difference between theoretical philosophy and applied philosophy is not best understood as a choice between truth and consequences. On the contrary, applied philosophers engage in forms of truth-seeking that are properly concerned with consequences—including the consequences of philosophical practice itself.     

How Distinctive Is Philosophers’ Intuition Talk?

The word “intuition” is one frequently used in philosophy. It is often assumed that the way in which philosophers use the word, and others like it, is very distinctive. This claim has been subjected to little empirical scrutiny, however. This article presents the first steps in a qualitative analysis of the use of intuition talk in the academy. It presents the findings of two preliminary empirical studies. The first study examines the use of intuition talk in spoken academic English. The second examines the use of intuition talk in written academic English. It considers what these studies tell us about the distinctiveness of philosophical language and methods and considers some implications for evaluative and ameliorative methodology.